


E 449


.S638

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



00005706683







X 12

Marine District,

District Clerk's Office July 30. 1838

Received Att. J. Murphy Clerk

16

56
The first of the series
is the one which is
the most common
and the most
important.





AN
INQUIRY
INTO THE
NATURE AND CHARACTER
OF
ANCIENT AND MODERN SLAVERY.

TO WHICH IS ADDED A
BRIEF REVIEW
OF A BOOK ENTITLED, TESTIMONY OF GOD AGAINST
SLAVERY,

BY REV. LA ROY SUNDERLAND.

"For I am a man under authority, having soldiers under me : and I say to this man, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh; and (*to doulou mou*) to my servant, (slave) Do this, and he doeth it.

When Jesus heard it, he marvelled and said,—I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel."—Matt. viii : 9, 10.

BY J. SMALL, M. D.

1836.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1936;
By J. SMALL, M. D.
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Maine.

2957

W. S. 6/8/11

CONTENTS.

Introduction,	1
---------------	---

CHAPTER I.

Scripture evidence of ancient Slavery and of what Slavery is,	9
SECTION 1.—Preliminary remarks on the terms, stranger, servant, and bondman,	9
SEC. 2.—Farther remarks on strangers,	10
SEC. 3.—Did the favors conferred on the circumcised stranger elevate his social condition above the reach of perpetual slavery?	12
SEC. 4.—Did Slavery exist anciently among the children of Israel, or did it not?	14
SEC. 5.—From among what class of people were slaves taken?	29
SEC. 6.—Was there a difference between the slavery of the Hebrews, and that of strangers?	34
SEC. 7.—Did the Old Testament scriptures include under the term "Oppression" &c. Slavery, or the loss of liberty?	36
SEC. 8.—When were slaves said to be oppressed, or in what did their oppression consist?	40
SEC. 9.—Yet after all, was not ancient Slavery used merely as a punishment for crime; and ought to be viewed in this light, and in no other?	47
SEC. 10.—Is the possession of the liberties of one man by another, necessarily, sin?	51
SEC. 11.—Is Slavery consistent with the Gospel dispensation; i. e. can it exist without sin under it?	52

CHAPTER II.

Brief Review of Rev. L. R. Sunderland's Book, entitled, Testimony of God against Slavery,	68
SEC. 1.—Strictures on Mr. S's view of Slavery,	68
SEC. 2.—A few remarks on the <i>course</i> adopted by Mr. S. in the above work,	91
SEC. 3.—Review of his testimony from "Moses,"	93
SEC. 4.—Continued,	95
SEC. 5.—Review of his testimony from Joshua, Job, and Ezra,	97
SEC. 6.—Do. from David,	99
SEC. 7.—Do. from Solomon,	101
SEC. 8.—Do. from Isaiah,	102
SEC. 9.—Do. from Jeremiah,	103
SEC. 10.—Do. from Ezekiel, Daniel, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zechariah, and Malachi,	105
SEC. 11.—Do. from Jesus Christ,	106
SEC. 12.—Do. from St. Paul,	107
SEC. 13.—Do. from St. James, St. Peter, St. John,	110
SEC. 14.—Some farther remarks on various sentiments divulged by our Author, in his Notes,	113

P R E F A C E .

We are aware that some may think the present production uncalled for, inasmuch as enough has been written to satisfy the most incredulous. This position, however, is not always tenable. Many people are led more by feeling than by reason or argument. To have such act understandingly they must receive "line upon line, and precept upon precept." And when we view the measures and plans that are adopted by a certain class of men to bring about a certain professed benevolent object at the present day, we feel that every man ought to act understandingly and in the fear of God. The abolition of that growing evil,—domestic negro slavery,—is ardently desired by all true lovers of human kind. That it will be abolished, we have no doubt. But of the precise time, no man knoweth; yet we would hope, it may be near. But that we "remove every stumbling block," it is proper that we build upon the "right foundation." That our *premises* be *correct*; and that our *inferences* be *just*. In view of these principles, it is, that we have offered these pages to the public. We make no pretensions to perfection. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if many errors are detected by the scrutinizing and the critic. We offer it to the public as it is,—hoping that it may be a feeble means of helping such as enquiring concerning their duty on the momentous slave subject, to look well to the "foundation" before they "build thereon." Let them not be carried away with the idea, that a "system" is necessarily "answerable" for all "its abuses,"—"that *all* slavery is *sin*,"—"that its "relation" must be abolished, because it cannot be abused," and that "oppression," "scourging," "maiming," "murder," "theft," "separation of man and wife," "adultery," and the whole black catalogue of sins that were ever committed by any people however wicked are the real genuine characteristics "of the slave system!" We say, let them beware of such ideas as these, for they are *false*! Slavery never can be abolished by such a false representation of things. View things as they *are*, and then act accordingly. Let wisdom, prudence and the Word of God direct; and not the blind, headlong, rash precipitancy of squeamish feeling. And then will slavery speedily come to an end, which is the earnest and sincere desire and prayer of the

AUTHOR.

Lovell, Feb. 1836.

INTRODUCTION.

The *present* is a day of benevolence and philanthropy. *Never* was there a time when there prevailed so strong and so ardent desire to *better* the condition of man as the present. And yet equally true is it, that so ardent is the desire, that unless the means are well looked to, it is to be feared, that, in some instances, at least it may frustrate its own desires. For it is too much the case that the mind of man is *predisposed* to vibrate from the *one* extreme to the *other*; one point of which is as far from truth, *as* the other.

In all agitated questions therefore, these feelings and passions which help on these extreme vibrations, should have a steady helm,—judgement and wisdom,—to regulate them;—without which these feelings will uniformly lead us astray. The impropriety, consequently, of appealing to the passions for assistance, where judgement and wisdom ought to direct, is not, of itself, a principle of humanity. If we are to be directed by benevolent feelings and passions merely, to all such as are actually suffering; we might throw open our prison doors, and cease enacting laws. For all these laws and prisons are based on the ground that crime is *punishable*; which punishment is not a sensation of *pleasure* but of *pain*. Now if our philanthropic feelings *alone* are to be consulted, we should certainly say, it gives *us* grief to see our fellow-beings suffer. Yet *true* philanthropy which is composed of prudence, judgement and wisdom, as well as of benevolent feelings and passion, for any individual, *approves* of the condemnation. For a principle of that philanthropy is, “It is better that the *few* suffer than the *many*.”

Among the other objects of philanthropy, which are

engaging the attention of the humane, that of *Negro Slavery* is not the least. The slavery of *one* part of the human family by an *other* part, is a fact which calls loudly for the interposition of measures for its *utter* abolition. Yet as "the *love* of Money is the root of *all* evil," so is it necessary to be doubly watchful and circumspect that we do not "pull down" faster "than we build up." That we do not rivet the chains of bondage more strong than they were before. And as a director in assisting us in our *first* steps which must be made *so* cautiously, it is proper that we have a definite idea of what the evil *is, in, and of* itself; divested of all extraneous evils which may attend it as *circumstances* or *effects*. This definite idea then will be couched in a *definition*. This definition must be composed of a sufficient number of characteristics to distinguish it from *every* thing else. A characteristic is a property attached to any thing which is *inseparable* from it. Which is essential to the existence of that thing, or which cannot exist without it. Thus *sweetness* is a characteristic of sugar, and *heat* of fire; for neither of these substances can exist without these their respective characteristics. We shall define negro slavery, therefore, thus: *The possession or retention of one man's liberties by another, independently as a punishment for personal crime.*

This definition embraces the *bonds* of the slave to his Master. But the Master is under bonds also. Although his bonds are not in the hands of any human being, yet they are not the less binding. Should he break them, the awful consequences will fall on his own head, in just retribution for his own unrighteous conduct.—These bonds are embraced in the "Moral Law of God." "Love thy neighbor as thyself." That is do by him in his circumstances, as thou wouldst wish to be done by, were the same circumstances your own portion.—Not that he is to be *immediately* "set free,"—although if it could be *consistently* done, it would be a thing greatly to be desired;—because a poor man might on the same principle, wish his rich neighbor to divide his property with him;—or the rich man were he poor might

wish the same thing, yet does any one suppose that such rich neighbor breaks this moral precept, should he not thus distribute his property? Most certainly not. To the Master, therefore, *slavery is a political regulation which is to be controlled by moral obligation.*

Slavery, as a system, therefore consists of the reciprocal "bonds," both of the Master and Slave. Those of the slave are necessarily embraced in the consequence of the loss of his liberty; and those of the Master in his *accountability* to his God. We would therefore say, that to the master, slavery is a political regulation, controlled by moral obligation.

This, we suppose to present a fair view of the principles of the slavery system. The bonds of the slave, as well as those of the master, will require a few remarks.

Some may suppose that slavery must essentially consist in the "holding of human beings as property." But if *this* is slavery, then *every* individual, who from inability, old age, sickness or any other cause which renders him unsaleable, is *not* a "slave;" notwithstanding he may be compelled to labor *beyond* his strength,—go half starved,—naked,—and receive a flagellation *seven* times a week!—Neither is the simple "*right*" of holding "property" in men any more tenable. For if all the control a master has over his negro, is the simple "*right*" of selling him as property, the negro can retain every right of a free citizen. They cannot control his liberties in the least. He may be considered in the light, somewhat of the "*eastern timber lands*," as an article upon which to speculate, but not, in particular, to occupy. For the negro himself may be at his liberty to do as he pleases. But am I told he could not be sold, unless he could be *used*? That is none of our concern. If you have the "*right*," sell him *if* you can.

Others have supposed that it consists in the "*forcible detention*" of the slave's liberties. Consequently, if *force* has not been *used*, the individual so held is *not* a slave.

What is to be done, therefore, with the following case?—A negro, a slave, whom we shall call A. goes to

B. and agrees that, for a certain sum, he will serve him all the days of his life. B. pays over the sum,—not to the negro,—but to his former master ; and takes the negro to himself. This negro then, notwithstanding he was “bought,”—“property recognized in him,”—and whose liberties are entirely *out of his own hands* and always *will be* ; yet because he was “willing,”—was not *compelled*,—is *no slave !**

But again : every person who *is* forcibly detained, is a *slave*. Consequently all persons taken on legal process !

We have said “the master was under bonds to the slave.” This we shall now endeavor to explain. By the expression however, we do not wish to be understood as saying the master’s obligations to his slave are *particular* ones ; or that they were made with a particular reference to slaves ; but that they originate from general laws, which are binding on every individual on the globe. These obligations are embraced in the *moral law of God*, “love thy neighbor as thyself,”—live irreproachably,—and obey all his commands, “that thy soul may live.” Now we say, these injunctions are *binding* on all mankind,—on the men of the North, as well as on the men of the South. Neither are they of *partial* application, but are to govern man in all his acts, as well those of a social and of a religious nature, as those governing slaves. Notwithstanding the slave is completely in his hands to do with him as seemeth him good ; yet moral obligation to his God will restrain the master from abusing him. He will give him that which is “just and equal,” and will deal with him as with children.

These then are the bonds under which we believe every master is placed who has slaves. But does this destroy the *relation* which exists between master and slave ? Surely not. If the master have the *entire* lib-

* “The Editor of the Southern Baptist, the Rev. Mr. Brisbane,” says the Christian Watchman, “assures us that ‘he has more than once, offered his slaves their freedom, and yet they still remain in bondage, though they have full and free permission to go whenever they please to Liberia, or any other place where the laws of the land will allow them to enjoy their freedom.’”

erty of the slave, so that it is his, in every sense of the word; it is nothing more than what may be said of himself.

Every master is in his *own* possession, and has a right to do with himself as he chooses, in virtue of the relation which he stands in to himself. He has no liberties but what belong to himself. Is he, therefore, merely in virtue of that relation, a *right* to get drunk,—to lie,—to cheat,—to defraud,—or to murder? Or has the parent, in virtue of the relation which he holds to his child, a right to abuse him? We know it is objected that the *relation* between *parent and child* is different from that of master and slave.—But in what respects we could never divine. The child has no liberty of his own, and *never* had. He was born *subject* to his parent,—he receives no wages for his labor,—has no right to its fruits—i. e. as a reward,—he *may* be whipped,—scourged, maimed, &c.—may also be *let*,—sold for money, and disposed of as property! until he is 21 years of age! And what more can you do with a slave? Do we hear it said, the law interferes with this abuse of the child? That has nothing to do with the subject. We are now speaking of the “relation,” and of that alone. We ask, is there, by such treatment of the child, a violation of the relation there existing, any more than there is in the treatment of the master to his slave?—By what natural, inherent right, aside from the obligations of the moral law of God, on the parent, has the child a right to interfere with such parental treatment? Has he, or can he have, any more than the slave? The parent therefore abuses no relation, for the child is his own. He can dispose of him without his consent,—“*bind him out*” to whomsoever he chooses by a trade for a stipulated sum!—Apply the money to his own use in the same way that he would if he had sold any piece of property whatever!—while the child must work for nought!

So it is with any property that a man has the entire possession of. He may put it to any use he pleases and not abuse his “right” so to do in consequence of

the relation he holds to it. He may gamble it away,—spend it in a brothel,—at a grog-shop—in carousing,—and in dissipation. But does he do right? Does the moral law of God uphold all these courses merely because there is no relation abused? If, therefore, every relation is to be abolished which may be made a sinful use of, what, kind reader, shall we have left? Even man himself, must submit to the separation of his body and soul,—never more to have a relation of any kind, which it is possible to have eventuate in sin, established between them! Consequently, should they come together again, they will be mere machines,—incapable of either a good or a bad act!

It is presumed that by this time the reader sees the impropriety of the abolitionist principle which they apply to slavery,—*that it ought to be abolished, because the master CAN commit SIN with his slaves without an abuse of the slave relation!*

But though man may not abuse his relation to his slave, in any abuse which he may offer such an one in itself considered; yet he may break the moral laws of God by making such a use of this relation. For since man's relation with surrounding things, whether visible or invisible, is as extensive as his acts; it follows, that, were his relations to be his criterion for good or bad actions, there would have been *no need of a moral Law*. But inasmuch as the former is different in this respect, we have been furnished with the latter, to which we are accountable, and to which the acts arising from our relation to all other things, must yield. So far as the master is concerned, therefore, the slave system, is, strictly speaking, *the doing unto slaves IN THEIR SITUATION, as the master would wish to be dealt by, were the same circumstances his own*. This is what we mean by the slave system, wherever that term is used, as it respects the master.

Before any individual is justified in saying that “slavery is sin,” he must have *indubitable* evidence that *every* instance of it is sin, in *any* and *every* form. For if a person can *imagine* a case of slavery where no sin

can properly and rationally be supposed to be connected with that slavery, then it follows that slavery *can* exist *without* sin; consequently sin and slavery are *two* things.

That slavery is *not* sin, in and of itself, it seems to us must appear evident to every one who looks candidly, with a sincere desire to arrive at the truth; and, as it is hoped, the following pages will make obvious to him. Yet no less true is it, that it is an "*evil*," not only by its being associated intimately with traits which must be considered as such, and as nothing else; but as being an evil of *itself*. These evils call loudly for redress, but which cannot be redressed but by the abolition of the system itself. But the system can never be thus abolished so long as we do not have *just* views of it. By some we would fain be made to believe that *extreme* oppression—*hard* and *vigorous* service,—*cruel* bondage,—*severe* flagellations,—*broken down* mental intellects,—*brutal* punishments,—*adultery*, *theft*, and *murder* are the "*essentials*" of slavery!—That they are *characteristics* of the system. But by holding up *these* as characteristics rather than as circumstances, or evils, attending it; they overthrow their own intentions. For if they are characteristics, then they must all be present in *every* case of slavery. Consequently wherever they are absent there is *no* slavery. But, let me ask, where is there a case where *all* these are present, or even *one half* of them? Indeed, how many cases are there of acknowledged slavery, where *not one* of them is present. The remarks made above, therefore, includes all the principles of slavery. We have been the more particular in these remarks, because some, we apprehend, have received an erroneous idea in relation to that system. Supposing that a system is answerable for all the bad uses which may be made of it. This, it will be seen, is a fallacious method of reasoning. The very principles which are assumed here, would, if carried out, destroy every system in the world, whether good or bad. Religion would be considered as false, and "Christianity, a fable!"

The object of the following pages may be presented thus :

1st. To give what we consider a fair view of the slavery "system."

2d. To show in some measure, incidentally, the *difference* between the "characteristics" and attendant "evils" of this system.

3d. An inquiry into the *nature* of slavery among the ancients.

4th. Whether such slavery is *sin*.

5th. Whether slavery is compatible as existing without sin under the Gospel Dispensation, &c. These items are not taken up in the order in which they are here enumerated ; but the principles they involve are essentially included in the remarks which are subjoined in the following pages.

No remarks therefore which follow are to be construed so as to have them *support* the idea of slavery ! Nothing can be farther from the intention of the author. For, while he contends that slavery *did* anciently exist, and that slavery recognized the same rights or characteristics as slavery now,—that the *abuse* of that system was, or might be, attended with the *same sinful* effects,—that the essential principles of it were they the *same* as the principles of it now,—that the principles were *then*, and *must* be, so long as it exists, the same,—that slavery, in itself, is *not* sin, &c. Yet all this is merely in attestation that slavery is not what some endeavor to make it, so exceeding sinful that no slaveholder can be saved who continues the practice ; but that while it is an evil greatly to be deplored, and which calls for efficient means for its abolition with a voice not to be misunderstood, it requires deep thought and a close examination for its consistent extermination. And that while it thus rests, during this time of consideration and reflection, those who hold slaves are not committing that sin which must exclude them from the special blessing of Heaven.

CHAPTER I.

SCRIPTURE EVIDENCE OF ANCIENT SLAVERY, AND OF WHAT SLAVERY IS.

SECTION 1.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE TERMS STRANGER, SERVANT AND BONDMEN.

We frequently meet with the terms “stranger,” “servant,” and “bondmen” in reading the Pentateuch. Consequently the following remarks have been elicited.

Strangers.

These were all such as did not belong to the genuine stock of Israel,—*foreigners*.—Having renounced idolatry, they lived and sojourned with the Israelites and became partially incorporated with them. Of these strangers there were *two* classes. And distinguished by the epithet “*dwellers*” and “*sojourners*.” See Lev. 19 : 33, 34. The first of these are sometimes called “proselytes of the Covenant,” while the latter “proselytes of the gate.” Proselytes of the Covenant were *circumcised* and enjoyed all the religious privileges, and subjected to all the penalties of the Israelites. “When a *stranger* shall *sojourn* with thee, and will keep the *passover* to the Lord ; let all his males be circumcised,” and in doing this the stranger becomes “*as one that is born in the land*.” Ex. 12 : 48. Numb. 9 : 14.

The other class were those who “renounced idolatry—acknowledged the true God—observed the seven precepts of Noah ; but were *not circumcised*, nor were they obliged to observe any of the Mosaic Institutions.”—*Clarke*.—They were therefore debarred by Moses from

eating the passover. For the law is, "no uncircumcised person shall eat thereof." Ex. 12: 48.

This distinction it is of consequence to keep in mind ; otherwise we may find some difficulty in reconciling certain texts. Lev. 25 : 35—37 and Deut. 23 : 26 is an example.

Servants.

These were mostly *slaves*. Hagar is called a "*maid*." Gen. 16 : 1, 2 ; but in the 21st chap. she is called a "*bond-woman*."—"But every man's *servant* that is *bought* for money, when thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof." Ex. 12: 44. Mr. Watson says, "formerly among the Hebrews and the neighboring nations, the *greater part* of *servants* were *slaves* ; that is to say, they belonged absolutely to their masters, who had a right to *dispose of their persons—their bodies—goods—and even of their lives* in some cases." Bib. and Theo. Dict. Art. Servant.

Hired Servants.

These were probably taken from among the "sojourners" or "proselytes of the gate." From among whom the Israelites could "*buy slaves*" or "*hire servants*."—See Lev. 25 : 45, and Ex. 12 : 45.

Bondmen.

From the very epithet by which these individuals were distinguished, we cannot suppose them to be either *kings, priests, or law givers*. More consistent is it to suppose that they were of the same class, as to condition, with the "Gibeonites" who were made "bondmen" and "hewers of wood and drawers of water" forever. See Josh 9 : 23 and 27.—This term was applied to such only as were slaves, or liable to be, for an indefinite period of time, or for life :—generally over six years.

SECTION 2.

FARTHER REMARKS ON STRANGERS.

We wish to have the reader obtain a clear idea in relation to this class of people. For in these *modern days*

we would fain be made to believe that all strangers were *alike*—that the same law governed them, as governed the Israelites themselves,—and if one class was exempt from slavery, all were,—pagan,—heathen,—Canaanites and all. We wish therefore just to make a few additional remarks before we quit the subject of strangers.

And we would observe, that the scripture is very particular in the application of certain epithets to each of the particular classes of strangers which we have noticed. While the one class is not to be "*vexed*," the other is to be "*loved* as thyself." Lev. 19 : 33, 34,—the one can eat of the passover, the other can not—the one when in want or distress can be assisted with money or food *without* usury,—the other must *beg* usury.—Lev. 25 : 35, 6 and Deut. 23 : 2,—the one is acknowledged as brethren ; the other not known by any such appellation.—ib.

By keeping up this distinction between strangers, it is very easy to see the appropriate application of various laws and usages among the Israelites. For no one would suppose that a law which was made for a circumcised person, could be consistently applied to an uncircumcised one. And as the Israelites were all under this rite, all the laws they made, by which to regulate themselves and others who dwelt with them, were evidently founded in relation to this. They recognized circumcision as the door through which every one must enter, in order to obtain the protection of their law, or their religious privileges. How, then, could an uncircumcised stranger expect to receive the benefits of the Hebrew's law ? What right had he to expect it ?—Surely none. Hence, all those passages which speak of strangers, as being on a level with the Israelites, must be understood as referring to the "proselytes of the Covenant,"—or strangers of the first class—those who had been *circumcised*.

If we look at the *privileges* which these circumcised strangers enjoyed, no one, who is at all conversant with the usages of the Israelites, will suppose for a moment, that the *uncircumcised* are in-

tended,—or even *could* be. It will be perceived that these privileges were equal to those of the genuine stock of Jacob.—They had the law read to them the same as the Israelites. “There was not a word of all that Moses commanded, which Joshua read not before all the congregation of Israel, with the women and little ones, and the *strangers that were conversant* among them.” Josh. 8 : 35.—He could *eat* the passover—Ex. 12 : 48,—could *offer up* sacrifices—Numb. 15 : 14, 15—subject in this respect, to the same law as the Hebrew, see v. 16—same *immunity* from crimes through ignorance—v. 26,—in this, governed by the same law as was the Hebrews—v. 29,—if *unclean* was *purified* in the same way—Numb. 19 : 9, 10—same *provision* for his *escape* from the slayer, or avenger of blood—Numb. 35 : 15—was to receive the *same righteous judgment* with the Israelite—Deut. 1 : 16—was to *rejoice* in all the good things which the Lord gave him and the Israelites—Deut. 26 : 11,—was commanded to *observe* and do all the words of the law,—Deut. 31 : 12—It is almost needless to observe here, that the uncircumcised could *not do* this.—Is (to be) to the Jews *as* one born among them, and to be *loved* as they *love themselves*.—Lev. 19 : 34.—Deut. 10 : 19.

SECTION 3.

DOES THE FAVORS CONFERRED ON THE CIRCUMCISED STRANGER, ELEVATE HIS SOCIAL CONDITION ABOVE THE REACH OF “PERPETUAL SLAVERY?”

Many people of sanguine feelings are ready to decide almost any question, however important, from its first obvious presentation, without taking the pains or the trouble to look into collateral circumstances, or its real nature. Hence because it is said, “the stranger shall be as one born among you,” and because “thou shalt love him as thyself,” some seem to take it for granted that all strangers,—and apparently without any regard to their condition, whether they be idolaters or not,—have turned Israelites in good earnest ! It becomes, therefore, important that we decide after mature reflection.

No law or *præcept* at present occurs to me, by which my mind would be influenced to believe, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the social condition of even circumcised strangers was equal to that of the Israelites. Nor is there any *rite* which could produce this effect. Circumcision which was the door to their religious privileges was no "stepping stone," by which to elevate their social state, in, and of itself. For slaves—or those who "*were bought with thy money must needs be circumcised.*" Gen. 17: 13.

Neither those passages which say there shall be "*one law*" for the "stranger" and "him that is home born" help us here, as these evidently refer to sacrifices, ordinances, &c. In Lev. 24: 22, where this law occurs, it evidently has reference to the punishments which should be inflicted on the "stranger" and on him which is "born in the land" for breaking any of the laws previously laid down between the 14th and 21st verses. That also in Ex. 12: 49, has equal reference to the passover, 43—49 v. The same remark applies to Numbers 9: 14. see the context 9 to 14, Num. 15: 14 to 16, 22 to 30. 19: 10. 35: 15.

None of these passages then refer to his *social*, but to his religious or moral condition. And if the stranger is affected by no other laws than these, he may be *born, live and die* a slave! And never know the sweets of liberty at all!!

Neither can the passage, Lev. 19: 34, be construed any more favorably, "Shall be unto you as one born among you—thou shalt love him as thyself." These are expressions which must be applied to the circumcised stranger, having reference to his adopted state;—or that state in which he realized all the religious privileges of Israelites, by conforming to their rites and receiving circumcision.

Even if it be taken in its most extensive sense, this law cannot elevate his social condition any *above* that of the Hebrews;—consequently, he could be a slave six years, for this they themselves were liable to. It is true, this passage and also Deut. 10: 19, may be ta-

ken in this extended sense, yet when all things are considered, it is fully as probable, that they refer to their religious privileges exclusively, as to any other. For it must be remembered, that parents and their children, all went under the general appellation of "strangers."—And these children, as well as their parents were bought for *bond-men* by the Israelites—Lev. 25 : 44—46. And when in *their* possession, they were circumcised. Gen. 17 : 12. Of course, they had a right to *all* the Mosaic Ordinances ;—but were *bond-men* notwithstanding. And these were to be unto them "*as those born among them,*" and to *be loved as they love themselves*. Just so now. The poor slave who has the love of God shed abroad in his heart, is loved by his Christian master as he loves himself, and is to him as one of his own children. He fellowships with him—partakes of the eucharistic symbols of our Lord's death and sufferings with him, and treats him, in every respect, as a brother in Christ.

SECTION 4.

DID SLAVERY EXIST ANCIENTLY AMONG THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL, OR DID IT NOT ?

If the existence of slavery must be proved from the occurrence of that term in the Bible, we must undoubtedly say, that evil never existed in Old Testament times. Yet, if there were not slaves in this period of the world, there certainly existed an anomalous set of beings for whom it is very difficult to find a classification. As an instance we may mention the Gibeonites Josh. 9 : 23, 27.—In Lev. 25 : 6 we have *four* different grades of individuals enumerated—1st the Israelite—2d his *servant* and *maid*—3d his hired servant—and 4th the stranger that sojourned with him. What all this assemblage of human kind could be, unless some of them were slaves, it is hard to divine. In other places they tell us about "*buying* servants," and of "*redeeming* servants" &c. all of which expressions seem hard to be understood unless slaves are meant.

That the answer of the question proposed may appear

as satisfactory as possible, we shall prove it 1st. by Scripture texts ; and 2d. by establishing, as far as possible, from the same authority, the various *characteristics* by which slavery, even in our day, is known.

1st. Scripture proof, by texts. Numerous are the passages which make it appear extremely probable, if they do not place it beyond a doubt, that slavery did exist among the ancients. We will now mention a few in which we suppose slavery is recognized.

“He that is born in thy house, and he that is *bought with thy money*, must needs be circumcised.” Gen. 17: 13. The individual that is bought in this case, Dr. Clarke calls a “*slave*.” See also the 27th verse. For he (Isaac) had possessions of herds and great store of servants. Gen. 26: 14. Here is more than an intimation that these “servants” were Isaac’s “*possession*.” Property in man !—Gen. 29: 24, 29, where the maids Zilpah and Bilhah are *given* to Rachael and Leah, see also Gen. 16: 2. “And whosoever lieth with a woman that is a bond-maid, she shall be *scourged*; they shall not be put to death because she was *not* free.”—Lev. 19: 20. The woman in this case must have been a slave. Had she been free, the law would have required her life. See Deut. 22: 23, 24. “If his master *have given* him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, then the wife and her children shall be her masters, (i. e. slaves,) but he shall go out by himself,” (i. e. from slavery) Ex. 21: 4. Who but the master of a slave, has the right to *give* a servant his wife? And then to claim her afterwards, together with her children? In Ex. 22: 3, we have a law by which, in certain cases, a *human* being may be *sold*! And that too to pay a demand out against him!! “Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee.” Deut. 23: 15. If this servant is not a slave, we cannot comprehend the propriety of the precept.—“Notwithstanding if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished: for *he is his money*.” Ex. 21: 21.—Here a servant is acknowledged to be his master’s property !—of course his slave. “If the priest *buy*

any soul with his money—he shall not eat of it.” Lev. 22: 11. Both thy bond-men and thy bond-maids which thou shalt have shall be of the heathen that are round about you ; of them shall ye *buy bond-men and bond-maids*. Moreover, of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land ; and they shall be your possession. And ye shall take them as an *inheritance* for your children *after* you, to inherit them for a *possession* ; they shall be your bond-men *forever*. Lev. 25 : 44—46 ; see also verse 6. If these passages do not inculcate the idea of slavery—of property in man—an inheritance to be entailed upon children—we cannot comprehend words.

Can rationality doubt, in the face of all the foregoing texts, the existence of ancient slavery ? If those individuals of whom they speak were *not* slaves, we confess we are at a loss for a classification for them. It will indeed require argument to prove that there are any *now* in existence, or *ever was* ! Of course, all the “hue and cry” that is now raised against slavery is a vain beating the air,—the confused ebullitions of a disordered brain !

2d. Proved by its characters. Characters by which it is known that certain individuals anciently were slaves

A certain author* tells us, “It is true that a *certain* kind of slavery was tolerated by some of the Old Testament writers ; but then it differed radically from the system of slave-holding, which prevails now in these United States.” This statement is in perfect keeping with many others with which he abounds. An individual who has eye-sight keen enough to see “nearly three millions of American citizens—doomed to suffer a worse bondage” or oppression than even the “children of Israel” suffered in Egypt, must have a state of that “seeing organ” strongly verging to *morbific*.

It is somewhat unfortunate that he did not tell us what this “certain kind of slavery” was ; whether it was “slavery to sin, to the devil,” or “to one another.” Yet notwithstanding the door to this latitude is thus left wide

*Testimony of God against slavery.

open ; we do suppose the slavery of one individual to another is intended. If slavery existed anciently, it seems difficult to understand how it could be different from that of more modern days.

For slavery now is nothing more than the *possession of the LIBERTIES of one man by another*. And if ancient slavery was *radically* different—different from the bottom,—the *very root* different ;—it is extremely hard for a person of ordinary understanding to have a definite idea of it.

As there has been, of late, a good deal said about the slavery in the Southern States of the Union ; we shall avail ourselves of the definition given to slavery in one or two of those slaveholding States ; and then see whether any or all of these features existed in that of the ancients.

“A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, his labor ; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire any thing but which must belong to his master.” Louisiana Code Art. 3.

“Slaves shall be deemed, taken, reputed, and adjudged to be chattels personal in the hands of their masters and possessors to all intents and purposes whatsoever.” Laws of S. Carolina.

In these definitions the following particulars seem to be noticed :

1st. The *liberty* of the slave is in the *hands* of his *master*.—Consequently,

2d. The slave may be *bought* or *sold* ;—

3d. The product of his labor belongs not to himself, but to his master.

4th. The master possessing the slave’s liberties he can possess nothing of his own without the consent of his master.

5th. Slaves are considered by S. Carolina, as “Chattels personal”—that is, liable to be taken as property for the payment of debts, or the satisfaction of demands.

In viewing these several items, it will be seen that the *four last* grow out of the *first*. For if the liberty of

the slave is *out of* his own hands, it is evident that that person into whose hands that liberty is lodged, has all power over that slave, which that liberty would have conferred upon himself, were it in his own possession.—Hence, if the slave who *has* his “liberty,” has a *right* to labor for himself—to accumulate property—and to “sue and be sued,”—possessing all the rights of free citizens ;—then it follows, if this liberty is taken from him, none of these rights accrue to him. For if all his liberties are gone ; all his rights are gone. And his rights will *disappear* just in proportion to the diminution of his liberty. Therefore that individual who cannot “sue,” cannot be “sued.” If a slave receive any corporeal injury, therefore from any individual—aside from his master—for which he would be entitled to compensation if *free*, or possessed his liberty ; that compensation necessarily accrues to the master who possesses his liberty. And this was a custom among the Hebrews as well as now among the Moderns. Ex. 21 : 32. On the same principle too is it, that a servant who hires himself to another to labor for a certain time, relinquishes his liberty to work for himself, or his right to claim the product of his labor during that time, for a certain sum—no matter whether it be for a dollar a year or a thousand dollars. The employer possesses the liberties of that servant for that stipulated time, and can demand, and obtain restitution by law, if that servant either labors for himself, or claims the product of his labor during this time without his master’s consent. And this restitution may be obtained of the servant, if otherwise *free* ; if not, of his father, master, or guardian. And why ? Because the master is supposed to have given the servant the just value of all the product of his labor during this time. Would the master’s claim be any *less strong* for a restitution if he had given him but one dollar for the whole time ? And would it be any more *strong* if the compensation had been a thousand dollars ? It certainly would not. The claim would have been equally strong in either case. The amount of compensation then has nothing to do with the claim. But the *amount* of resti-

tution will depend on the value of the servant's services. The question whether the servant let *himself*,—or whether he was let by his father,—his master,—or his guardian, we have nothing to do with here. The simple loss of the servant's liberty for the time specified, so far as the contract extended, is all we have been contending for,—and that only so far as to deprive *himself* of all "*right*" to his time and labor,—which we contend are his master's.

All that will be absolutely necessary to prove then in relation to ancient slavery is, the simple particular—*the loss of their liberty*. Yet we shall adduce some facts and inferences which go to establish *other* particulars. These we shall now attend to. But in attending to this, we do not propose, neither indeed is it necessary, to produce a "Thus saith the Lord" in order to confirm any one particular. If we should produce facts and inferences sufficient to carry conviction to any unprejudiced mind, it is all we wish.

1. It will appear therefore in the *first* place, that the individuals whom we call slaves, did *not possess their own* liberty, from the simple fact of their designation—"servants." And this simple term is sufficient of itself, without any other fact, to prove the point under consideration satisfactorily; *until* it is *proved* that these servants labored a definite period of time for a stipulated price. For the term "servant," without any restrictive term, is taken in a similar sense with the term "*man*," without an article. Therefore if it is just to consider the phrase, "A candid temper is proper for *man*," to mean that this temper is proper for *all mankind*; it is equally just to consider the phrase; "And had maid-servants and men-servants,"* as implying that all these servants were slaves. For since there is no words to modify the meaning of the term, "servants," we are constrained to believe them as serving, in this case, their master Jacob in every possible way that was desired,—and that too as long as they lived. It matters not how Jacob came by them. If he bought them

* Gen. 30: 43.

he had a right so to do ;—if he “stole” them, the worse it would be for him. But either of these ways, or any other, touching his possession of their liberties, we have nothing to do with in relation to the *term*. We must consider them slaves in every place where the term occurs, unless that signification is modified by some collateral circumstance or expression to which the term is attached, until it is satisfactorily proved to the contrary.

2. In the twenty-fifth chapter of Leviticus there is a law providing, that if a Hebrew “wax poor and *sell* himself to a stranger,” he may “*be redeemed* by one of his brethren.” Redeemed *from what*? Does a man who *lets* himself simply to another, require to be *redeemed*? Is it rational to suppose, that a man in the possession of all the proper *liberties* with which nature ever endowed him, *can be redeemed*? If so, please to tell us *from what*? His *liberties are the only objects of the redemption*. There is nothing else—there *can be* nothing.

3. We have another law in the commencement of the twenty-second chapter of Exodus, in which it is provided that “if a man steals” and be found out; and farther, should he have nothing to pay;” he may be “*sold for the theft*”—*sold for the theft*! *Who* sells this individual?—*himself*?—his *neighbors*?—or the *auctioneer*? And *what* do they sell?—his *body*, independently of the liberty he has of exercising that body? Or his liberty of using his body? Evidently the latter. For what benefit would the thief’s body be to the buyer unless he could control that body; and how could he do that unless he had the control of the liberties which regulated it? It therefore follows the thief’s liberties *alone* was to be *sold*. And if *sold*, then *out of* his own control.—Consequently, he was “*in the power of [the] master to whom he belonged*.”

4. In the thirtieth chapter of Genesis we have some account of the relation which the maids Bilhah and Zilpah bore to their mistresses Rachael and Leah, to whom they were *given* by Laban.

By looking over their history as it is recorded in Gen-

esis, the following points appear evident, viz : 1. These maids were in the *gift* of Laban. 2. Consequently, in virtue of that gift, Rachael and Leah possessed all the power over the bodies of their respective maids which this gift could bestow.

These maids could not have been in the gift of Laban had they been simply *hired*. For in that case Laban could have done with them nothing different from the contract by which their services were engaged to him. And probability is entirely against the idea that a contract could have been made between them granting Laban that control over them which he undoubtedly held ; *the power of giving them to whomsoever he would*. It is sufficiently evident then, that just in proportion as they were controlled by Laban, they could *not* control themselves. And if Laban *could give* them away whenever it pleased him, the servants themselves could not have that power—of course, the control of their own liberties was *out of THEIR* hands. For *what control of liberty* does that individual have, who *can be given away* by his master ? Farther,

Laban being a rightful owner of the liberties of these servants, he could, by gift or otherwise, confer the *same* power of possession to another. Therefore, when his daughters Rachael and Leah were married to the patriarch Jacob, Laban gave them each a servant—to Rachael he gave Bilhah, to Leah, Zilpah. The liberties of these two maids were in the possession of their respective mistresses. The proof of this position is sufficiently evident from the manner in which Rachael and Leah dealt with them. For without even asking Bilhah's consent, or consulting her mind, Rachael gave Jacob this, her handmaid, saying, at the same time, "she shall *bear upon my knees*," and therefore "*I may also have children by her*." Gen. 30 : 3. And when Bilhah had borne Jacob a son, Rachael said, v. 6, "God hath judged me and hath also heard my voice and hath given *me* a son." The same remarks apply to the case of Zilpah, Leah's maid—see 9 to 13 vs. of the same chap.

The history of these two maids then furnishes us with

one, at least, of the distinctive characters of slavery—the *loss of liberty*. For if Rachael and Leah did not hold the liberties of their respective servants in their own hands, it is very difficult to produce a clear solution of their conduct toward them.

We might also mention the case of Hagar. For by reading some account of her history in the 16th and 21st chapters of Genesis, we find that the same relation existed between her and Sarai, as between Bilhah and Rachael. But the evidence of that relation—the possession of Hagar's liberty by Sarai—is expressed in stronger terms. For when Hagar "had conceived," "her mistress was despised in her eyes." "But Abram said unto Sarai, Behold *thy* maid is in *thy* hand; *do to her as it pleaseth thee*." Here, then, is a recognition by Abram of the *right* that his wife had "to do to [Hagar] as it might *please*" her. A question then occurs, could she have had this right if all her maid's liberties were not in her own hands? For the phrase, "as it pleaseth thee," is an expression of great latitude, and implies that *all her pleasure might be done*. Accordingly, we find that "Sarai dealt *hardly* with her," so that Hagar "fled from her face." And, according to Dr. Clarke, the phrase "dealt hardly," means, she "*afflicted her—the term implying stripes and hard usage, to bring down the body and humble the mind*." No wonder then that the poor slave *fled*! But where did she flee? To her house, among her friends—her brothers and sisters and brothers' relatives? Did she commence in her old business, or in the concerns of her old household affairs in which she was engaged previously to her *engaging*, or "hiring out" with Sarai, Abram's wife? O no! She fled to the "wilderness," "and the angel of the Lord found her by the fountain in the way to Shur." And what did he say to her. Did he tell her not to submit to oppression? That her rights were as good as Sarai's?—that they were *equal* to hers? And that it is "*piracy*" to "return a slave escaped" from her mistress?—that it is sin to hold property in human flesh? Nothing like it. He says, "*return to thy mistress and submit thyself un-*

der her hands." What a comment this on the the text of modern anti-slavery theologians.

But what does this remark of the angel to Hagar imply? Does it contradict the principle involved in the remark of Abram to Sarai?—that she *possessed the liberties* of her *maid*? "Return to THY mistress." In this simple expression is contained all that is necessary to prove the point: For Sarai is acknowledged the "mistress" and Hagar the "servant" and that too by the "angel of the Lord," which relation cannot exist where both parties have the right to do just as they please; or where one does not possess the liberties of the other.

That Sarai *possessed* her maid's liberties is not only evident; but that she *exercised* the authority this possession gave her, is equally evident: as we have already seen in the circumstance of Sarai's afflicting her. Gen. 16: 6. But we have another instance in the 21st chap. where Sarah commandeth Abraham to "cast her out" together with her "child." And this Abraham did although with a sorrowful heart at first till comforted by "God."

If the "liberties" of Hagar were not "in the hands" of Sarah, we cannot see by what right she conducted herself toward Hagar in the manner she did. How she could sacrifice her chastity! and assume her servant's offspring as her own; could deal with her so roughly as she did for a crime which she herself had been the means of bringing about: and then send her out of her house with nothing but a little "bread and a bottle of water into a wide world of misery and want, to provide, without means, for herself and child, is an enigma of difficult solution on any other principle. And, if these facts do not prove most forcibly that Hagar had no liberties of her own aside from those of her mistress—and that she "was in the hands of [a mistress] to whom she belonged,"—"that the [mistress] could dispose of her"—"that she acquired nothing but what belonged to the mistress," even her own child—see verse 2 chap. 16.—they prove nothing!

11. The *buying and selling* of "*human flesh*!" a-

mong the ancients as a characteristics of slavery.—From the scripture it appears, that the genuine children of the stock of Israel could be made merchandize of—i. e. bought and sold,—as well as others. This will appear in the sequel. We will now mention a few places where “buying and selling” is recognized.

And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you, every man child in your generations, he that is born in thy house, or *bought with money* of any stranger which is *not* of thy seed.—Gen. 17 : 12.

He that is born in thy house, and he that *is bought with THY money*, shall be circumcised. Gen. 17 : 13.

And Abraham took all that were born in his house, and *all that were BOUGHT with his money*, &c. Gen. 17 : 23.

And all the men of his house, born in his house, and *bought with money* of the stranger were circumcised with him. Gen. 17 : 21.

But every man’s servant that *is bought for money*, when thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof. Ex. 12 : 44.

If the sun be risen upon him, there shall be blood shed for him ; (the thief) for he should make full restitution ; if he have nothing, then *he shall be sold* for his theft.—Ex. 22 : 3.

Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you ; of them shall ye *buy bondmen and bondmaids*. Lev. 25 : 44.

Moreover of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye *buy*, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land : and they shall be your possession. Lev. 25 : 45.

And if a sojourner or a stranger wax rich by thee, and thy brother that dwelleth by him wax poor, and sell himself unto the stranger or sojourner by thee—after that he is *sold* he may be redeemed again. Lev. 25 : 47, 48. This is a case where a Hebrew could sell himself into slavery—i. e. sell all his liberties to the stranger—else, why *redeem* him ? Why make the law to grant him

freedom at the end of six years? *Free* from what? If thou **BUY** an Hebrew, six years he shall serve: and in the seventh he shall go *out free* for nothing. Ex. 21 : 2.

And if a man **SELL** his daughter to be a maid-servant, she shall not go out as the men-servants do. Ex. 21 : 7.

And if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be **SOLD** unto thee, thou shalt not *compel* him to serve *as a bond-servant*: but as an hired servant, &c. Lev. 25 : 39.

Here is recognized *the right* in the master to deal with a Hebrew thus sold to him after the manner he would to any slave; therefore he is *cautioned* against exercising that authority "with rigor," v. 43. Otherwise, *why* the caution? What its need?

And if thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, *be sold* unto thee, and serve thee six years; then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee. And when thou sendest him out free from thee, thou shalt not let him go away empty. Thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy flock, and out of thy floor, and out of thy wine-press. Deut. 15 : 12—14.

Was not this Hebrew in the "power of the master to whom he belonged?" Did he acquire any thing of his own? Was not his labor his master's? Could not that master sell it?—and dispose of it in any manner he saw fit? Else why command the *master* to let him go free after six years? Why command *him* to "furnish him liberally" at the time of his departure, if the servant had been laboring for wages? Why say, "thou shalt not let him go away *empty*?" Where is the *consistency* of this law and its provisions, if the Hebrew was merely hired? working for wages? See also Lev. 22 : 11.

III. *The product of their labor belonged not to themselves, but to the master.*—This must be the case in the very nature of things. For if a man has either hired servants or slaves, it is because he needs their labor. It would be a palpable inconsistency for a man to hire a servant and let him work for himself, while he himself received none of its benefits. Or even to feed, clothe

and protect a slave, and not have that slave's labor promote his own interest. But farther,

Is it presumed that the ancients would *buy* men and women, while they thereby get the control of them, and not receive the product of their labors? Did they not claim it as *their* right? And are there any among us possessing hardihood enough to *deny* this? If there are, we would ask them, reasonably to establish the fact that Abram's servants did *not* work for him?—or, in other words, that he did not receive *all* their labor without any other compensation than food and raiment? Did not the servants of Isaac and Jacob keep their master's flocks? and have we any evidence that they claimed any part of their labor, or received any compensation different from that of the servants of Abram? And again; did not Sarai, Rachael and Leah act in perfect consonance with the idea that all their respective maids *were, could be, or could have* was lawfully their own? And was it not on this principle that these women gave their respective maids when barren themselves, to their husbands, that they might claim the *offspring* of these maids as *their own*?

But we have more evidence to the point. So far was a servant from possessing *any thing* of his own,—even the reward for *personal injury* from a source *different* from his master,—that he could not, by the law of Moses, claim the compensation for his own sufferings. “If the ox shall push a man-servant, or maid-servant; he, (the owner of the ox) shall give unto their (the slave's) MASTER, *thirty shekels* of silver, and the ox shall be stoned.” Ex. 21: 32. Hence, says Dr. Clarke, “a slave was valued at *four pounds ten shillings*!” If the principle of *holding property in man is not recognized here*,—AND THAT THE SLAVE COULD POSSESS NOTHING OF HIS OWN—that *all he was, could be, or have*, was absolutely *his master's*; we do not know what language or what sentiments it inculcates.—Again,

“When thou sendest him out free from thee, thou shalt not let him go away **EMPTY**.” “But shall furnish him liberally out of thy flock,” &c. Deut. 15: 13, 14.

This was spoken of a Hebrew who had sold himself into slavery. Now this slave or servant labored either *for hire* or *claimed a certain portion* of his labor; or he *did not*. If he *did*, then the fear of his going away *empty* at the end of six years, was groundless, and that provision in the law useless; as the slave possessed property of his own. But if he *did not*, then there was humanity in the requirement of the law. Now, which position is it best to take;—the *one* which supposes that ancient slavery was not like the modern form—that the slave could claim a part or all his labor; consequently, making this provision of the law “null”—there being no cause for its foundation in fact; or the *other* one, which supposes that all his labor was his master’s—consequently, that he could possess nothing of himself—that the law was founded in wisdom—and that the slave was *truly* and *indeed* “*empty*,” without this munificence from his master?

From the evidence now adduced it appears, that the slaves’ labor was the exclusive property of their masters; and consequently they could not labor for themselves. They were utterly debarred from it—all they had and were, belonged not to themselves but to others.

IV. *Could slaves be considered as “chattels personal” among the ancients?* Or be taken to satisfy a demand.*

It may be doubted by some whether this question should be answered in the negative or affirmative. Yet there are probably as many points, if not more, to favor the affirmative, as there are to establish the negative. For it cannot be doubted, we think, from the evidence that has been adduced, that slaves were considered by their masters and treated, as their *property*. They could do with them just as they thought proper—why not then pay a debt *previously* contracted as well as to exchange them for money in a *present* contract? We can see nothing more appalling in the one course, than in the other.

Indeed, the *children* of poor people were liable to seizure, and to be sold into slavery for the debts of their

*Whether the law allowed of this, we have no *positive* evidence

parents ; why not their slaves ? We therefore find the following language in the sacred volume :

“Thy servant my husband is dead ; and thou knowest that thy servant did fear the Lord : *and the creditor is come to take unto him my two sons to be bondmen.*” 2 Kings 4 : 1. The thief also was to be sold to make *restitution*, if he had nothing of his own to pay. Ex. 22 : 3.

V. *Provision, by the Mosaic Law, for the separation of a man and his wife.*

Notwithstanding the evils of slavery have been glowingly painted before us in all the colors of fancy and imagination ; and our ears have been horrified with the sound of defenceless females and helpless innocence torn from the embrace of paternal affection, by which to paint the *sin* and enormity of having slaves in our possession ; yet it is equally evident all this pomposity can never “turn one hair black or white.” The existing evils of slavery remain the same in spite of either commendation or reproach. For slavery has intrinsic evils connected with its very existence, which it is out of the power of exaggeration, either way, to extinguish.

And however harsh the chord of family separation may vibrate on the ear of modern humanity ; yet it was certain that the law of Moses, recognized, in certain cases, the separation of the wife and children from the husband and father.

We may be told that in this case the husband is not obliged to leave his wife. And what of that ? He has only a choice of, what Abolitionists call, “sins.” For he must either separate himself from his wife and children ; or have his *ear punched* and remain a *slave forever* ! What a happy condition such a Hebrew must be in !—The law is as follows :

“If his master have given him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters ; the *wife and her children* shall be her *master’s*, but *he* shall *go out by himself.*” Ex. 21 : 4.—see also 5, 6 verses.

That is,—at the end of six years the husband shall be *free* ; but the wife and children shall still continue in

slavery ! Well was it for Moses he did not live in the nineteenth century. Had he, he would have been condemned never to have seen heaven, or to have enjoyed Christian happiness or the fellowship of saints ! !

SECTION 5.

FROM AMONG WHAT PEOPLE WERE SLAVES TAKEN ?

We think it most probable they consisted of individuals from the children of Israel and of uncircumcised strangers—possibly, of some of the circumcised class ;—and among the patriarchs, in all probability, of Egyptians, particularly those belonging to Abram.

It does not appear that the Israelites could make slaves of any of the Canaanites, for these, in consequence of Idolatry, were to be *utterly* destroyed ; of these, it is said, “thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth.” Deut. 20 : 16.—“But thou shalt *utterly* destroy them ; namely the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites ; as the the Lord thy God hath commanded thee.”* v. 17—Deut. 7 : 2.

*Notwithstanding the above strict command to destroy all these nations, it appears there were some left whose children existed in the days of Solomon. These did Solomon oblige to pay “tribute.” See Judges 1 : 21, 27—35.—3 : 1—5. Josh 15 : 63—17 : 12, 13.

As for all the people that were left of the Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, which were not of Israel, but of their children who were left after them in the land, whom the children of Israel consumed not, them did Solomon make to pay *tribute* until this day,” 2. Chron. 8 : 7, 8, “*bond service*.” 1. Kings 9 : 21.

What were these individuals who had to do *bond service* ? Were they slaves, properly speaking ; or were they nations “subordinate ?”

That the individuals here mentioned were not slaves, properly speaking, we think is evident from the following considerations, viz. :

1st. Several of the tribes of the children of Israel were *not able* to drive them out ; of course unable to *make slaves* of them. See Judges 1 : 27, 34.—Josh. 15 : 63—17 : 12, &c.

2d. The objects expressed in the 3d chap. of Judges, (from the first to the fourth verse*) could not, or *would* not, have been subservient to the ends designed, had these nations been under slave subjection to the Israelites.

How could defenceless slaves prove the Israelites ? *How*, and for *what* use, learn them war ?

3d. *Nations* are expressly named, and *not* individuals particularly, —showing they had a government of their own. Judges 3 : 3.

* See also Chap 2 : 22.

Other nations however which were "very far off," and which are not "of the cities of these nations," it is quite probable, were made slaves from conquests in war, or tributaries and servants. See Deut. 20: 10—15.

But there may be a question in the minds of some whether these captives were private or public possession—i. e.—whether they belong to individuals or to the state.

That Hebrews themselves were frequently slaves it seems no unprejudiced mind can have scarcely the shadow of a doubt. The texts which have been already adduced, it would seem, are amply sufficient to prove the point unassisted by any other evidence. That selected from Deut. 15: 12—18 is peculiarly to the point. In looking over the points noted in this law, the following seem to be most prominent, viz. :

4th. They continued to be idolaters v. 5—7,—consequently, not under Israelitish dominion, for by the law, idolatry was punished with death. See Deut. 7: 26—8: 49, 20,—13: 6—19,—17: 3—5, "He that sacrificeth unto any God, save unto the Lord only, he *shall* be utterly destroyed." Ex. 22: 20.

5th. All Israelites;—and all that belonged to their house or families, were to be *circumcised*. Gen. 17: 12—14.—"Every man child that is born in thy house, or bought with money of *any* stranger, which is not of thy seed" must be circumcised.—Observe "of *any* stranger." This compared with the 27 v., would make it appear, that the Israelites could not have *even slaves*, unless they were circumcised. If so, how could the uncircumcised, idolatrous Canaanites be otherwise to the Israelites than simple "tributaries?" Compare, also, the 44th and 45th verses of the 12th chap. of Ex.

6th. Because they were engaged in great *public* works;—building cities for "store," for "chariots," for "horsemen," and that which Solomon desired to build in Jerusalem, and in Lebanon and in all the land of his dominion." 1 Kings 9: 19. But of the children of Israel did Solomon make no *servants* for his *work*;" that is, for doing their labor in building their cities. 2 Chron. 8: 9.

It is true, people employed in this way may sometimes be called, *slaves*; but in that case, they must be spoken of more particularly as *individuals*;—for we cannot very consistently conceive how any set of people can be known by the appellation of a "nation," a "tribe," of a "community" when that nation, tribe, or community possess none of the characteristics which designate such a body. For no one body is known from another but by its character. If these nations were indeed slaves, in the strict sense of the word, their characteristics as a nation, a tribe, or a community would have been annihilated, and could be spoken of only as individuals, and as nothing else. But instead of this, their situation was so different, that these nations were a continual annoyance to the children of Israel by reason of their idolatry.

1st. That the individual specified was a Hebrew.—
 “If thy brother a *Hebrew*,” &c.

2d. That this Hebrew did *not* sell himself, but was sold by some other person. “*Be sold* unto thee,” &c. a passive verb.

3d. Consequently that a price was paid for him.—
How, otherwise, could he be *sold*.

4th. The term of time which he should serve was *not* the result of any *contract* whatever; but was absolutely fixed by law, over which neither the buyer, or slave had any control. “In the 7th year thou *shalt* let him go free.”

5th. That while in his purchaser’s employ, he accumulated *nothing* for himself. “Shalt not let him go *empty* away.”

6th. When he left his master at the end of six years, he did not go in virtue of any stipulated claim he had to be released: but in consequence of the injunctions of the law on the master. “*Thou shalt let him.*” “When thou *sendest* him &c.” The 12th and 13th verses therefore teaches us, that a “*Hebrew*” “*was sold*” “*by some*” third person for a “*price*” during a “*term of time specified by law.*” And that during this time, that Hebrew “*earned nothing for himself,*” and at the end of six years he could go out,—not in consequence of any power of his own to command it, or by the force of any contract,—but “*by the strong arm of the law,*” the master was obliged to give him his liberty if desired. For any and every slave can refuse a favor if they choose. See Ex. 21 : 2—4.

The following inferences seem obvious.

1st. That that Hebrew must be a *slave*. For,

2d. He was the *property* of his master ;—

3d. Had no liberties of his own ;—

4th. Was made *merchandise* of; or sold for money.—

5th. Possessed nothing; and never would so long as he bore that relation to his master which he then did.

Now if these are not the characteristics of a slave, we know not what to make of them.

Yet notwithstanding the master had this slave’s liber-

ty, the moral law under which every Israelite was placed, as well as Christians now, which requires man "to love the Lord your God and to serve him with *all* your heart and with *all* your soul." Deut. 11: 13—to "love the stranger." Deut. 10: 19—and "to love thy neighbor as thyself." Lev. 19: 18, obliged the Israelites neither to *oppress* nor *vex* others, even their slaves. Therefore it is stated in the 14th and 15th verses: "thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy flock, and out of thy floor, and out of thy wine press; of that wherewith the Lord thy God hath blessed thee thou shalt give unto him" when he departeth from thee. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bond man in the land of Egypt, and the Lord thy God redeemed thee: *therefore* I command thee *this thing this day*."

Now on what is this provision *based*? On the *poverty*—the *absolute need* of the recipient; or on something else:—a mark of respect—a token of friendship for a hired servant?—Can it be the latter? Suppose they were on unfriendly terms when they parted. Could this donation be *natural*? Would it be wise in law to make provision for such an appropriation? Surely not. All laws are based on *necessity*. There certainly could be no necessity for this.

We are left then with the only alternative of supposing the recipient indeed *poor*, and in need of the donation.

It cannot be supposed in this case that the servant had received wages but had squandered it away; unless we suppose that all such hired servants were alike spendthrifts. But in that case would the Omnipotent God make laws by which to have the money thus spent refunded? Would he thus countenance profligacy? No, verily! Whenever he makes provision for assistance, he does it because there is need of it. The poor slave in the present case was not awarded with wages—he had nothing! and was now about to leave his master and home and "look up" a residence of his own somewhere else. How proper then that he should have a portion of "whatever the Lord had blessed his master with" to

help him on his journey and to assist him until the earth could produce for him her bounties.

But there is a *reason* urged upon the master for doing this. What is it?—"Remember that thou wast a *"bond-man"* in the land of *Egypt*."—As much as if he had said; "*Do* unto thy slave *now*, as thou wouldst wish to be *done by* wert thou a slave," for, "Remember thou wast a bond-man," &c. when thou hadst no one to do these good offices to you; therefore thou wast brought out of Egypt by a miracle by "the Lord thy God."—See Deut. 29: 5.

Notwithstanding these provisions for his comfort, "If he say unto thee I will not go away from thee, because he loveth thee and thine house, because he is well with thee? Or, "because I love my wife and my children, I will not go out free,"—Ex. 21: 5—then thou shalt take an awl, and thrust it through his ear unto the door, and he shall be his servant *forever*! Deut. 15: 16, 17.

In looking over these texts the following particulars seem conceded, viz.

1st. That the slave was *contented* and *happy*.

2d. That he *loved* his master, and his house.

3d. That, if the master gave him his wife, he must leave her and her children, if he left the master. See Ex. 21: 4. Yet he *loved* his master, notwithstanding. See v. 5.

4th. By having his ear "bored," he is made a servant *forever*; without any wages other than "living" and "protection."—of course a *slave*!

Nearly the same positions may be proved from Jeremiah: From the 34th chap. of this prophet it appears plain enough that the Israelites themselves considered these "sold Hebrews" not as *hired* servants, but as slaves. But having imbibed the spirit of the world, they had overleaped the law of Moses and instead of letting their Hebrew slaves be free every seventh year, they continued them in bondage. Hence the prophet upbraids them with, "Thus saith the Lord God; I made a covenant with your fathers in the day I brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of

bondmen, saying, at the end of *seven* years let ye go every man his brother, an Hebrew, which hath *been sold* unto thee ; and when he hath served thee six years, thou shalt let him go free from thee : *but your fathers hearkened not unto me neither inclined their ear.*" Jere. 34 : 13, 14.

But even after they had freed their captives according to the command of the Lord by the mouth of Jeremiah they again "turned and caused every man his servant, and every man his handmaid whom he had set at liberty at their pleasure, to *return*, and brought them into *subjection*, to be unto you for servants and handmaids." v. 16.

What the propriety of calling these servants by any other name than *slaves* ?

That *strangers* were slaves frequently, we have the fullest proof from Lev. 25 : 44—46. "Ye stand this day all of you before the Lord your God ; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel. Your little ones, your wives, and thy *stranger that is in thy camp, from the HEWER of thy wood unto the DRAWER OF THY WATER.*" Deut. 29 : 10, 11.

SECTION 6.

WAS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SLAVERY OF THE HEBREWS AND THAT OF STRANGERS ?

So far as it concerns the loss of liberty, there was no difference ; they were both slaves so long as they were subject to a master. And the principal difference between them was, "bondmen" must be slaves so long as they lived, or at least, more than six years, whereas "Israelites" were to have their liberty—if they chose—in the sabbatical year. Therefore it was said "thou shalt not compel him,"—the Israelite who was poor and sold unto thee,—*"to serve as a bond-servant ; but as a hired servant and as a sojourner."* That is, they should not be in *perpetual* slavery like as bondmen were ; but "shall serve thee"—it is said immediately after—*"unto the year of jubilee."* This latter clause being evident.

ly the *opposite* to "not to serve as bondmen." And that bondmen did serve forever is evident from the 46th verse. In this respect, therefore, "thou shalt not *compel* them to serve as bondmen."

But as *hired* servants. For hired servants always labor for a stipulated time. Thereby proving them to be slaves; for, if hired servants, why *command* them to be treated as hired servants? Would they not, as a matter of course be treated as such? They certainly would. Thereby disproving the idea of some, that these Israelites were nothing more than hired servants, because they were to serve as such, in contra-distinction to bondmen. But farther,

They *could not* be hired servants, because these, and sojourners, were *not* circumcised. They being strangers, who, having renounced idolatry, were permitted to live among the Israelites; but not to be adopted into their families; while *slaves*, who were circumcised were favored with all their religious privileges. Hence, strictly speaking according to the sense of the law, no circumcised Israelite could be a *hired* servant, neither an uncircumcised stranger be a *slave*. See Ex. 12: 44 and 45. That there was no exception to this, among private individuals, we do not say,—no case at present occurs.

It is a singular fact that in all the dealings of the Lord with the children of Israel, he takes that course with them which shall refer them back to *past* scenes. Hence in his various injunctions upon them, he often adds by way of inducement and remembrance, "Ye were bondmen in Egypt," &c. Hence, in the present case, "Thou shalt not rule over him with *rigor*;" for, "they are my servants which I brought out of the land of Egypt." Evidently referring to their state of slavery—of their bondage in Egypt,—their oppression there; and their deliverance. Hence, do not rule over thy brother who is a slave to thee "with rigor," as the Egyptians did over thee." Ex. 1: 13. Thou shalt not require of him labor beyond his strength, nor make other oppressive requirements of him: but "thou shalt fear the

Lord," realizing that he has power and a right to permit the same oppression to rest upon thine own head, which thou art exercising over thy brother who is thy slave. For thou ought to remember that if I had dealt in this oppressive manner with thee, thou wouldst have been this moment a bondman in Egypt, suffering all the oppression of thy forefathers.

SECTION 7.

DID THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES INCLUDE UNDER THE TERM, "OPPRESSION," &c. "SLAVERY;" OR THE LOSS OF LIBERTY?—IN OTHER WORDS, WAS THE LOSS OF LIBERTY "OPPRESSION?"

This question we answer in the *negative*. Our reasons are embraced under the two following heads, viz.

1st. Whatever was *according* to their law, the ancients did not consider as an affliction or an oppression; for this would argue their law to be *unjust* and *cruel*.

2d. Consequently slavery was *not* considered by them an *oppression*, because this it allowed.

We shall make a few remarks on each of these heads.

In looking over the law of Moses we find the following points, among others, particularly specified; viz.

1st. A Hebrew who was in distress by reason of poverty, was to be relieved. Such an one was not to receive either the money or the victuals of his benefactor upon usury. See Lev. 25: 35—And that too even although he be a stranger or sojourner.

2d. But to Hebrews money must not be lent upon usury. Ex. 22: 25. Deut. 23: 19, but to a stranger (uncircumcised?) thou mayest lend upon usury. v. 20.

3d. No pledge was to be taken of the poor Hebrew; yet, if taken, must be restored by the going down of the sun. Ex. 22: 26. Deut. 24: 6, 10, 13, 17.

4th. The stranger was not to be vexed or oppressed, "for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." Ex. 22: 2—"for ye know the heart of strangers, seeing ye were strangers in Egypt." Ex. 23: 9—"love ye therefore the stranger, for ye were strangers in Egypt." Deut. 10: 19.

5th. The widow and the fatherless children not to be afflicted. Ex. 22: 22. Deut. 10: 18,—27: 19.

6th. Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbor neither rob him. Lev. 19: 13. The wages of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night till morning.—ib.

7. Thou shalt do no unrighteousness in judgement; thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty; but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor. Lev. 19: 15.

These provisions of the Mosaic law no one will feel inclined to censure. They are based on that precept which is the sum of the law, "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." Deut. 11: 13. "and thy neighbor as thy self." Lev. 19: 18. And while this law provides that the stranger shall be neither "*vexed*" nor "*oppressed*;" it nevertheless has the following precept: Moreover of the *children of the strangers*, that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye *buy*, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land; and they shall be your possession. And ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children *after you* to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your *bondmen* forever." Lev. 25: 45, 46.

This last is as much a provision of the law of Moses, as that which states that the stranger shall "*not* be oppressed." And *this* we say without fear of any successful contradiction. No one will doubt but that these "*bondmen*," who were to be *bought*, and to be a *possession* entailed from father to son, were *slaves*. Now if the stranger is not to be "*oppressed*," and if slaves were to be taken from these unoppressed strangers, must it not follow, as an unavoidable consequence, that *oppression cannot include slavery,—or the loss of one's liberties?*

But how shall we reconcile all those places which denounce the Israelites as oppressing others? This is very easily done. For, as the law was given for the regulation of the Israelites "through succeeding years," the whole that the Judges, Kings or Prophets of Israel did or said, was based, or ought to have been, upon this

law. Hence we hear Ezekiel saying ; “As for his father, because he *cruelly oppressed*, spoiled his brother by violence, and did that which was not good among his people, lo, even he shall die in his iniquity.” Ez. 18: 18.

But if he begat a son “that seeth all his father’s sins—neither hath eaten upon the mountains—neither hath *oppressed* any—hath not withholden the pledge—hath given his bread to the hungry—hath covered the naked—hath taken off his hand from the poor—hath not received usury or increase—he shall not die.” Ezek. 18: 14—17.

So also Zechariah: ‘Execute true judgement, and shew mercy and compassion every man to his brother,” saith “the Lord of hosts,” *oppress* not the widow, nor the fatherless, the *stranger* nor the poor.” But they refused. “They made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the *law*, and the *words* which the Lord of hosts *had sent in his spirit by the former prophets*.” Zech. 7: 9—12.

To the same point, but more explicit, is Jeremiah: “Thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel. I made a covenant with your fathers in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondmen, saying: At the end of seven years let ye go every man his brother an Hebrew, which hath been sold unto thee; and when he hath served thee six years thou shalt let him go free from thee: but your fathers hearkened not unto me, neither inclined their ear,—but ye turned and polluted my name, and caused every man his servant, and every man his handmaid, whom he had set at liberty,”—according as the law had provided,—“at their pleasure, to RETURN, and brought them into *subjection*, to be unto you for servants and for handmaids.” Therefore, behold, I proclaim liberty *for you*, saith the Lord, to the sword, to the pestilence and to the famine.” Jere. 34: 13, 14, 16 and 17.

From this it evidently appears, that the Lord was not displeased, because these servants were obliged to labor for their masters *six* years; *but* because they were held

perpetually or longer than six years. In other words, they had broken the law. Therefore all they served over six years was, "oppression," as by law, their rights returned to them after this period of time, but which they were not allowed to exercise by their masters.—hence the *oppression*.

In this sense we must understand Isaiah, when he says ; "Is not this the fast that I have chosen?—to loose the bands of wickedness,—to undo the *heavy burdens*,—and to let the *oppressed go free*, and that ye break every yoke ;" that is, *every thing* which is contrary to the law of Moses. And that the oppression here spoken of is to be taken in the sense we suppose—reference to the law,—is placed beyond doubt in the verse following, where the particulars recognized by the law are enumerated. "Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry—that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house—clothe the naked," &c. Isa. 58 : 6, 7.

From the above texts the following items seem to be proved, viz.

1st. *Whatever* the law recognises, or provides for, is *no* oppression or affliction. Consequently,

2nd. A *Hebrew* is *not* oppressed by being a slave *six* years.

3d. A *stranger* is *not* oppressed, in being a slave during his life,—and being entailed as *property* from father to son.

4th. That a Hebrew's rights, or liberties, returned to him after six years, in consequence of the law.

5th. If his master keep him after this, unless according to the provision in Deut. 15 : 16, 17, he oppresses him. For by the law he is now considered free,—of course, his detention is the same as the detention of any other free citizen.

From these facts the following irresistible inference is drawn : That *that individual who is not, and never was, recognized by law as free, is not oppressed*. I wish to be understood here, as speaking of the law of Moses. For all other laws which are dictated by human wisdom may be unjust and unequal ; but the Mo-

saic law which was dictated by God himself must be *equal*, and *do INJUSTICE to none*.

SECTION 8.

WHEN WERE SLAVES THEN SAID TO BE OPPRESSED;
OR IN WHAT DID THEIR OPPRESSION CONSIST?

The answer to this has been more than intimated in the last section. The stranger was not to be ruled with rigour." Of rigorous service, Dr. Clarke gives the following definition. "Labor beyond a person's strength, or labor too long continued—or in unhealthy or uncomfortable places and circumstances, or without sufficient food," &c. The Jews say, "service which is *not determined*, and service whereof there is *no need*."

In short it would seem that the *requirements* of masters, should be based on the precept, "Love thy neighbor as thyself." That they should require nothing of their servants but what, on a change of circumstances, they themselves would be willing to do. And this idea is confirmed by the injunction "remember that ye were once bondmen in Egypt.

It therefore appears that we must view the children of Israel not only as a political body of men; but also as a Christian community. The abuses of their political privileges were controled by their moral obligations;—on the observance of which even their political existence depended. For whenever they should worship the idols of the heathen, the curse of God was upon them.—And notwithstanding the inhabitants of Canaan were to be driven out before them,—in order that they might possess this country, yet the promise, and *threat*, were equally sure, that in the day they turned aside to serve other gods—to walk after the manner of the heathen, they were to be overcome by the Canaanites, in the same way, that these last were to be subdued by the Israelites had they been faithful. Deut. 28: 1 to 14, also 15 to 68.

They were therefore cautious to walk in "*all* the commandments and ordinances of the Lord" that this dire catastrophe might not overtake them. Hence the *rea-*

son why, in obedience to the command "Love thy neighbor as thyself," they dare not *oppress* or *afflict* the "*widow*," the "*fatherless*" or the *SLAVE*.

The remarks in this section, and a few in other places bearing upon the same point, have been introduced more particularly, because many people, otherwise well meaning, have been led to believe that "*oppression*," even in Old Testament times, was *synonymous with slavery*, or, the *SIMPLE LOSS OF LIBERTY*. And although it appears plain enough, that *nothing* among the children of Israel themselves, could be considered as an "*oppression*" which their law *allowed* and though it be equally plain, that that law *allowed* of slavery; yet, perhaps, some may still be "*slow of faith*," because it was "*oppression* which caused the Lord to deliver the children of Israel from Egypt."

That the "*oppression*" was one moving cause of the escape of the Israelites from Egypt, is plain; yet it is *not* equally certain that "*slavery*" is "*oppression*." It is *one* thing to prove that *oppression* was the procuring cause of the Exodus of the Israelites; and quite *another* to prove that *slavery* did it. It is no argument against *slavery* here, to prove that this Egyptian *oppression* *grew out* of it. For if *slavery*—the loss of liberty, is to be denounced as crime or sin, because evils grow out of it,—or, because a bad use may be made of this liberty when in bad hands, we may denounce every favor, or blessing of life nearly. For what blessing is there that is *not* abused? If, on this ground, we were to denounce *slavery*, even our food and raiment would be on the proscribed list.

But let us attend a little more closely to the circumstances which the history of this transaction discloses.

It is to be observed that the Israelites were slaves in Egypt four hundred years. And although, as the apostle tells us, they were in "*bondage*" and "*evil entreated*," yet we find no particular complaint from them till some time previous to their departure. Even so late as about *forty* years before their exit; their exceeding hard usage,—their lives being made bitter with hard bondage,—

had not as yet weaned them from their attachment to Egypt. For when Moses, seeing two Hebrews strive together, "said to him that did the wrong, "Wherefore smitest thou thy fellow?" he replied "Who made thee a judge?" &c. "Intendest thou to kill me as thou didst the Egyptian?" Evidently implying, let us alone, we are able to take care of ourselves *when necessary*. From all of which as well as from what is implied from the speech of the king, Ex. 1 : 10, it is evident, that, notwithstanding they were "evil entreated," they were not anxious to get rid of it. At least, we have no intimation that this was the case; and there is no *cause* stated which would make us suppose that they were dissatisfied with their condition or wanted to escape from it. If they had been used as roughly as some would intimate, would not their own sense of right—their own love of ease from abuse, have stimulated them to have made their wrongs known *then*, as well as subsequently? Was not their feelings, as acute in the *first* stages of their slavery, as in its *later* periods? Would not the "whip" or the "lash" produce as keen sensations upon their backs *before* the days of Moses as *afterwards*? Most certainly. If so, the *simple loss of liberty* was not considered *by them* as a very serious oppression. And I am inclined to think that the "bondage," and the being "entreated evil," spoken of in Acts, has a stronger reference to their *religious*, than to their *political* or their *social* privileges. For Moses is uniformly told to say to Pharaoh, "Let my people go that they may *serve* me." Directly implying, they could not serve, or sacrifice to the Lord in Egypt. This, as the Israelites were the chosen people, was a "bondage," and an "evil" to them.

But let us look at their history just before their Exodus out of Egypt.

We hear the king,—him who knew not Joseph—i. e. him who disproved "of that system of government which Joseph had established, as well as his haughtily refusing to *acknowledge* the obligations under which the whole land of Egypt was laid to this eminent prime minister of one of his predecessors,"—saying to his people,

“Behold the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we : come on, let us deal wisely with them ; lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there falleth out any war, they join unto our enemies, and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land.” Ex. 1 : 9, 10.

From this it appears that the king had *two* principle objects in view ; 1st to prevent their multiplying or increasing in numbers ; and 2d to guard against their joining his enemies in time of war. But in order to “kill two birds with the same stone,” he thinks to accomplish both objects by “*hard*” labor and vigorous servitude. And here just let us reflect a moment upon the labor he must think it necessary to require in order to accomplish his object. The Egyptians had labored too much themselves to suppose that labor or servitude any where within the circle of reason could accomplish the thing desired. *How* hard then must that be which should be the means of *preventing their increase* !—either by thinning off those already in existence ; or by preventing conception and the birth of children !! How lost to all feeling of humanity must that heart be, who could ever devise such a method, much less put it into execution ! But so intent was he to accomplish this object by this means, that when Moses went to him to expostulate with him on keeping the Israelites in bondage, he probably fearing the accomplishment of his object—the prevention of their revolt,—would not be effected ; commanded that “the people be given no more straw to make brick as heretofore ; but let them go and gather straw for themselves.” And “the same tale of brick were they required to make as before.” Ex. 5 : 7, 8.

Having become acquainted with the king’s object, and the general principle on which he resolved, let us note the *means* he held in requisition to effect it.

The means by which this extreme hard bondage was to be brought about was by TASK-MASTERS. And the object of these task-masters was not to see that their slaves did good day’s works,—to keep them diligent—and to furnish more work when necessary, but they were

set over them "to *afflict* them with their *burdens*." On purpose to afflict them. To make their labor as hard as possible. To make their "burdens" oppressive, fatiguing and exhausting. And even after freedom was requested, these task masters were required to demand of them the usual tale of brick, while no straw was allowed them, and they even had to gather stubble instead of straw. Indeed, in doing this they were followed by these unrighteous task-masters with : "Fulfil your works, your daily tasks as when there was straw." Notwithstanding the impossibility of accomplishing these tasks, the officers of the children of Israel *were beaten* of these lordly task-masters, and demanded of them why "have ye not fulfilled your task in making brick both yesterday and to day as heretofore?" Under this severe oppression, they cry unto Pharaoh, complaining of their hard usage, and praying for redress in the most affectionate terms. But what does the unfeeling monarch say to them? "*Ye are idle ! Ye are idle !! Go therefore now, and work ; for there shall no straw be given you, yet shall ye deliver the tale of bricks.*"

And so severely pressed were they that they could not hearken unto Moses when he spake to them for anguish of spirit. Ex. 6 : 9. Or as the margin has it, for *shortness* or *straitness* of spirit. The original words signify that their labor was so continual, and their bondage so cruel and oppressive, that they had scarcely time to breathe.—*Clarke*.

But notwithstanding, the more they afflicted them, the more they multiplied and grew, ch. 1 : 12. Consequently, finding that making "the children of Israel to serve with rigor ;" and even making their "lives bitter with *hard bondage*, in mortar, in brick, and in all manner of service in the field," did not produce the effect desired ; he next had recourse to the expedient of destroying all the male children, *first* by commanding the midwives to do it ; and *secondly*, by throwing them into the river ! ch. 1 : 16, 22.

Truly may the Israelites in Egypt be said to have been oppressed ! First to be under such rigorous service as to

be out of breath by reason of it ; and then secondly to have all their male children destroyed !! And yet strange to tell, it is said there “are nearly three millions of American citizens suffering *worse* bondage in these United States, than that of the children of Israel in Egypt !!!”*

But they were oppressed in a more important light in another way. While in Egypt, the Israelites were prohibited from serving their God. “Let my son go that he may serve me.” Ex. 4 : 23. They could not sacrifice in Egypt, because the animals to be sacrificed were sacred with the Egyptians. See ch. 8 : 26.

They were indeed oppressed, not only in having to serve *beyond* their strength, ch. 6 : 9, but were debarred the privilege of sacrificing to their God. Deplorable indeed must be their condition. They had petitioned Pharaoh for redress of grievances, ch. 5 : 15—18, but their prayer was treated with contempt by him ; and having no where else to go, at last they cry unto the Lord. Hence it is said ; “And the children of Israel sighed *by reason of the bondage*, and they cried, and their cry came up unto God by reason of the bondage.” ch. 2 : 28.

In this text two particulars are evident :

1st. That they sighed,—or cried,—unto God.

2d. The “bondage” was the *cause* of this cry.

Now, inasmuch as the children of Israel had been in slavery 400 years,—Gen. 15 : 13,—and inasmuch as we have no evidence that this slavery ever, in a single instance, was the *cause* of their crying to God ; it necessarily follows that this “bondage” could not mean simple slavery—or loss of liberty only. For, if *like* causes produce *like* effects, the bondage spoken of here, could not be the bondage of simple loss of liberty, as we have no evidence that *that* bondage ever was the *cause* of a single prayer to Heaven ? We shall therefore assume it as a fact that the bondage spoken of in this text has reference solely and entirely to the oppression of the

*Testimony of God against slavery.

Israelites independent of the simple loss of liberty. But let us look again :

“And God heard their groaning, and God remembered his covenant—Gen. 15: 14,—with Abraham, with Isaac and with Jacob. And God looked upon the children of Israel, and God had respect unto them.” Ex. 2: 24—25.

What evidence does this passage afford to the idea that the Israelites were brought out of Egypt merely because they were in bondage there? The bondage—oppression—was the cause of their crying in sincerity and from the heart unto God. And these prayers were heard, not because they requested redress from affliction, but because they were from the heart. Hence it is said, “And God *heard* their groanings.” And what then? Why, “he *remembered* the covenant he made with Abraham,” &c. Here then we have a solution of the difficulty,—it was not because they *suffered*; but because God had made a covenant with Abraham, and had renewed it to Isaac and to Jacob, that he would thus deliver them, that they were delivered.

The following points then seem to be made out in relation to the exodus of the Israelites out of Egypt.

1st. Their “cruel bondage” induced them to cry to God; and he heard them, not because they had simply *lost* their liberty, or even because of their gross oppression; but because their supplication was from the heart, and because God had previously promised thus to deliver them—Gen. 15: 14—when they should cry unto him.

2d. There is no evidence to prove that the bondage here spoken of even *includes* the simple loss of liberty, —though it is evident enough that this bondage grew out of this loss. For *this* they had not enjoyed for 400 years; yet we hear nothing said of this “hard bondage”—ch. 1: 14,—till after the accession to the throne of Egypt of that king “who knew not Joseph”—v. 8.

3d. There is no evidence,—with which I am acquainted,—to prove that the Israelites were brought out of Egypt, *because* they suffered oppression *merely*; or be-

cause they endured rigorous service, or hard bondage,—severe as it was. But the evidence goes directly to prove that the Lord brought them out in consequence of his Covenant. “God heard their groaning,” and then “*remembered* his Covenant.” Of course he acted accordingly.

As a necessary inference from these particulars, we come to a

4th. Which is, that slavery,—the simple loss of liberty,—had nothing to do with the *final* exit of the Israelites. For, notwithstanding the “hard bondage” grew out of this loss, yet it must be considered in the light of an *abuse* of that power which the possession of the Israelites’ liberty had given the Egyptians. For no law can consistently authorise one individual to deal with another *differently* from that manner in which he himself would wish to be dealt by were he in the same circumstances with him. The Egyptians felt none of the obligations imposed by the Moral law of God.

SECTION 9.

YET, AFTER ALL, WAS NOT ANCIENT SLAVERY USED MERELY AS A PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME; AND HAD IT NOT OUGHT TO BE VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT AND IN NO OTHER?

That slavery was used as a *punishment* is evident. As an instance we may mention the case of the Gibeonites who for deceiving Joshua and his people, they being idolaters—were “made bondmen—hewers of wood and drawers of water for the congregation, and for the altar of the Lord, forever.” Josh. 9: 23, 27. Slavery was also threatened the Hebrews; if they turned their feet from following the testimony of the Lord and served other gods, they should “be sold unto their enemies for bondmen and bondwomen.” Deut. 28: 68.

Other instances however occur in which we cannot suppose that slavery can be considered as punishment. For instance, the cases of Hagar, of Bilhah, of Zilpah, the other servants of Abram, Eliezer of Damascus, &c. as well as those of the other patriarchs, Isaac and Jacob.

We cannot very well suppose that the slavery of those servants was considered, by the ancients, in the light of punishments who were to have their liberty in consequence of the loss of an eye, or a tooth even, if that loss was occasioned by a blow from the master.—Ex. 21: 26, 27. For when slavery is used as a punishment, the criminal must endure it with all its attendant evils. Though the Hebrews, while walking in the commandments of God, could not, by the law of Moses, be slaves but six years at any one time, for which reason they were *not* called “bondmen;” yet when they transgressed they were to be sold into slavery as *bondmen*—i. e. when it should exist for an indefinite period. And not only this difference was there between slavery as a punishment, and other legalized slavery, among the Hebrews; but other attendant evils also must they suffer—for instance, be offered for sale, “and no man shall buy you.” Deut. 28: 68. So wretched indeed was their condition to be, that they would even *wish* to be “bought slaves” among the heathen, but this privilege is denied them!

Inasmuch as slaves could not be made, legally, of any of the nations of the idolatrous Canaanites in consequence of the curse of extermination. Deut. 20: 16—pronounced against them; it is evident the law could recognize *none* of *these* as slaves—i. e. so long as they were idolatrous. For idolatry being the “besetting sin” in those times, the children of Israel were to be guarded on every hand against being led away—either by mixing with idolatrous nations, or by suffering them to intermix with them. Hence the restrictions against intermarriages.—Deut. 7: 3—Josh. 23: 12, 13. They were to make no covenant with them, ‘lest they be a *snare* in the midst of’ them. Ex. 24: 32. They were utterly torbid dwelling even in their land, “lest they make thee to sin against me.” Ex. 23: 33. If a Hebrew was not to permit an idolatrous stranger ever to dwell in his land, is it probable he would make a slave of him while he remained an idolater against the express command of God?

Deut. 20 : 16. "*They shall not dwell in thy land, lest they make thee to sin against me.*" Ex. 23 : 33.

"Take heed to thyself, lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land whither thou goest, lest it be a a snare" unto thee. Ex. 34 : 12.

"Lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a whoring after their gods, and do sacrifice unto their gods," &c. v. 15.

"And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee ; thou shalt *smite them*, and *utterly destroy them*, thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor *show mercy unto them.*"

Deut. 7 : 2. See also Numb. 33 : 52,—Josh. 6 : 17,—8 : 24—9 : 24—10 : 28. 40—11 : 11, 12. Lev. 27 : 29. Numb. 25 : 1—5,—31 : 15—17.

From these texts and many more which might be named, it is sufficiently evident that, whatever the children of Israel might do to the contrary, the law of Moses, being dictated by the spirit of God, could make no provision for slaves from any of these nations. For as these were idolators, that law declared they should be "*utterly destroyed*,"—*not* be made slaves. We can find no passage in all the Mosaic law to the contrary of this. There is no provision by that law for even the reception of *tribute* of *any* of the seven anathematized Canaanitish nations : much less for the making of them domestic slaves.

It is true indeed, that other nations against whom the Israelites might fight were to be treated somewhat differently. When the Israelites went against a city of these nations, they first "*proclaimed peace unto it.*"—"And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people found therein shall be *tributaries* unto thee and they shall serve thee,"—not as domestic slaves, but as a nation or a city paying tribute to another nation. Deut. 20 : 11,—But.

If it do not make peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it : and when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thy hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the

sword." But the women and little ones are to be exempt. These "shalt thou take to thyself." Deut. 20 : 13, 14. But after such a campaign, they were to abide without the camp seven days. And "whosoever hath killed any person, and whosoever hath touched any slain, *purify both* yourselves and your *captives* on the third day." Numb. 31 : 19. Yet notwithstanding this exemption of females, if they had been a cause of turning away the hearts of the children of Israel from serving the true God, they too were to be slain. See Numb. 31 : 15, 16.

From these texts the following deductions seem to be legitimate ; viz.

1st. No idolatrous nation on being captured, was to be saved alive, if persisting in their idolatrous course.

2d. A nation formerly idolatrous could retain their integrity as a nation, on certain conditions ;—viz. making peace with the Israelites on their own terms and paying them tribute ; *provided*, they did not consist of a Canaanitish nation.

3d. Those "saved alive" for slaves must be "purified" on "the third day" in the same manner with the Israelites themselves.

4th. No Canaanite could be thus saved.

5th. Every idolator on becoming a slave, must renounce his idolatrous course, and conform to the Jewish rites. Even if he is not a slave he must renounce idolatry in order to retain a living among them.

The *punishment* due idolatry as these evidences plainly show, was not *slavery*,—but, *Death* ! Hence when the children of Israel had "committed whoredom with the daughters of Moab ;"—when they had "sacrificed to their gods," and had "bowed down" to them ; and "when Israel had joined himself unto Baal-peor," "the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel," and he thus addressed Moses : "Take all the heads of the people and hang them up before the Lord against the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel." Therefore Moses gave the command "*Slay ye every one his men that were joined unto Baal-*

peor.” Numb. 25 : 1—5, see also, Ex. 32 : 24, 27. Deut. 13 : 6, 9, 13, 15.

From all of which it appears plain that slavery could *not* be considered as a punishment for idolatry.—Neither can it be admitted that *former* idolatry, though not practised *then*, could be thus punished; for, to be just, *all* such ought to be thus punished. Whereas we know that *hired servants* and sojourners were not, as a general thing slaves, and of course, were not punished. But farther such an idea is against the express word of holy writ. “All his transgressions that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him: in his righteousness he hath done he shall live.” Ezek. 18 : 22.

We think the above remarks are sufficient to show that all slavery could not be considered in the light of punishment for crime. But if any farther evidence should be wished, we would refer them to texts already quoted in some of the preceding remarks found in the twenty-first chapter of Exodus, and Deut. 15 : 12 to 13.

Inasmuch as those strangers who sojourned among the Israelites had renounced idolatry, we freely own, *we* cannot see for what crime their children,—born even among the Israelites themselves, and in all probability accustomed to their rites, from their infancy,—should be doomed to perpetual and everlasting slavery, if slavery is a punishment!—See the 40th and 45th v. of the 25th chap. of Leviticus.

SECTION 10.

IS THE POSSESSION OF THE LIBERTIES OF ONE MAN BY ANOTHER NECESSARILY SIN ?

On this question there are different opinions. Some suppose it *is* sin, while others, equally sincere and well-meaning, believe otherwise. For ourselves, we offer no opinion further than we think the Word of God obviously intimates. If others, after an impartial, unprejudiced, candid and thorough examination of all the laws of God on this point, come, *rationaly* and by logical deduction to the conclusion that simple loss of liberty *is* sin, we would be the last to shackle his conscience with

restraints or opinions of our own ; provided, he himself walked in consonance with the Christian character.

If, on the examination of the law of Moses, it be found that slavery was tolerated by that law ; it will *necessarily* follow that slavery was no sin in relation to that law. And that slavery was thus tolerated, we think has been sufficiently proved by the texts and arguments adduced in the preceding pages. Now if that law *does* inculcate the principle of slavery, we infer, that in relation to that law, that principle is *no* sin for the following reasons : viz.

1st. *NOTHING can be sin which is according to the law.* For this reason is it, that oppression is not the legal result of slavery, neither can slavery be sin.

2d. *Because scripture evidence is in favor of this view.* For, “whosoever committeth sin transgresseth the law ; for sin is the transgression of the law.” 1. John 3 : 4. To the same point St. Paul.

“Because the law worketh wrath ; for where no law is, there is no transgression.” Rom. 4 : 15.

The only point farther to prove is, whether slavery is sin under the gospel dispensation. But as that question is intimately connected with its existence under that dispensation, we defer saying any thing farther on it till that question is noticed.

SECTION 11.

IS SLAVERY CONSISTENT WITH THE GOSPEL DISPENSATION ? I. E. CAN IT EXIST, WITHOUT SIN, UNDER IT ?

This question is founded on the objection urged by some, that notwithstanding slavery might, or did exist among the ancient Israelites, yet it *cannot* in these days of the Gospel Dispensation, without its incurring the *guilt of sin*.

Being reminded of the position laid down in the last Section, that nothing is sin which is in accordance with the law ; the fate of that question will be determined by that of the question now under consideration—viz. the existence properly of slavery under the Gospel.

In order to come to a *just*, and to an *impartial* decision of the question at issue, it is proper to be divested

of any pledged *ism*, or *theory* to which we may feel obligations of support, and then "with a single eye," to turn to the "law and to the testimony."

It is to be feared that some, from an over heated zeal for the poor slaves, who are but in too many instances, "vexed" and "oppressed;" and from a desire to accomplish too much at once, have laid hold of what they are pleased to call a principle, "that slavery" of every grade, form and color, "is sin."

We do not wish to have any remarks which we may make on this subject so construed in the mind of any one as to lead him to believe that we are in *favor* of slavery. Far be such a thought from us. Could slavery be consistently abolished *to-day*, it would rejoice our heart, and would be a time of ever grateful remembrance with every philanthropist. But all we contend for is, that people should "look before they leap." For let an individual of a warm, zealous temperament,—of sanguine feelings and warm hearted;—disposed naturally to view things *superficially*,—feeling a strong attachment to Religion, and an utter aversion to sin in all its shapes,—I say, let such an individual get the idea fixed in his mind that all slavery is sin,—sin against his God: and he will be willing to go almost any length however indiscreet, though well meant, to do away a crime so heinous. And such an one will be headstrong and furious, and beyond the reach of argument to convince.

It does not follow that slavery *must* exist if it is *not* sin; for almost all admit it as an evil greatly to be deplored. And measures have been making for its abolition; and as the public mind becomes prepared, other, and more efficient ones will be devised. We therefore proceed to the question at the head of this section.

If slavery could be justified under the *Abrahamic* Covenant, or *Mosaic* dispensation, it can be justified *equally* under that of the gospel. And this position we shall endeavor to sustain on the following ground, *viz.*

The moral law by which man is held responsible to his God was as binding on the ISRAELITES as on us, and VICE VERSA.

The Covenant made with Abram was as much a Covenant of grace as the dispensation under Christ. By this, we do not wish to be understood to mean, that they were both alike. By examining that Covenant attentively we shall find, that, in addition to its temporal advantages, the following blessings are promised :

1st. God would bless Abram and make him the father of many nations. This blessing and promise, according to St. Paul, has greater reference to a spiritual seed than to a natural. 'And the scripture, foreseeing, that God would justify the *heathen* through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall *all* nations be blessed.' Gal. 3 : 8.

2nd. The gift of the land of Canaan to Abraham and his seed. This also was but a type of a better inheritance. For St. Paul tells us he sojourned in a land of promise, as in a strange country, dwelling in tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, the heirs with him of the same promise : for they looked for *a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God*. Heb. 11 : 9, 10.

3d. God promised to be his God, and a God to his seed after him. A promise with which is connected the highest spiritual blessings.

4th. In Abraham's "seed all nations of the earth shall be blessed." That is, all those nations and people who exercised faith in Christ. Compare Gen. 17 : 1—10, with Gal. chap. 3.

By the Apostle, faith is made the means in consequence of which God made his covenant with Abraham, and that even his temporal blessings were types of spiritual ones. Hence "know ye that those which are of faith, the same are the *children of Abraham*," even though they be heathen, or Gentiles. All who have faith in the promise of God, are, through Christ, blessed with faithful Abraham.

Here then we have the ground-work, so to speak, of salvation by faith. And as this covenant was to extend not to Abraham only, but to his seed after him, there could be no law introduced to do it away, which would not fulfil the blessing promised. If therefore this cove-

nant was thus binding, what was the need of a law?—Or as the Apostle has it, “if the inheritance be of the law, it is no more of promise,—wherefore serveth the law?” “It was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise was made.”—“Which seed” was “Christ.”

Here we discover the grounds on which the law was given to Moses by God on Mount Sinai. The seed of Abraham not exercising that “faith” in the promises of God which they ought, not relying on the mercy and power of God, they disbelieved that they should ever inherit even the temporal Canaan. Wherefore they complained of Moses for leading them from Egypt saying, “were there no graves in Egypt that thou hast taken us away to die in the wilderness?” Ex. 14: 11, 12. And so strong was their propensity to err and go astray, that even while Moses was in the Mount receiving a law for them, that they even committed idolatry by worshipping a molten calf. Ex. 32: 24—27. Therefore the Apostle says, “the law was ADDED because of *transgression*.” As much as to say, “if the seed of Abraham, the children of Israel, were left to proceed on their way merely through the *strength* of their “faith” in the promises of God, they *never* would reach the promised Canaan.” For every man would follow the impulse of his own imagination, so that, instead of advancing forward, they would be continually retrograding. The propriety of a law therefore becomes apparent.—For notwithstanding the law could confer no blessings of itself, yet it would oblige those under its influence to walk in that way which would unerringly lead to them. For this reason was it, that St. Paul considered the “law as a schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ.” Gal. 3: 24.

We now see the connexion there is between the Abrahamic covenant and the Law,—the one being the basis of all temporal and spiritual blessings, the other an assistant or director pointing the way to those blessings, and urging the delinquent, and the “slow of faith” by penalties. While the law holds out no blessings of its own, it secures the blessings of the covenant

to all those who walk according to its requirements, in virtue of the promise.

It is a mistake to suppose the gospel was never promulgated till after the introduction of our Saviour into the world. For St. Paul tells us that the "Gospel was preached before to Abraham," in that it was said "In thee,"—i. e. in thy seed,—"shall all nations be blessed." It was evidently impossible that all nations could be blessed in Abraham personally, for he must soon go the way of all the earth; consequently, it must be in his seed. Now this seed was Christ. For Christ came through the stock of Abraham.

As all the nations of the earth were to be blessed in this seed of Abraham,—the promised Messiah,—the Christ,—who had not yet come,—it is plain all these blessings depended on faith in the "promise" of *this* "Seed." And circumcision was the sign or seal of the covenant on which this faith was predicated. So that although the Saviour had not as yet made his appearance in the world; yet all who had become a party in the Abrahamic Covenant by circumcision were bound by a strong *moral* obligation to hold this faith in lively exercise. For this was the condition on which the blessing was predicated. And if ye continue "by faith in Jesus Christ," then "are ye all the children of God." "And if ye be Christ's then are ye Abraham's seed and heirs according to the promise." Gal. 3 : 29.

The *moral obligations* under which those were placed who received the seal of the covenant by circumcision, to conform to the requirements of that covenant, were more clearly made known, and shown in their various bearings between individuals of the same covenant as well as their duty toward God in the *moral law* given by God to Moses on Mount Sinai. The first four commands there given, show us our duty to God;—the six last, our duty to our fellow creatures. The sum of which is "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, soul, mind, might, and strength, and thy neighbor as thyself." On these two hang all the law and the prophets. Mat. 22 : 37 to 40.

The giving of the law then to Moses was not, in strict fact a new *covenant*, but rather a re-enactment of an old one,—the Abrahamic. For it is to be remembered, that up to this time, the children of Israel had come out of Egypt,—and had progressed thus far, on the strength of the covenant, or promise made with Abraham 430 years before. Aside from all other evidence therefore, it would be obviously absurd *now*, before the objects are accomplished on which they were engaged in virtue of that promise, to have that covenant disannulled on which that promise was founded, and the substitution of *another*, founded on different principles. There could be no harmony in this:—it would be unworthy of an All Wise God.

The principles therefore embraced in this law to the children of Israel on Mount Sinai, were the *same* as those embraced in the Abrahamic Covenant, though not there so obviously enumerated.

The same *moral principles run through, the whole of the New Testament dispensation*; but frequently more enlarged upon than even in the Mosaic Code.

There appears to be no just foundation, we think, to the idea entertained by some that this law—the moral law—was done away by Christ. But so much to the contrary appears to be the fact, that every principle involved in that law is either directly taught or obviously implied by Christ and his Apostles. Therefore says Christ, “I am not come to destroy the law but to fulfil.” Math. 5 : 17.

But some may suppose that because it is said, “Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth,” that Christ did away the whole Mosaic dispensation. Rom. 10 : 4.

The truth is, the Mosaic code of laws taken together, are composed of *three* parts;—each of which have received distinct appellations, according to the object they were destined to effect. And each of these three parts are often spoken of as *laws* of themselves. We therefore have the *political*, the *moral*, and the *ceremonial* laws. Properly speaking, Christ could be the *end* of none

but the ceremonial, or as it is sometimes called, the ritual law. For as none could be saved *in* their sins—and as there could be no remission of these without the *shedding of blood*, and as Christ had not as yet offered up himself, although he had promised to do this at a future day ;—the Israelites were obliged from necessity to institute sacrifices, oblations, and to have recourse to rites and ceremonies in order to be saved. And the rules and regulations which governed these, were called the ceremonial or ritual law. But when Christ came who was the object typified by these usages, there could, of course, be no need of them any longer.

The *political* law was that code which was instituted for the regulation of the Israelites as a nation.—It was adapted to their situation and the circumstances of their case. But as spiritual blessings was the great object of the covenant which was the basis of the *moral* law ; it is obvious they could have no political regulation which would be inconsistent with the acquirement and possession of these blessings. Their *political* and their *moral* code must therefore go “hand in hand” together. Consequently, the *principles* of that political code, must forever remain the principles of *all* political law among all nations, *where* the moral law holds. To be sure, those principles may be extended, receive new illustrations, and acquire more extensive applications ; but yet, the principles themselves must remain unchanged, for they are in their nature unchangeable. If in law, a principle should be instituted, in opposition to a principle of the Mosaic code, that new principle must be in opposition to the principles of the moral law, consequently not in accordance with the spirit of Christianity. On this point we wish to be understood. We do *not* contend that the political code of the Israelites, as it *is*, is to be, or ought to be, the law of every nation. Nations and people *now* may be situated very differently from what the Israelites were when this law was given them ; consequently, their law, as a body, is not applicable to the case of modern nations. But we *do* contend that the moral law is as binding on us at the present day as it

was on Abraham, or on his seed, the children of Israel, in the days of Moses. And that the *principles* of the *Mosaic political law*, not the law itself,—but the *principles* on which that law was founded, *must* be the principles of *all* political law among all nations *where* the *moral law* holds. If, therefore, a nation can be found which is properly exempt from the obligations of the moral law; then that nation can institute laws founded on principles the very *opposite* of the Mosaic institution. For if a man can be so situated as to be under *no* moral obligation, either to his God or to his fellow creatures, he is in a pitiable situation. And it matters not much, what kind of laws are made for him; whether they be just or unjust, wise or unwise.

Our position is therefore sustained. Christ came “not to destroy, but to fulfill” the moral “law,” given by Moses, but which had the Abrahamic Covenant for its principles and base;—He “was the *end* of the” ceremonial or ritual “law” “for righteousness to every one that believeth;”—and their political law was a rule by which to regulate their national and other concerns of a purely temporal character; the principles of which must be in strict harmony with those of the moral law, as they *both* had the same *ultimate* object in view.

To recapitulate the scope of our argument then, we would say, that the plan or design of a gospel system was first *intimated* to man, after he had broken the *first* covenant, or the covenant of works, whose provisions were “Do this and live,” by the promise of a Saviour; “the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent’s head.” Gen. 3: 15. This intimation of the gospel, or rather this *development* of it, was confirmed unto Abraham. And this confirmation, is called the Abrahamic Covenant, or the Covenant of Grace. The principles of which St. Paul expressly calls the GOSPEL. See Gal. 3: 8. The Gospel therefore was preached as well *before* Christ came in the flesh, as *afterwards*. And those who suppose there was no gospel until the *Incarnation*, are most grievously mistaken!

These principles of the gospel embraced in the cove-

nant with Abraham, received new illustrations, and were more fully developed in the covenant, as it is called, or the law given by God to Moses, on Mount Sinai on the two tables of stone. The purport of which is, according to Christ himself, "to love the Lord thy God with all thy soul, mind, might and strength; and to love thy neighbor as thyself." The same sentiment is also inculcated in other parts of the Old Testament. It is therefore said, "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." Deut. 11: 13, "and thy neighbor as thyself." Lev. 19: 18. So also the sentiment contained in the following quotation: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the prophets." Matt. 7: 12, is also found in the Mosaic law. See also Lev. 19: 11 to 18, and 32 to 36, and many other places.

But all its beauties and glories were not displayed until Christ himself came, to do "away the types and shadows prefigured in the law" by offering up himself "a sacrifice once for all" for the sins of the people.

Viewing the subject in this light, the same principles of the Gospel are seen to run through the whole system from Abraham to the dispensation of Christ. Faith in Christ, the promised seed, was the condition of salvation both under the law and under Christ. And this faith was *accepted* in consequence of the merits of the Saviour, *not* in consequence of its own worth. Christ was to die—offer up himself a sacrifice—to appease justice in the sinner's behalf—in order to reconcile him to the Father. This death, this sacrifice, was *meritorious*, and was the medium through which mankind, in every age of the world, have been saved. Before *this* sacrifice was offered, it was typified under the law by the sacrifices and oblations of animals. And the law which regulated these sacrifices, and the ceremonies of the temple worship was called the ceremonial law, which law was of course done away when Christ, the true sacrifice, came into the world and offered himself up. Here then is the difference between the Mosaic and the Christian Dispensations. The one worshipped God through types

and shadows ; the other without the intervention of these veils. See 2d Corinthians chapter 3.

We think then we have made it sufficiently plain that the Moral Law as it is called, is an essential feature in the gospel economy ; and that man has been obliged to observe this law on pain of forfeiting its proffered blessings ; not that this law has blessings of its own, but by following its requirements, the blessings connected with the gospel will be conferred in virtue of the promise.— For the willing and the obedient shall eat the good of the land. Isa. 1 : 19. As the principles of the gospel extended through the whole Mosaic dispensation up to Abraham, it is equally evident that if the moral law was essential to one part, it was to the whole of it. Consequently the principles of the moral law, and those of the gospel *must run parallel* ; if either be taken away, the other is imperfect. Take away the *law*, and we have no directory to the blessings ; take away the gospel and there is nothing to be obtained by following that directory, or schoolmaster as Paul has it.

It was without doubt, a political regulation that patronized SLAVERY under the Mosaic dispensation. But as the Moral law was also binding at the same time, no political regulation could be introduced to disannul or make void any precept of it. For as both laws were dictated by God, we necessarily suppose that no principle of the one, can contradict a principle of the other. It therefore follows that under that dispensation slavery could not be *sin*. For if it was sin, then that principle which tolerated it must contradict the moral law, consequently making one part of the Lord's commands at variance with another part ; as both these laws were dictated to him. The same remarks will apply to the holding of slaves by Abraham, with this difference, that there was no formal enactment of a political law in his case, as it was then unnecessary.

But again ; As the same moral law extends into the Christian dispensation, it must follow, that any principle which could tolerate slavery consistently with this moral law under one dispensation, may under another dispensation, if no principle of that Moral law has been alter-

ed. But we have no evidence that any alteration of this kind has ever taken place in this law under the Christian dispensation ; consequently, slavery is as compatible with the gospel under the *Christian* dispensation, as with the gospel under the *Mosaic* dispensation.

This exposition of the principles of the gospel we shall hold as correct until it is satisfactorily proved to be false. And this, we think, cannot be done as it respects "*principles.*" For it is with principles we seem to have to do. No one will suppose that *any* have been saved, since the fall, but on the *principles* of the gospel ; and no one can suppose there can be a gospel without a provision of *moral principles*, which owe their existence to the moral requirements of God. Consequently if slavery existed harmlessly anciently, it can exist equally inoffensively *now*.

That the view of the subject which we have now given is correct we infer,

1st. From the fact, that neither Christ, nor his Apostles have ever contradicted it.

They have never, in a single instance, flatly, or otherwise, denounced slavery as *sin*, or as inconsistent with the Christian religion. The Apostle Paul speaks of the subject, in a very different style from many of the present day. He says to the slave, "if thou mayest be made free, use it rather;" but if thou canst not be made thus free, "*care not for it*;" 1 Cor. 7: 21. For "in Christ there is neither bond nor free;" i. e. the privileges and enjoyments of the one, in Christ, are as great as the other. His blood is free ; no outward circumstances can prevent its application to that soul which truly seeks after it.

But we may be told, that all those texts which speak against oppression ; which required us to love our neighbor as ourselves—and all such as request us to do to others as we would wish them to do unto us, are *against* slavery. Now this position we must take the liberty to *deny, in toto*, until a law is *produced* ; or an express command *named*, where the simple loss of liberty is denounced as *sin*, or as oppression. Of course, we shall

except all those cases of Hebrew slaves that were retained in servitude for a longer term of time than six years. It is no argument here, to produce, instead of argument, as is too much the fashion in these days, some thirty or forty metaphysical questions designed to mislead the ignorant. And thereby *ungenerously* requiring others to prove that which belongs to themselves. Let the points therefore be *honestly* tested; and not subtly palmed off by vain and metaphysical sophisms.

But in the mean time just permit us to say, we *did* think that man was placed in this world to serve God and prepare for the next; not merely to acquire property or to gain wealth. And that the object of *all* men was, to acquire a daily livelihood, not to hoard up treasures for others to quarrel about. And that no man was properly justified in going farther than this. Because his time ought to be devoted to his soul's interest, not to that of filthy lucre. If these principles are correct, and we think no Christian will be prepared to dispute them, we would humbly ask, where is the *harm*, in one man's having *the liberties of another, so long as he provides sufficiently for him?* In truth, the master himself can enjoy nothing more than what is necessary for his food and raiment. And all this the slave may have. And that too without the trouble and anxiety of getting it.—Is it objected that his living is not so nice as that of his master's? Strange philanthropy! What! would you reduce that robust frame, that vigorous arm, that piercing eye, that smiling visage and active mien, to the wan, emaciated and dejected wretch, whose frame is racked with pains; whose arm is tremulous; whose eye is dim; whose countenance is palid and sunk, and whose gait is tottering with premature old age; whose mind is imbecile and whose offspring is puny; we say, if you would produce all these evils—or blessings probably, as some would call them, if the slave could but be free;—then let him set at the table with his master. Denounce before him the use of simple fare; tell him 'tis beneath the dignity of man thus to live; pamper his appetite with the dainties of the opulent and wealthy; beget

within him a disrelish for the simplicity of former habits, and your work is done! Done, irrecoverably done!! Well would it be for the master did many of his dainties give more place to the simple fare of his servants.

It is said by some that the slave is not permitted even to use the means of grace. If so, it is to be lamented; and we feel extremely sorry, and highly deprecate the condition of such. But be that as it may, it is no objection to the position we have advocated. Scripture evidence seems to say to us, *that simple loss of liberty by a political law, whose principles correspond with that given by God to Moses, and which is restrained by the Moral law emanating from the same source, is NO SIN.* This position we think is sufficiently substantiated by the two arguments already adduced; yet to make it still clearer in the minds of some, we proceed and say,

2d. That its existence is obviously implied by Christ and his apostles as existing in his day, both in the church and out of it.

That it existed out of the church, and among the people in the days of Christ, may be satisfactorily proved from history; but the New Testament itself, furnishes evidence enough to the point in the various parables put forth by our Saviour when he compared the kingdom of heaven to a man having servants, &c.

But secondly it is proved by specific texts and passages. The parable put forth by our Lord in Matthew twenty-fifth, from the 14th to the 30th verses inclusive, appears in point.

This parable proves in the *first* place two things, viz: 1st. That slavery existed in his day and was familiar with the people to whom the parable was addressed. 2d. That the relation existing between the master and slave was *not a sin*; for, the kingdom of heaven was *compared to it*. And this comparison of the kingdom of heaven to this relation is a *very* strong proof, that the servants spoken of were slaves; in no other view can the comparison hold. For let me ask, *what* does a man possess that does *not* belong to his heavenly Father? Is not man the *property*, so to speak, of his Creator? Is

he not in his power? Can he not *sell* him, i. e. relinquish him to his own destruction, or deliver him into the hands of his enemies for idolatry—*when* he pleases? And to *whom* he pleases? Can he *possess* any thing of *his own*? Is not the whole of his time and labor his master's? Most certainly. And the very moment you suppose a servant can possess *any thing* whatever of his *own*, the comparison is destroyed. From this fact therefore, as well as from the parable itself, the following points are substantiated, viz:

1st. They were the man's *own* servants. v. 14th.

2d. They had *nothing* of their own.

3d. All their time and labor properly belonged to the master. Therefore he, who worked not for his Lord, was punished. v. 30.

4th. It was their *duty* thus to labor for their master. v. 27.

5th. They labored *not* for *wages*. This would have carried the idea of MERIT in their services.

6th. And yet, after all, the master *did* unto them, as it would be just for him to have been dealt by, was he in their situation. He *gave* the obedient *presents*; but *punished* the *disobedient*. Consequently,

7th. The relation which here existed is just such an one as we have contended for, viz:—*Political slavery controlled by moral law*. The same remarks apply to Luke 19: 12—26.

In accordance with the same views are the sentiments of Paul to Timothy. Hear him:—"Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own masters worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed."

"And they that have believing masters, let them not despise them," that is, believing masters *not* to *despise* their slaves—"because they are brethren," i. e. in Christ; "but rather do them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit," viz. of their services. *These things teach and exhort.*

"If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to *wholesome* words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ,

and to the doctrine which is according to godliness, he is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strife of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, *supposing that gain is godliness* : from such withdraw thyself. But godliness with contentment is great gain. For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out. And having *food and raiment* let us be therewith *content*." 1 Tim. 6 : 1 to 8.

From this quotation, the following inferences naturally present themselves, viz.

1st. These servants were slaves, being "under the yoke," and having "masters" over them.

2d. That some of these masters were Christians—"believers."

3d. These masters and their slaves were "*brethren*," not according to the flesh ; but in Christ.

4th. They were enjoined to "*honor*" the master ; and the master not to "*despise*" them.

5th. These slaves labored not for wages. "Having food and raiment let us therewith be content." Partakers of the benefit."

6th. This *relation*, and "these things," Timothy was to "*exhort and teach*." And that for the following reasons, viz. :

1st. That the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed." For, as we have above shown, Christ taught that the kingdom of heaven was as a man having slaves under him. See Matt. 25 : 14 to 30. As this man's slaves belonged to him, so all men belonged to the Father, who had an equal right to them, their labor, their time, and their all, as the man in the parable had to his slaves—so here ; if Paul had taught Timothy to have preached insubordination of slaves, or had he *denounced* the relation existing between master and slave, he would virtually have anathematized the doctrine of Christ. But,

2d. "If any man teach otherwise," he "consents not to *wholesome* words, even the words of our Lord Jesus

Christ ;" but is proud, knowing nothing, doating about questions and strife of words, envy, railings, evil surmises," &c.

We might multiply texts to the same import, but the above we think are sufficient.

In conclusion of this and of the preceding section, we would say, we do not believe that the simple holding of one man's liberties by another, in the sense we have defined, is "*sin*." Did we think otherwise, we would be the last—the *very last*, to speak in its favor. The scripture testimony of God, and the very nature of things, forbid such a belief. Did we lay down a *principle*, unwise should we be, did we not follow it.—And should we assert, that "loss of liberty is *sin*, as a principle, WHERE should we stop! Does the principle *stop*, when we have emancipated all the slaves? No! Does it *stop* when we have forever anathematized a man's right to his hired servants, day-laborers and domestics? No! Does it stop, when we have disannulled all penal law, thrown open the prison doors, and denounced sin upon the ministers of justice? No! Does it stop when we have torn children from the embrace of parents, to prevent their committing sin, perhaps all their days? No! Where then does it stop? It stops not, till anarchy is established throughout the world! It stops not, till every man shall do *as he pleases*!—till families are separated, and till there is no punishment for crime!

CHAPTER II.

BRIEF REVIEW OF REV. L. R. SUNDERLAND'S BOOK,
ENTITLED, "TESTIMONY OF GOD AGAINST SLAVERY."

SECTION I.

STRICTURES ON MR. SUNDERLAND'S VIEW OF SLAVERY.

The importance of having our views on all objects of research *defined*, has ever been felt and acknowledged by all who have paid any attention to investigation. For whenever investigators have arrived to that point where they could gain a knowledge of a *defined* "outline," the difficulty of the undertaking is, in a great measure overcome. And the task of thus "defining," is sometimes extremely difficult. It is no less than the drawing a division line between what is *essential*; and what is collateral, extraneous, or coincident. It is the *divesting* of a subject of every thing which is not a "constituent" of it; and it is the *retaining* of every thing which is "essential" to it.

In defining slavery, therefore, none of those evils or circumstances which are *results*, and which are produced by the operation of the slave system,* should ever find their way into a definition of that system. Should they enter into it, confusion is produced,—the *effect* producing the *cause*; and the *cause* the *effect*.

Let our ideas be definite of the system itself, and we shall be in a better situation to judge of its merits or demerits. We apprehend this mixing of cause and "effects" together, has been the cause of much warmth between partisans of the slavery question, which might

*By any operation of it, whether lawful or unlawful.

otherwise not have been known. For a system is *not* necessarily, answerable for all its *bad* results, or for all the evils which originate from it, when in bad hands.— If so, every system ought to be denounced, whether good or bad. A distinction ought always to be made between a “system” which is, in itself *sinful*, and *sinful* “effects.”

Our author happens to be among those who have not kept this distinction good. If we understand him he jumbles both “cause” and “effects” together ; and then, gravely tells us, of some “evils” which are, according to him *results*, which can be made to be nothing more nor less than *CAUSES* of the whole ! Let us hear him : “We observe, then, that by *slavery*, in this country, is meant *the possession and holding of the human species as property,—the using them not as human beings, but as things and beasts, exacting of them services and compelling them to perform labors without rendering them any just and equivalent in return, and with an equal view to their own benefit.*” p. 9.

In this definition are recognized traits which must be considered as *effects*, and as nothing else. 1st. The using of human beings not as such, but as “*things*” and as “*beasts.*” 2d. Exacting of them hard “*services*” and “*labors.*” Now we defy any man to show these traits as *causes* in themselves. But they can very readily be shown to be the *results* of some other cause.— For no man can treat another as a “*thing*,” and as a “*beast*” and exact services and labors without compensation, unless he first have him in his power and possession. Again :

Our author tells us, page 10, “those who are slaves have been *violently* made such, and they are now kept in this state by force and arms.” Force, then, becomes necessary to make a slave. But where in this definition do we find it requisite ? For aught this definition informs us slaves may be voluntarily bought, or hired ; there may be no compulsion whatever ! Indeed, our author would have us believe, that primarily, i. e. in making slaves,—it was altogether unnecessary : for he

makes *force*, or the violently depriving the "slave of his right to himself," as a *result* of the slave system ;— not as the *cause* of it, or an essential feature in it. *Compulsion* then has nothing to do primarily with the slave system, and is only to be deprecated as an evil resulting from it ! The following is therefore a simple literal version of our author's definition and the results of his slavery system. "A *harmless or voluntary* possession and holding of the human species as property." And from this inoffensive sort of slavery originates the gigantic results of arbitrary power of the master "over the peace, the health and life of the slave !" of "*violently* depriving him of his right to himself, his right to the free use of his own will, reason, judgment, and labors !!" What confusion ! If this is the system of slavery against which he levels his artillery, well may he exclaim, "Such are a few of the features by which this system may be distinguished from *any thing and every thing* which was ever tolerated by the God of the Bible under the name of servitude or slavery !" or before ever known among men !

This definition we are to receive as characterising the slave system in this country ! How egregiously have all abolitionists heretofore misrepresented this whole subject ! *Force*, which obliges the slave to submit, we have ever before been told, by these philanthropists, was essential to the system. But we are here fain told, it is no such thing ! Compulsion is no part of the plan ;— Slavery can exist without it ! And even when our author told us, that "slaves have been *violently* made such," it is to be supposed his mind had not had time to regain its wonted equilibrium after consulting his authors, "Strand's Law of Slavery, Rankin's Letters on Slavery, Torry's Portraiture of Slavery," &c.

It is presumed we shall not be told that the sentence we have selected was not intended as a definition, for the following reasons : 1st. The question is asked, "What is slavery ?" "Especially, what is that kind of slavery which prevails in this country," &c. Then after giving an account of the importance of settling this

point, our author proceeds, "We observe, then, that by *slavery*, in this country, is MEANT the *possession*," &c. 2d. By the sentence being in *italics*. 3d. By the remark, "*This* kind of slavery"—i. e. such as he had defined in the italicised sentence—"may be distinguished by the following remarkable particulars." These three particulars make it apparent that the sentence quoted was designed as a definition for slavery. And as such we shall claim the privilege of making a few more remarks upon it.

And first, the proper definition given. This is the first member of the sentence—"the possession and holding of the human species as property." The other part of the sentence expressing merely *sequences*, for reasons before noticed. Negro slavery, then, consists, in this country, in "*the possession and holding of the human species as property*." As we before remarked, *force* is entirely a non-essential. If a man can get the "possession" of another, so as to "hold" him, it matters not whether he be taken as captive, or by a *voluntary* trade.

The method of holding slaves however does not seem to hold a very prominent place in the sense of this expression. That of "property" seems to be the all absorbing topic. Unless the expression, "property," find a place in all descriptions of slavery, Abolitionists think, it would seem, that that appalling evil is neither described nor defined. We shall therefore give this idea a passing notice. And here permit us to remark, that the value of a slave depends on his *ability* to labor. His *body*, aside from his labor, is of no value whatever; because it can be put to no use. Consequently, how much soever it might have been valued *once*, while active and athletic, is entirely *void* of value when dead. So also, if the slave be sick or lame. If his disability be *permanent*, the master, in point of property, may consider him even worse than a dead slave. If it be not, in its nature permanent, the master values him just in proportion to the difference between the expense of "raising him," and the amount of labor he will probably accomplish if

he gets his health. Now if slavery consists essentially in "property" "held in man," the master's property in his slave, holds a just proportion to the labor he is capable of performing. Consequently, if from permanent disability he can perform *no* labor; that slave is considered as *worthless*. And that property which was *once* held in him, is now *lost*! He is, therefore, *no slave*! Even although such an one may be whipt, and scourged every day for his supposed stupor and sullenness; yet, because he cannot be sold, he is **NO SLAVE!!**

That there is something more than simple "property in man" necessary to constitute slavery is still farther illustrated in the case of those negroes, who, having been sold into slavery, afterwards prove their liberty. In these cases all the steps had been gone through with, as with real slaves. Why then were they not slaves?—Because simple property of itself cannot make them. Property, simply, can never give a man any power whatever to "hold," or to "possess" a slave. The slave must be made such by some other principle, or he is *never* made. All that property can do, is to be the medium through which a negro, who is already made a slave, can be transferred from one owner to another.—And this, property will do among white men, as well as among black. A farmer hires a white servant for a specified time; but soon sells him, or transfers him, for his services' sake, to his neighbor A. B. or C. during the remainder of the time, for another stipulated sum. And who ever supposed such a servant was a slave? And yet, in one sense he was bought and sold;—i. e. for his services' sake. So are slaves sold, for their labors' sake.

It may be objected, that the question of slavery does not so much turn on "property," as on the *power* of "holding" or "possessing" this "property."

If by this "power," is meant the *control of the slave's liberties*, so as to have the power of holding property in man a *secondary* circumstance; we have nothing to object. We ourselves believe this to be the fact. For the power of holding him *as* property is in common with the power requiring of him labor. For with the slave,

the power of requiring the one, as well as of holding the other, originates from the same source, the entire subjugation of the slave to his master, or, in virtue of the relation between the master and slave.

But, if the "power is to be only commensurate with the property ; then, when the property disappears, the "power" disappears also. Consequently, the slave who is permanently disabled, is no slave ! For in such an one, the master has *no* "power" to *hold* property ; merely, from the simple fact that there is no property there ! The idea of "*power of holding*," &c. is as fallacious as that of property itself as a test of slavery.—They both turn on the same point. For as property is made essential to the slave condition, the power, by which it is held, is necessary only for this purpose. But if slavery consists in the *power* "of possessing and of holding the human species as *property*," "there is a manifest impropriety in considering the holding of property in man," as a *cause* ;—for it is obviously the *effect*. For the "power," must necessarily *precede* the existence of the "property." The very idea that "power" is necessary in order that one man can hold "property" in another, proves that "property" is the *consequence* ; and that the "power" is the *cause*. The palpable inconsistency, therefore, of considering "property in man" as an *essential* to slavery, is clearly manifest.

We know it is urged by some, that slavery consists neither in "*property*" merely, or in the "*power*" of holding property, but in the "*right*" of so doing. A very slight attention indeed to this point will show its utter futility. The simple idea is this ;—the simple "*right*" of holding property in man, constitutes slavery. No matter whether that slave is saleable or not, so long as his master has the "*right*" to sell him,—were he saleable,—he is a slave. The futility consists in supposing a "*right*" to a thing, as synonymous with the *actual* "possession" of that thing. Or, in other words, to apply to the case under consideration, in supposing the "*right to sell* a thing the same as the *actual* sale of it. Now every body knows there is a wide difference be-

tween a man's "*right* to sell," and his *actual selling*.—Between the "*right*" of possession, and possession itself;—or between the "*right*" to sell, and the actual sale, there appears a very perceptible odds. A man may have the "*right*" to possess a thing, while the actual possession thereof is in some *other* person's hands;—or he may have the "*right* to *sell* a thing as property, while the thing itself is unsaleable, and therefore cannot be sold. Just as a man obtains the "*right*" to *possess* the highest prize in a lottery by buying one of its tickets. If a man buy a ticket in a lottery, that ticket, after it is paid for; gives that man a "*right*" of which no other man can *forcibly* deprive him of possessing whatever prize it may draw, even if it be the highest in the lottery. And this "*right*" is just as strong the moment the ticket is purchased, as it is after he gets the prize into actual possession. The *uncertainty* of his drawing a prize, does not affect his "*right*" in the least.—Yet the bearing it has on his "*possession*" of it is obvious enough to be seen by any one. So also, after the ticket, is purchased, its owner has a "*right*" to *sell* that "*right*," and make merchandise of it. Consequently, it must be viewed, to him in the light of "*property*." This "*right*" to the prize, can be *bought*,—and it can be *sold* and may be *transferred* from one owner to another in the same way as any piece of property whatever. And yet, who of them has ever *possessed* it!

The difference between the "*right*" to property for the purpose of sale, and its *actual* "*possession*" is well illustrated in the method practised by some recently, in the "*Eastern speculation*" of buying "*Bonds*." By this method, A agrees to let B have a certain piece of property for a certain stipulated sum, provided B pays that sum within a given time. To secure this chance for "*trade*," B comes under bonds to A, for another sum, to abide the agreement, or pay the forfeiture. By this method, A has the "*right*" to *sell* this property bonded to him by B, at any period of the time specified. But he has *no* "*right*" to occupy it—improve it,—or "*possess*" it. As an article of property A has

every right to it during the time named. He may *give* it away,—“swap” it—*sell* it,—or it may be taken on legal process. It therefore does not necessarily follow, that, because a man has a “right” of “property” in a thing that he actually *possesses* that thing, or that that thing is altogether under his control.

So it is with the slave. If slavery consists in the simple “right of “holding property in man;” or the “right” of holding “human beings” as “we hold property,” then it follows that the poor slave is not in so pitiable a situation as we have fain been made to believe! For, so long as he is a mere creature of the “rights” of sale, and of possession, he may *actually* “possess” himself. Consequently, he is “his own man” as to his labor, occupation and mental endowments.

We are aware that the two last objections are not necessarily, appended to our author’s definition. For viewing that definition in its proper relation to its inferred results, we cannot see the propriety of having the “*power*” of possessing, and of holding human beings as property; or even the “*right*” of so doing, take the place of ‘*cause*.’ For they are both made, in the work before us, “*results*.”

Now if they are results, how can they be the cause? There is, therefore, a manifest inconsistency somewhere about this writer. In short, we have scarcely seen so confused,—so jumbled up,—or so distorted a mass of ideas in so short a space, as occurs in the first three pages of the work under consideration. We are first told that slavery essentially consists in both its Causes and Effects;—and secondly, that its *results* consist of its Causes and Effects also! The true English of which appears to be; A “cause,” can produce itself!! and an “effect” can be produced without a cause!!!

We therefore say, that, whatever good intentions Mr. Sunderland had in view in giving the world this definition with its logical results;—or however clear his mind might have been on the subject previously to his committing his thoughts to paper: we must be permitted, respectfully, to suggest, that *he has utterly failed of his object!* In his endeavoring to answer the question,

"What is slavery?" he has rendered darkness ten times more visible! He has shown that he is a warm professed friend of the Negro slave, while at the same time he has no *definite* idea of the subject. He wishes to cut a tremendous figure in the cause of emancipation, but misses in the proper place, the commencement.—At one time he tells us, slaves have "been made such by "force of arms;" at another, that it is unnecessary! Again, that, "the using of" men "not as human beings, but as things and beasts," is a *cause*; and subsequently, virtually, as *effect*. Slavery is now a voluntary* possession of the human species as property; and anon, slaves are *violently* made such!

If, therefore, Mr. S. has defined any thing, it cannot be Negro slavery! And we fear, that, should he imagine he had got slavery in such a tangible form that its complete overthrow is inevitable from the first broadside discharge of his artillery, he will find, on close, thorough and impartial inspection, that he has been fighting all the while, an *ignis fatuus*!

But the evils of which he complains, if they do in reality exist in the garb he puts upon them, or even in any garb whatever, call loudly upon humanity for redress. And it is confidently hoped that some efficient and practicable course will be adopted to remove every vestige of the evils of Negro slavery from our land. But while the attempt is making, let us keep the natural distinction good, between the slavery *system* and the *evils* resulting from it, and we shall act the more efficiently.

In looking over these evils however, they being nine in number, we really thought we did not know what part of the inhabitants of that slave region were the *most* to be *pitied*; the *master* or the *slave*. The following are his words:—"Its direct and legitimate tendency and *influence* on the minds of both the *enslaver* and the *enslaved* is, to deaden the conscience and *prevent* the salvation of the soul!" p. 10. A question occurred to our

*We call it a *voluntary* possession, because we do not know what other appropriate epithet to apply to that kind of possession which is obtained without *force* or compulsion.

mind, are all the inhabitants of that region who *have* slaves, lost forever!! Is there *no* hope! No, certainly!! Gone, forever GONE!!! For this influence on the mind, it must be remembered, is not a *voluntary* one; but it exists in *nature*; man has no control over it, so long as the cause of it—slavery—exists. Man being, necessarily a sinner, according to this doctrine, when he obtained his *first* slaves; and not having had his mind sufficiently awake to enable him to seek to become a *better* man when his conscience was *free* and *active*, unhampered by any of the torpifying influences of slavery: is it natural, is it reasonable, to suppose he would *alter* his course under all the benumbing influences of slavery on his conscience, when that torpitude *increased* with every revolving day while he held slaves? Surely not. There is no *moral* possibility, therefore, that such *can* be saved; and if slavery is *sin*, God will *never* save them. For he will save no one in his sins. How lamentable indeed must be the situation of those masters! Slumbering over the brink of remediless ruin! Forever shut from the kingdom of God; and destined never to enjoy happiness beyond the grave! How solemn! how awful the thought! How happy ought *we* to be—how thankful beyond expression ought our hearts to be—that this wretched, this most deplorable situation is not permitted to afflict us.

Our author tells us farther; that “it is perpetual, descending from one generation to another.” Now this *perpetuality* of slavery must either be *inherent, inseparable from it; one of its characteristics*; or else a *fortuitous* circumstance attending it. In either case, it will not help our author. For he undoubtedly holds up this as an unexceptionable feature of slavery, in order to produce *disgust* in the minds of the friends of humanity against slavery. For, if perpetuality is a *characteristic* of slavery—inseparable from it—in *vain* is it to make the endeavor to *abolish* it. For this you can *not* do, unless you can change the nature of *perpetuality*. But if it is only a *fortuitous* circumstance, then slavery may exist *without* it. Consequently perpetuality will nei-

ther militate *against*, or in favor of slavery. It is merely a "bug-bear" to effect that which argument will not.

We are told, "it is a power over the peace, purity, health, character, liberty, (life and salvation) of the slave, which nothing but the will or consent of the master can dissolve." Now this we distinctly *deny*.

1st. No law can be made by any State, *repugnant* to the general tenor and scope of the laws of the United States.

2d. No law can be made with the *avowed* purpose of destroying purity, health, or character; or even peace, much less the life and *salvation* of the slave! That the power which masters have over their slaves has been taken *advantage* of by some, is freely admitted. But to the idea that laws are made for this avowed object; or that they can be exercised in this way, by fair implication, we enter our unequivocal denial. Until the finger is placed upon the chapter and verse where such things are recognized, we shall hold the authors of them guilty of a base fabrication.

3d. The *will* of the master is superior even to the law, according to our author. "Which nothing but the *will* and *consent* of the master can dissolve." Here then is a clear avowal that the will of the master is superior to the law. Now if such a master has *abused* his slaves, why blame the law—that could not prevent him, so long as his own will is *above* it. But "these masters *make* the laws." Indeed! And in virtue of that, can they make a law to cut the throats of all such as they dislike, either *black* or white?

"The master *may* compel the slave to endure hardships, and to perform labors which are inhumanly wasting to his health and life." And so *may* a father deal by his son. But this usage is only fortuitous. The master *may* use him very kindly. Even make him "lord of his whole house" as did Pharaoh, Joseph, and Abram his servant Eliezer.

"It deprives him of all adequate protection of his person, his character and morals!"

Wonderful! *Cannot* a slave be moral? Can he not

sustain a virtuous and christian character? And must his person be abused? If so, who is to blame? The Abolitionist answers, the *system* of slavery. It is *denied*. All that that system gives to the master, are the *liberties* of the slave, which liberties he is as sacredly bound to *respect* as he is his own. And no law can be constitutionally enacted to alter that respect wantonly. That people do *not* uniformly respect that liberty is notorious, for they do not respect their *own*. Will our author give us a well vouched instance wherein a master properly respected his own liberties, that did not respect these of his slaves? If scoundrels take undue license with their slaves, it is no more than the same class of people take otherwheres. It exists as well among the "*free*" as the "*bond*." And so is flagellation also sometimes practiced. But is this a proof that there is no law against these abuses, because they exist?

"It crushes and kills the human mind, by violently withholding and preventing all suitable instruction in letters and science."

If this is a true representation of slaves, they must certainly be in a singular state; living bodies, with "*crushed*" and "*killed*" minds! Really indeed, abolitionists would not turn nearly *three millions* of such fools and idiots loose upon our generosity! We know they would not. They would rather that *this* race, at least, would stay with their masters undoubtedly, as our Hospitals and Alms-houses would, as yet, hardly contain them.

But let us examine this sentence a little more closely. That the mind becomes more expanded and enlarged by exercise in science, is evident, and the withholding of letters, at present, is a grievous step. Yet, be this right or wrong, it is a sentiment no where found in our creed, that the want of these helps *necessarily* destroys the mind. Facts are too strong to the contrary. The book of nature is always open before them, as well as before us. And beside, if the mind is to be thus destroyed merely from the simple want of instruction in letters, there are thousands, and hundreds of thousands who are in the *very* same predicament, and yet who are not

slaves either. But again: the sentiment is denied *in toto*, that by this want of instruction, the mind is made one jot *less* than it was formed by nature. It can not be proved that it is. Even the case of Casper Hauser, with as little trace of intellect as he evinced, is proof in our favor.

"It shortens human life, by violently compelling the slave to endure rigorous hardships, and to perform excessive labors." p. 10.

That human life may be shortened by "excessive labor and rigorous hardships" is evident. Yet it does not necessarily follow, that life *must* be shortened by such means. The case of the Israelites in Egypt is an example in point. Yet it is presumed there are very few cases indeed where the lives of slaves have been shortened by these means. There is but little, if any, difference between the longevity of slaves and their masters. And as to disease, they have as great an immunity as any people. Intermittent fever,—fever and ague, they resist much longer than the northern whites; whereas if their systems were so broken down by hard labor, we should suppose, they would be very subject to it.

The above remarks are sufficient to show that all these evils of which our Author complains, are *not* inseparable from slavery. For, setting the loss of liberty aside, that state *can* exist which can be called nothing else but slavery, and yet *without* any of the evils enumerated by our Author. Consequently slavery is one thing; and these evils which sometimes attached themselves to it, but are not *necessarily* connected with it, are another. To have a fair, candid and an impartial view of the subject, our author ought to have kept this distinction obviously in view.

"Such are a few of the features by which this system may be distinguished from any thing and every thing which was ever tolerated by the God of the Bible, under the name of servitude or slavery."

We think we have made it evident that the evils enumerated by our author are not an *essential* part of slavery, although they may co-exist together. For if they are

essential, then they must all be present in *every* case of slavery that exists in the land. But to this, we hardly think our author would be willing to subscribe, for his good sense must teach him that in all probability there are some exceptions, where a slave is treated differently from this. Where then is the *propriety* in saying that slavery in these United States, is *characterized* by these evils? Where is the candor in doing it? Acting on the same principle, you might select a number of the worst characters that are to be found in the land, such as murderers, drunkards, adulterers, liars, &c. and then, holding them up to the world exclaim, "such are a few of the features by which Americans are distinguished from any body and every body that existed in the Old World." The one course is just as justifiable as the other. One thing is known from another by its characteristics; but an evil which *occasionally* grows out of any principle is no more a characteristic of that principle, than it is the principle itself. Even if it should occur 999 times in a thousand. Still it is not a characteristic. For a *characteristic must NEVER fail*. Hence, *heat* is a characteristic of fire; and *coldness* of ice. But will our author aver that all the evils he has enumerated are *always* attendant on slavery; that they are *never* absent in a single case? We presume not. Where then is the candor, or even courtesy, in saying "*such* are the *features*, (characteristics) by which this system is *distinguished* from any thing and every thing that was ever tolerated by the God of the Bible, &c.?"

He continues—"It is true a certain kind of slavery *was* tolerated by some of the Old Testament writers; but then it differed *radically* from the system of slaveholding, which prevails in these United States." In this quotation it is admitted, 1st. That slavery did exist, or was tolerated by *some* of the Old Testament *writers*. 2d. That this slavery was different *radically* from that which prevails now. A question occurs, what *kind* of slavery could that be, to be *radically* different from the present form? To be radically different, it must be different from the *root*; its *basis* different. But, per-

haps our author means, that, inasmuch as the slavery of which he was speaking, was simply the “investing of *property* in man ;” ancient slavery consisted essentially in the *whole and entire loss of liberty*. That they were entirely “in the power of the masters to whom they belonged.”

“Besides, if any kind of slavery may be tolerated now, under the gospel dispensation, because a certain species of it existed among the Jews anciently, or because Christ and his Apostles did not say in just so many words that “slaveholding under all circumstances of the case, is sin against God,” then it follows by the same rules of interpretation, that polygamy is justifiable now, by the Bible, for some of the patriarchs were polygamists, and they carried out their views by their practice.”

Our author seems to think that, because Abraham, David and Sampson were polygamists, polygamy stands on the same footing with that of slavery in the Old Testament ; and because Christ has not denounced slavery as *sin*, in just so many words, that the one can be proved as well as the other from the New. Here we are at issue ; and that for the following reasons :—

1st. Slavery was a political regulation dictated by God, and controlled by moral obligation. Lev. 25 : 44, 45, 46.

2nd. Polygamy had no such authority. There is no command or precept in the Bible, requiring a man to have more than one wife, at the same time.

3d. There is evidence enough to prove that it was never the design of heaven that polygamy should exist. See Gen. 2 : 24, Eph. 5 : 31, Mark 10 : 8, Math. 19 : 5. In these places, one man and one woman only are lawfully recognized as “man and wife.”

4th. In consequence of the prevalence of the custom introduced by Lamach, the grandson of Irad, and great grandson of Enoch, it was undoubtedly extremely common ; so much so, that its criminality had been lost sight of. Consequently, all the nations of the earth practised it. The Israelites, while in Egypt, among

those heathen, had become so familiar with it, that they had adopted it among themselves: and by long use, 400 years or more, they could see no harm in it, considering it lawful and as a principle of innate nature, when the law was given by Moses. It is almost unnecessary to state, that the practice existing so long, strong attachments would naturally have been formed in its favor, as well as a great variety of relationships, which it would be extremely dangerous to sever. Hence,

5th. The Mosaic law *suffered* polygamy to exist for the present. Probably choosing the less of the two evils. But where is the parallel to this in the history of Ancient Slavery? Where is there an intimation that it was simply *suffered*? So much to the contrary of this is it, that there is an express declaration in its favor.

6th. There appears to be no parallelism between them. One is *directed*, the other is *permitted*:—the one is recognized by Christ and his Apostles; see Math. 25: 14—30. 1 Tim. 6: 1—4; the other is very plainly reprobated. I. Tim. 3: 2, 12, Tit. 1: 6, Math. 19: 5, Mark 10: 8. See also our Lord's discourse concerning divorce, in 19th chapter of Matthew. The crime of adultery here does not so much consist in the repudiation of the wife, as in the cohabiting with the second woman while the first is living. See Rom. 7: 2, 3.

The one is obviously condemned by Holy writ, while no such condemnation is appended to the other. The one can be proved to be *not* in accordance with the tenor of even the Mosaic political law; while the other was consistent with it.

7th. There are express commands against the multiplication of wives even in the Old Testament. See Deut. 17: 17, (1 Cor. 7: 39, and 2,) Mal. 2: 14 to 16.

But *none* against slavery as *sin*.

8th. If a man *had* two wives already, Deut. 12: 15, then the law of Moses directed, that, in distributing his *goods*, the man should make the first born son of the *hated* wife, take the place of the first born of the beloved

wife. This, from its very nature, we see was intended as a sort of reprimand for having two wives. For had he before had but one, this unpleasant task to his feelings, could have never accrued. But where do you find a reprimand even similar to this, for slavery? It is true, a man could not "*steal*" a slave; yet that was no reprimand against slavery itself; it being merely directed against the *manner* of *obtaining* them. For a man could *buy* them notwithstanding. Neither the fact that a master must free his slaves when they had sustained a loss of an eye or a tooth through his violence, any better argument. As these commands were mere reprimands or punishments for their brutal violence.

"If he take him another wife" &c. Ex. 21: 10.— Here is a *permit* for a man to have *another* wife, when the *first* one *was* or had been, a *slave*, see 8th and 9th verses. In which case, the father of the son thus married, was not to "diminish" the "food," the "raiment" or the "duty of marriage" to the first. The objects in this provision were undoubtedly *two*; the 1st, equity and justice to the *first* wife; and the 2d, a reprimand to the husband and father. For so long as the husband was well satisfied with the first wife, it is hardly to be supposed, he would take another. Consequently, the using of a *disliked* wife, during the whole course of her life, in the same manner with a *beloved* one, could be no small tax on the feelings of his nature.

These feelings therefore would be continually reminding him of the *unhappiness* of polygamy.

The whole scope of the requirement of the law in cases of polygamy had an obvious leaning *against* it; and designed ultimately to bring it into disrepute.

But where do you find that obvious bearing *against* slavery? Where is there a *single* passage, which *directly* goes to show, in any way, that it was ever *designed* to be done away. By this we do not mean, that it never *was* designed to be done away; but that we have *no evidence* of it in scripture. But so far to the contrary, that every precaution is taken to make a state of slavery rather *desirable*, than otherwise. A slave enjoyed the

same religious rights as a Hebrew ; was circumcised,—offered sacrifices,—was not “vexed” nor “oppressed ;” and were to be loved,” so far as external treatment was concerned, as they “loved themselves.” Consequently were to be well fed and clothed. What is there in all this calculated to make slavery *undesirable* ? Or to create a disgust against it ? Surely nothing. But can you say as much in *favor* of polygamy ?

9th. Farther : In *effect*, Christ has put his *veto* upon polygamy in his condemnation of adultery. It is very obvious, that where polygamy exists so extensively as it did among the Hebrews and the neighboring nations, that there *must* be discontents, animosities, quarrellings, and almost every variety of discord nameable both among the wives themselves, and even frequently, between the husbands and wives. And unless there was a way devised by which the husband could divest himself of these restless and discontented wives, consequences the most serious might happen. To remedy this disastrous state of things, Moses granted them the privilege of “Divorce.” Truly was it said then, “for the hardness of your hearts Moses *suffered* you to put away your wives,” for “in the beginning it was *not* so.” That is, in the beginning when *one* man married but *one* woman, divorce was not *necessary* : but now since your hearts are so “hard” as not to observe the original institution by God himself, but practice polygamy, “Moses suffered you to put away your wives,” to prevent worse consequences. But this “putting away the wife” Christ condemns, except, for the cause of “fornication.” Consequently polygamy which was in a great measure the cause of it. It was also condemned in the Old Testament. See Mal. 2 : 15, 16.

But no where does he condemn slavery in this manner. He even indirectly approves of it, or at least considers it harmless. For he compares the kingdom of heaven to a master and his slaves. Where the children of men are obviously considered as possessing nothing of their own, but even their lives, liberties, labors, bodies and every thing they call their own, belongs not to them,

but to their Father in heaven ; just as the slave possesses nothing, but every thing he has, his body, his life, even his labor and effects are all his masters. See Matt. 25 : 14. In any *other* sense the parable does not hold.

The reasons above assigned make it also clear, that polygamy cannot be proved by *implication* ; even if it is necessary to have recourse to this means to prove the propriety of slavery, from the New Testament. For notwithstanding both these systems are implicated in the New Testament, yet what is unfortunate for our author, this implication is directly *against* polygamy ; but in *favor*, rather than otherwise, of slavery. Hence we have nothing to fear from the attempt to support polygamy on the same basis, with slavery. There is no parallelism between them.

It is no argument, to prove here that the word of God speaks *against* sin, oppression, unmerciful labor, rigorous service, starvation, flagellation, theft, murder, revenge, rape, &c. For these, however closely they may be associated *with* slavery, are no more the characteristics of it than they are of the principles of the American Constitution, or that of any genuine evangelical Christian church. And he who would seize upon these crimes and offences against God and man, and hold them up to the view of the world in order to bring contempt and scorn on what slavery in *reality* is, might with the same propriety, hold up the *same* crimes, to condemn our national Liberty, and the principles of the church to which he belongs !

If slavery can be tolerated by the Bible, then by the same rules, can "private revenge, murder, offensive wars," &c. be tolerated.

This is denied. For Christ vetoed the *first* ;—that of murder is an *assumption* altogether gratuitous,—there being no murder in the case referred to. "Numb. 35 : 19." And as to offensive wars, they were the judgments of God,—wholly foreign to the subject. In passing however, we would just say, the same doctrine is almost every day proclaimed from the pulpit, even under the gospel dispensation, in the saying, "He that is often

reproved and stiffeneth his neck shall suddenly be destroyed and that without remedy."

"By this law it was made the duty of a man to marry his brother's widow : and the master to marry his female slave, or set her free." p. 11. For this there was a special reason. Did the same circumstances exist *now* as *then*, the same regulation would be proper. This is no objection against slavery. For as it is the transgression of the Law of God that constitutes sin ; so whatever breaks that law at *one* time, will break it at another. Now if a man could *innocently* marry his brother's widow, or even his female slave without sinning against that law *then*, he *can now*, under the *same* circumstances—unless it can be proved, that that law of God has either been changed or abrogated since.

If the silence of Christ may be referred to as a justification of slavery, then by this same silence, we may justify the making, selling and drinking of ardent spirits, polygamy, lotteries, theatres, offensive wars, tyranny of any kind,—gladiatorial exhibitions,—purgatory,—transubstantiation,—indulgences, and numerous other pernicious errors, which in his day had a "local habitation and a name." p. 11.

Here truly is a formidable list of errors to be *established*, if slavery *is*. But supposing slavery *should* be established, even by the testimony of Christ, would our Author "stick to his text?"—and would he give us his proofs by which all these errors are to be supported and established? Or would he be willing to get out of a small place by "picking some pretended flaw" in the argument. But as all these errors are to be supported by the "same rules of interpretation" as is the relation which slavery institutes between master and slave, we think his task must be a hard one. The point we propose to make out then, is the *relation* which must exist between a master and his slave.

Our author will, of course, admit with us, that man in, and of himself, has *nothing*. That he has no just and *legal* right to his labor, life, liberties, body or mental faculties ; but that all these belong to the God who

made him. Consequently, after man has done all that he can for his God, he is taught to say that he "is an unprofitable servant," that he "had done nothing more than was his duty to do."

Here is a frank avowal of man's nothingness and poverty. Now Christ compares *this relation*, which exists between God and man, to the *relation* that exists between the master and his slave. According to our Lord, servants had *nothing* of their own; v. 29, 30 of Matt. 25. The master had a *right* to do with them *as he saw fit*; v. 15, 28, 30. The *whole* of the servants labors were *for* their master: not for themselves, v. 21, 23, 27. They were *accountable* to their master; v. 20, 22, 24. They labored *not for hire*; v. 27. The master *rewarded* their faithfulness with gifts; vs. 21, 23. The master had a right to *punish* them as he saw fit; vs. 28, 30. But am I told these could not be slaves because they could not be *sold*? We reply there is as much evidence that they *could be* sold, as that they could *not be*. And besides, "property in man" is *no characteristic of slavery*.

But farther: The moment any one supposes that these slaves *did* possess any thing of their own, that very moment does that individual say that man has "whereof to glory." And that man is not *wholly* dependant, but that he can help himself *some*. There is no other way therefore to take this parable but to suppose these servants, slaves. For if they were *hired* servants, then man is blessed just in proportion to the *merit* of his works. If they could not be sold, then has man a right to interfere in the government of Providence; as there is *one* thing at least which Providence must *not do*, without *man's consent*!

Consequently, Christ was *not silent* on this subject. But compares the requirements of God of the children of men, to this *very* relation. And whenever the relation that exists between master and slave is impugned as *sin*, an imputation is cast on our blessed Lord.

But shall we be met here, with the miserable shift, in relation to this subject, that we are properly *Gods*, be-

cause he created us ; but when man gets a slave, he does it by *force*, against the *will* of the slave, which is *not in the least consulted*.

In the first place, this is no objection to our position, as the question, *how* this man came by his servants, was not the point to discuss. But simply the "*relation*." But since it is asked, we will answer it for the present, by asking another. Did man come into the world by his *own consent*, or did he not ?

Our author farther states, that, "if the Apostles may be referred to as justifying any system of slavery, when they direct servants to be obedient to their masters, then it follows they sanctioned the tyranny and bloody cruelties of Nero when they commanded Christians to be obedient to Magistrates ; and by the same rule also, Christ justified persecution, when he commanded his disciples to pray for those who persecuted them." p. 11.

Alas for human nature ! If our author finds no stronger arguments than this to prove his positions, we fear he will ultimately fail entirely. To a superficial observer however, there is something plausible in his favor from such assertions as this, but which plausibility fails entirely when the sentiment is examined. Let us therefore see what can be made of it. 1st. The assertion admits the existence of slavery in the apostles' days. 2d. That it existed in the *church* is evident from the texts he has cited from Eph. 6 : 9, Col. 4 : 1, 1 Tim. 6 : 2. 3d. Mr. S. takes it for granted that slavery is *sin*, from the fact simply that persecution is sin, in virtue of the advice given to the *persecuted* and to slaves, without any regard to the import of that advice. That is, inasmuch as it is admitted that persecution is sin, and that Christ commanded the *persecuted* to pray for the *persecutor*, so it follows that slavery is sin, notwithstanding the advice given to slaves to be "faithful," &c. The fallacy consists in forming a comparison between slavery and persecution, merely on the grounds of *advice*, without having any reference to the import of that advice. The advice of Christ to the persecuted to *pray* for their persecutors, was based on the idea of the sinfulness of that course ;

while the purport of the advice to slaves was not based on any such idea—at least, there is no evidence of it. And should it be said, that just such advice would have been given, was slavery a *sin*, we reply, just such advice would have been given, was slavery *not* a sin.

We freely admit there is nothing in the gospel which favors insubordination of slaves, or disloyalty of subjects. Consequently how despotic or cruel soever a government may be, the Christian is enjoined to obey his Rulers. But in this case, while he submits, he is equally enjoined to *pray* for them! That “this sin be not laid to their charge.” But where is there a corresponding command for the slave, while he submits to *pray* for his “believing” master that the sin of holding him as a slave be not laid to his charge? In fact, there appears to be no relation, touching the sin of the case, between them. The one advice is obviously founded on the sin of the persecutor’s course; the other has no such obvious foundation. It seems to bear a close resemblance, in its character, to the admonition, “Wives be subject unto your own husbands.” And we apprehend that the relation of man and wife, may be derided against as sin, with as much propriety, when held in comparison with Christ’s advice to pray for persecutors, as the relation of master and slave. It is therefore obviously seen, that it does not necessarily follow, that if the advice of the Apostles may be referred to as justifying slavery, that Nero’s cruelties, or the persecutor’s sins, were justified, because Christians were to obey magistrates, and pray for persecutors. For the *nature* of the advice given, will not bear such a comparison. The whole of the objection is a miserable sophism. As our author started with the intent of proving slavery to be *sin*, he ought to have endeavored to have done so. But, alas! when he comes to a certain class of texts, he finds it more convenient to institute a *forced* comparison, leaving others to do that which belongs to himself!

SECTION 2.

A FEW REMARKS ON THE COURSE ADOPTED BY MR. SUNDERLAND IN HIS WORK UNDER REVIEW.

From the remarks in the last section it will be seen that the author of the work under review, has taken, or endeavored to take that course which would bring to view the slavery system in its worst form—although its best is bad enough—for the mere purpose, it would seem, to represent it as *sinful*, and the better to have a mark at which he could level his artillery, even though it should be done at random ! For so long as he has made slavery to consist in oppression, robbery, theft, rigorous service, cruelty, adultery, rape, sin, &c. it is no very hard task to find passages of Holy Writ against slavery ! Indeed, he might take nearly every passage of sacred scripture from Genesis to Revelation in proof of his position. Not only so, he might go farther still, and say there was no other sin in the world but slavery, and that the whole Bible was against that, and that alone !

With Mr. S., so extensive is the sin of slavery that it matters but very little what passage it is which he quotes, whether it make *for* his position in reality, or against it—it uniformly has the *same* application. Or even, indeed, if it is entirely foreign to his subject. As an example of the second sort of passages we would mention, Lev. 25 : 44*—of the third, Isa. 58 : 1.† Indeed, while reading his production, we were strongly reminded of an anecdote we once heard of a pious minister of a former generation. This gentleman had contracted such a dislike for Episcopacy, as unscriptural and of hurtful tendency, that he preached much against it, and seemed determined to preach it down. Whatever the text he selected, episcopacy would be the theme. Never did he get far into the discussion or illustration of his subject, before he fell to belaboring the bishops. One

* Both thy bondmen, and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have, shalt be of the heathen that are round about you ; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.

† Cry aloud, and spare not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and shew my people their transgression, and the house of Jacob their sins.

of his shrewd hearers, being worn out with the everlasting din about episcopacy, once gave him for a text the first verse in the Bible—supposing it impossible that his minister could strain hard enough to get his hacknied theme into a sermon from such a text. But he was mistaken. The Sabbath came, the house of God was thronged; the preacher, after the usual introductory services named his text and began his comment: “Gen. 1: 1. *In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.* Nothing about *bishops* here! *God*, you see, my brethren, never made a bishop; they are the work of man,” &c.

But not only so, passages are so quoted by him, as to make them frequently convey a meaning very *different* from the one intended by the sacred penman. As an instance of this, we may mention Nahum 3: 1 to 4. We will first give *his* quotation, and then the *true* one. “Woe to the bloody city! it is all full of lies and robberies; the prey departeth not; the *noise of a whip*—because of the multitude of the whoredoms of the well-favored harlot, the mistress of witchcrafts, that selleth nations through her whoredoms, and families through her witchcrafts.” p. 67. The true quotation: “Woe to the bloody city! it is all full of lies and robbery; the prey departeth not; the *noise of a whip*, AND THE NOISE OF THE RATTLING OF THE WHEELS, AND OF THE PRANCING HORSES, AND OF THE JUMPING CHARIOTS,” &c. The reason *why*, in quoting this passage, Mr. S. drew a dash after he had written “the noise of a whip”—and omitted what immediately followed, we leave the reader to supply. So much, then, for the honor and candor with which our author comes into the field to wedge an eternal war with slavery!

But we must haste to give his scripture testimony a passing notice. It will not be necessary for us to be very lengthy on this, as we have already seen that the *objects* at which he designs to level the force of his scripture “testimony” are merely the “effects” or “evils” which have, in some instances, grown out of the slavery system; though not *necessarily*, but, as it were, as an *abuse* of it. Consequently these texts are as much di-

rected against the sins growing out of the abuse of a republican government, of civil law, of paternal ties, and the abuse of the law of God in any, and every other respect, as against that of slavery. When, therefore he tells us, that murder, theft, inhuman *crudelty*, adultery, rape, &c. are sins, we do not deny it; we admit it, and we as heartily deplore them as he does. The sin of these, and their kindred crimes, we know will, unless repented of, call down the wrath and fiery indignation of Heaven upon the authors of them. And so will they also, if committed otherwheres, as well as by masters with their slaves. For it is a notorious truth that these crimes *do* exist in other places than in slave States. Consequently they are not *absolutely* connected with slavery! And if the system of slavery is answerable for all its abuses, then is the Constitution of the United States for its abuse at Vicksburg! and other places!

This "testimony is divided into eleven chapters, each of which will form a Section in our review. His passages will not be quoted any farther than what are necessary for the remarks we have to make, but which will be referred to, for the convenience of the reader.

SECTION 3.

THE TESTIMONY OF "MOSES" AGAINST SLAVERY.

This testimony is based on "the bondage of the Israelites in Egypt, and the measures which God took to liberate them." chap. 1, p. 12. The texts cited, are Exodus 3: 7, 9—2: 23, 24. In this passage the phrase "with Abraham, with Isaac and with Jacob," is *left out*. The Israelites were delivered from bondage, *not* because they "suffered," but in consequence of the *covenant* made with Abraham, &c. 400 years before. Ex. 9: 1—10: 3—5: 6 to 8—5: 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23—6: 2, 5, 6, 9.

If any one will take the trouble to look at the history of the Israelites while in Egypt, and their egress from it, we think the following points will appear clear, viz:

1st. The Israelites were as much in slavery nearly

400 years *before* that “king arose who knew not Joseph,” as they were after that period.

2d. Before that period, the inference is plain that they found no particular cause of dissatisfaction. When that king arose who would not follow the steps and rules directed by his predecessors and Joseph their prime minister, then was it that they complained. Consequently it was *not* so much “*slavery*” itself, that grieved them, as it was “oppression” and “cruel bondage,” consequent upon it. This cruel bondage had for its object, according to his own declaration,

3d. The *thinning* of their numbers; see ch. 1: 10. The children of Israel were too numerous—he must prevent their multiplying. This he intended to accomplish by *excessive* labor! The king required of them labors beyond their strength; and even set task-masters over them, not to see that they were *diligent*—but on purpose “to afflict them with their burdens!” v. 11—to worry them, and to distress them! And when Moses came to expostulate with him, it only vexed him to *increase* their affliction by withholding the straw and yet requiring the full tally of brick, ch. 5: 6 to 9. And so exceedingly worried and distressed were they, that, when Moses spake unto them, they hearkened not unto him for anguish of spirit; or, as the margin has it, for straightness or shortness of spirit!! But this failing to accomplish his object, the king next required the Hebrew midwives to destroy all the male children at birth; this failing, they were next to be thrown into the river!!! Who ever before heard of bondage like this? And yet, strange infatuation, Mr. S. tells us, this bondage was certainly not so cruel and severe as that which nearly *three millions of American citizens are now doomed to suffer!!* Permit us just to ask our author, *when* were these 3,000,000 of American citizens as a class, doomed to labor beyond their strength?—*when* were task-masters appointed over them on *purpose* to afflict them with oppressive burdens to the end that they may not multiply?—*when* was this principle the avowed object either of the laws or of their masters?—*when* were slaves, as a

body in this country, deprived of "straw," and yet obliged to return "the full tally of brick?"—*when* were they compelled by their masters to fulfil their "works, their daily tasks, as when there was straw?"—*when* were they compelled to do this, by *gaining* time in their *quicken*ed step *urged* by the lash of their task-masters;—*when* were they called "idle" and *lazy*, for not doing that which it was impossible for them to do?—*when* was their desire to worship God, attributed to their laziness? *when* were their midwives commanded to kill their offspring at birth? or even when were their children thrown into the River? We ask again *when* was all this done? What bondage is there *more* cruel than what the Israelites suffered? Without any fear of contradiction, we unhesitatingly answer, none. What then becomes of the pompous assertion of Mr. Sunderland?—that the "bondage of the Israelites was not so cruel as that suffered in "this country!" No great enterprise can ever be accomplished by such gross misrepresentation! Most grievously mistaken are those who expect to accomplish their ends by enlisting the passions with "paint" alone!

SECTION 4.

TESTIMONY OF "MOSES" CONTINUED.

"The different kinds of servitude allowed among the Hebrews," chapt. 2, p. 17. The texts cited, are Ex. 21: 2. The "Hebrew servant" *bought* in this case, our author supposes was a *slave*, although he could be retained but six years, p. 22.—Ex. 21: 7 to 11. Here, also, our Author admits, a man could *sell* his daughter into slavery, p. 22.—Ex. 22: 2, 3. Another way in which a Hebrew could get into slavery!—*he sold for his theft!* Ex. 21: 20, 16,—22: 21 to 24.—Lev. 19: 11, 13, 14, 18.—25: 35, 39 to 43. In this case, was the Hebrew a slave. The very expression, that he should be to his master *as* an *hired* servant, is evidence enough that he was not *hired*. Neither was he a *bond* servant, for he must have his liberty in the jubilee—he being a Hebrew. Lev. 25: 44—Numb. 10: 9—Deut.

5: 19, 21. This does not help our author. There is no more need of *coveting* a slave than there is any piece of property whatever. Just *buy* the slave, and there is no coveting about it any farther. Deut. 10: 17 to 19—15: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. In this case the Hebrew was a slave, as I have otherwheres shown. And I notice it here just to expose one of our author's sophisms. "*Thou shalt not let him go away empty.*" This was a matter of "*justice*" says he. "From this and the following passages," Deut. 15: 12 and so on to the 18th verse, "it appears, that in 6 years, a servant, (slave) among the Hebrews, brought a sufficient profit to his master to pay him *double* for his FREEDOM, and to furnish himself with grain and stock to begin to labor for his own support." Now the verse from which it is presumed the above is an explanation, is the 18th which thus reads: "It shall not seem hard unto thee, when thou sendest him away from thee: for he hath been worth a *double* HIRED servant to thee in serving thee six years."—Worth a double HIRED servant; not hath brought his master a sufficient profit to *pay* him *double* his FREEDOM!! Deut. 15: 14, 18—23: 15—24: 7. This is not against slavery, but against stealing them of the Hebrews. Deut. 24: 14, 17, 18.

The passages above quoted are those which Mr. S. has given us in his second chapter in testimony *against* slavery! Of these twenty-seven texts, *twelve* expressly recognize that very state which our author endeavored to disprove by them, viz: Ex. 21: 2—21: 7 to 11—22: 2, 3—21: 20—Lev. 25: 39 to 43—25: 44: Deut. 15: 12 to 18—23: 15. Ex. 21: 16 and Deut. 24: 7. The two last only have been made a handle of as evidence against slavery. And these are no proof *against* it. They being merely prohibitions against the *stealing* of men, or rather perhaps of Hebrews—against a certain method of *getting* them—not against the system, for they may be *bought* notwithstanding. Indeed, in five or six of the texts named, it is acknowledged by our author himself, that slaves are recognized! And of

all the other passages* which he has adduced, there is not one which denounces slavery in any shape, much less as a sin!! And, in fact how could they? If the Mo-
saic law recognized slavery, how *could* it denounce it?

The advice in the texts is addressed to strangers, the widow, the fatherless, in which the more wealthy are directed not to withhold their liberality from the *poor* Hebrews, nor to retain the wages of the hired servant after it was due, &c. But in all things to deal with others in their circumstances as they themselves would wish to be dealt by, were those circumstances their own. Else, why not direct the rich to *divide* their property with the poor, and thus go shares in the whole?

SECTION 5.

TESTIMONY FROM "JOSHUA, JOB AND EZRA."

"God has always delivered his people from the oppression of their enemies, when they cried unto him for deliverance." Chap. 3, p. 29.

That the Lord will deliver his people, when they cry unto him, is evident; yet what that fact has to do with slavery, as a system, it is hard to divine. For, we have no evidence that he will ever deliver any, but such as are truly his. And even good people are not always assisted by him, for the mere purpose of either gaining wealth or honors. The principle assumed here seems to be, that all slaves are the true children of God, and to prove it, our Author places them by the side of the children of Israel, the chosen people of God who were blessed in Abraham, while Ham, the son of Noah was cursed! See Gen. 9: 22, 25. There is no more relation between the children of Israel and the children of Ham, or negroes, than there is between Hebrews and any other Gentile nation whatever. The applying therefore of Judges 2: 18,—6: 8, 9,—10: 12, to the slaves as a body, is not warranted by the tenor of scripture.

The other passages cited to prove the position at the

* Ex. 22: 21 to 24—Lev. 19: 11, 13, 14, 18—25: 35—Numb. 10: 9—Deut. 10: 17 to 19—15: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11—24: 14

head of this section are Josh. 9 : 23,—Job 3 : 17 to 19, 6 : 14,—15 : 20, 21,—20 : 19, 20,—27 : 13,—29 : 11 to 13,—15, 16,—31 : 13, 14, 16, 17, 19 to 22,—35 : 9,—36 : 15 ; Ezra 9 : 8,

Among all these texts, there are but two that have any relation to slavery whatever. That in Josh. 9 : 23 and Job 31 : 13. The first was servitude inflicted upon the Gibeonites for deceiving Joshua and his men ; while the latter was a simple acknowledgement by Job that he had slaves, and that he treated them as a man should who is accountable to the moral law of God. He loved them as himself, and did by them as he wished to be dealt by. Hear him : “If I did despise the cause of my man-servant, or if my maid servant, when they contended with me ; what then shall I do when God riseth up ? And when he visiteth, what shall I answer ?” Job. 31 : 13. Did Job *free* his slaves, how then could it be said he *despised not their cause* ?

The principle “drift” of all these texts is in opposition to oppression, and in favor of the poor that are in affliction, &c. That slaves are oppressed in *this* country very frequently is not denied. But the fallacy lies in supposing that oppression is synonymous with the simple slavery system. For it is to be remembered that a system is a system. And that human laws cannot alter it. It is inherent in itself. Laws may be made to modify its application to us, but they never can alter the system itself. It is, so to speak, an essence of itself. Hence, in reality, there is but one system of Divinity, and this system cannot be altered by any law or power whatever. Yet men write treatises on Divinity, which are, themselves called systems,—and systems they are too which are very different from each other, but the only reason of this difference, is, because none of the writers of them have a *perfect* knowledge of the one only true system. So also the system of slavery. So long as slaves exist, there are certain unalterable laws which are binding, and from which no human laws can clear the master. These laws are embraced in the moral law of God. The laws, then, among the Israel-

ites which placed the slave in the *entire* possession of his master, nevertheless reminded him of the moral law to which he was accountable to his God. And so long as the moral law stands, just so long can no human law be made to alter the slave *system*, so long as slaves exist. It ought always to be borne in mind that the slave system is one thing, and its abuse quite another. The system therefore I do not believe is sin. Neither is it oppression. For it must be remembered, that all the crimes which are denounced in the Old Testament were transgressions of the law. Consequently, nothing which was recognized by that law could be either sin or oppression. But as the law recognized slavery even by our Author's own acknowledgment, it follows that these passages are not at all against that evil, because they are against oppression and its kindred crimes. They are entirely foreign to the subject. If a Hebrew was kept a slave for a time *longer* than six years, then he was "oppressed" in being obliged to serve that extra time. See Jeremiah 34. But he was not oppressed during his service of six years. neither were strangers and sojourners oppressed in being made slaves *forever*, and in being an *hereditary possession* from *father to son*. Lev. 25 : 44 to 46. Consequently, all the passages in this, and the following chapters, *against* oppression, have no reference to the slavery system ; unless they refer to its abuse as in the case of the Hebrews ; who as we learn from Jeremiah. were *oppressed* in being obliged to serve more than six years.

SECTION 6.

TESTIMONY FROM "DAVID."

"God has always manifested a peculiar pity and regard for the oppressed—and he promises his blessing upon all such as imitate Him in this thing." Chap. 4. p. 37.

This proposition is undoubtedly intended to embrace the two following sentiments : 1st, that slavery is *necessarily* oppression, and that God has a "peculiar pity

and regard" for slaves ;—and 2dly, that He will bless all Abolitionists, because they suppose, they "imitate Him" in this thing."

The falsity of the *first* position we have already shown,—namely, *that slavery is necessarily oppression*. To say that God has a "peculiar pity and regard" for all slaves *indiscriminately*, merely because they have *no liberties of their own*, is a *base assumption*, and wants proof. That he regards such as are his children in *truth*, among slaves, is an evident fact ; for he regards people of this class *every where*, as the texts cited by Mr. S. abundantly prove. Consequently, when the "poor and needy," among *any class* of people, if they are pious before God, are oppressed, they will be heard when they cry unto him.

The *second* sentiment, as applied to the subject under consideration, is the *maximum* of self complacency, and blind impetuosity ! No matter how indiscreet,—how malevolent to others,—how self-sufficient,—how unjust ;—no matter by what means,—by what power,—or by what principle the machine is made to move,—so long as they have a "peculiar pity and regard" for the poor slave, they expect the blessing of Heaven to rest upon them !! And a *peculiar* pity and regard it is too ! For instead of *forwarding* the cause of Emancipation, "it has," to use the language of Drs. Reed and Matheson,* "thrown back the cause—to a lamentable distance !"—For, say they, "it has been resolved on getting the wedge in : but in fulfilling this resolution, it seems to have been careless whether it should be by *the butt end or the fine one*."

The texts cited in proof of the position at the head of this section, are Ps. 10 : 17, 18,—9 : 12,—12 : 5,—22 : 24,—41 : 1 to 3,—42 : 8, 9,—50 : 16 to 18,—72 : 1 and 4,—72 : 12 to 14,—82 : 3, 4,—89 : 15, 16,—103 : 6,—119 : 134,—140 : 12,—146 : 7 to 9.

For remarks on those passages which speak against oppression, see last section. In farther proof of the

*Drs. Reed and Matheson were two English gentlemen who visited this country a short time since.

statements there made let me refer the reader to one of the texts quoted above, Ps. 119: 134, "Deliver *me*," says David, from the *oppression* of man," &c. Was David a *slave*?

The last clause of the last text cited, Psalms 146: 9, "but the way of the wicked he turneth upside down," applies with as much force to "wicked" *slaves* as to "wicked" masters. The same, or similar remarks may be made on all the texts quoted in this chapter. They undoubtedly have reference to two characters,—the good and the bad;—to the saint and to the sinner whether they be "bond" or "free."

SECTION 7.

TESTIMONY FROM "SOLOMON,"—HIM WHO HAD 700 WIVES, AND 300 CONCUBINES; SEE PAGE 11.

According to our Author, Solomon could talk against slavery, as well as David, who were, nevertheless, polygamists! If these men denounce slavery, let Mr. S. prove that they denounce polygamy; for, according to him, the same "rules of interpretation" by which one is supported, the other can be; consequently, by the same rules, that *one* is denounced, the *other* can be.

"God has threatened his displeasure against all such as forbear to deliver the poor and the needy from the hands of those who oppress them." Chap. 5. p 43.

This position is put down in true Abolitionist style. The true spirit and tone of which is, no person must "forbear to deliver the poor and needy" from their "oppressor's hands," even *by force*, without incurring the "threatened" "displeasure" of God! "Let go you shall, either by fair means or foul" appears to be the motto of the principle! Do we misrepresent? Read the following:—"We shall see in the course of these chapters, that there are as many commands in the Bible to a THIRD person, to DELIVER the oppressed OUT OF the hands of the oppressor, as there are commands to the oppressor to let the oppressed go free," p. 42 note 8. This, then, is the way in which slavery is to be abandoned *now and forever!* COMPEL those you cannot

urge!! Strange enthusiasm! And does Mr. S. think to prove such Jacobinical doctrines by the Bible?—Please to examine his texts. They are the following: Prov. 14: 20, 21,—14: 31,—22: 16,—22: 22, 23,—23: 10, 11,—24: 11, 12,—29: 7,—31: 8, 9,—Eccl. 4: 1,—5: 8,—7: 7,—Prov. 19: 7,—16: 8.

These passages undoubtedly refer to social duties; those which exist between man and man. Those who have the means, are to remember the *pious* “poor,” without any distinction of color. The poor white man, if pious, is as highly favored of his Maker, as is the slave,—and much more so, if the slave is not a Christian. That the poor white is oppressed, is as notorious as that the black is. And until Mr. S. can show that these passages apply to slavery alone, as *sin*, we shall consider him as doing them injustice, and as perverting scripture. For in his setting out, he definitely gave us to understand, that the testimony which he should adduce, should be *prima facie* evidence against it.

But we may be answered, the only object of these passages was to prove the principle laid down at the commencement of the chapter. And what of that?—Does that prove slavery? By no means. It no more proves that slavery is *sin*, than it proves that civil governments are sins; because oppressions exist under them as well as with slavery.

SECTION 8.

TESTIMONY FROM “ISAIAH.”

“God commands the oppressor most explicitly to let the oppressed go free.” Ch. 6, p. 50. And what if he does? When these commands were given, they could be given only as applying at that time to the oppressions which then existed. And those acts only were oppressive ones which contravened the *law*; but as slavery did *not* contravene the law, it follows that the “oppressions” spoken of in these texts, had no reference to that subject, as a system, but only, if any, as abuses of it. Consequently they are no advantage to our author.

Texts cited, Isa. 1: 16, 17,—5: 7—9: 17—Isa. 14:

2, 3. Our author saw fit, from some cause, not to quote the whole of this passage, in connection. He begins at the latter part of the second verse: "And they shall take them captives whose captives they were," &c.—Whereas, to have given the true sense, he should have begun with the first, or a part of it, thus:—"And the strangers shall be joined with them, and they shall *cleave* to the house of Jacob. And the people shall take them, and bring them to their place: and the house of Israel shall *possess* them in the land of the Lord for servants and handmaids." This was left out; and for what reason, the reader will see by looking at the passage as it stands in Isaiah—Isa. 19: 20—30: 12, 13—33: 15, 16—45: 13. The expression in this text refers, probably, to Cyrus, the Persian General, who, by taking Babylon, liberated the Jews who were in slavery there to the Babylonians, without "price or reward." Isa. 51: 22, 23—58: 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12—59: 3—59: 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14—57: 14.

By looking over these scriptures, it will be seen, that they refer to the sins and transgressions of the Mosaic law, and to those only. To have them assist our author, he should have first proved that *all slavery* was *against* that law, and that the law never recognized any "species," or "forms" of it. But instead of this, he has *acknowledged* that a "species" of it *did* exist under that law. Consequently he has been "beating the air" ever since! pp. 10 and 22.

SECTION 9.

TESTIMONY FROM "JEREMIAH."

"God has pronounced the bitterest of woes upon all such as are concerned in stealing men—and upon all such as use the labors of their species without wages." Ch. 7. p. 58.

Of the sentiment contained in the first part of the proposition, we have already expressed an opinion. The Hebrews were debarred from stealing one another for the purpose of merchandize. See Ex. 21: 16, and Deut. 24: 7. Yet if slaves were *bought*, there were

none of these "woes pronounced." See Ex. 21 : 2—21 : 7. Lev. 25 : 44 to 46. Consequently, this assertion is nothing against slavery.

The sentiment in the latter part of the position we *admit* ; and yet we do not admit that it militates against slavery as sin. For, as the position stands, it goes to say, that these "bitterest woes are pronounced" against all those parents who receive the "labors" of their children, unless they pay them a stipulated price, as *wages*. No one supposes this is the case. If the parent "feed and clothe his child," every one is willing to admit, that he has a right to his child's labors until 21. And must such a parent stand accursed with all these "bitterest woes" upon his head for thus dealing with his child ? Then why the master for the slave, if the master feed and clothe him ? Is not this enough ? Was Paul mistaken when he said, "having food and raiment let us therewith be content ?" 1 Tim. 6 : 8. There is no evidence that the passage in Jeremiah 22 : 13, has any reference to cases of this kind.

It is a little curious to see how a certain class of men work to raise an objection to slavery on the principle of "wages." We are often told "their pay is not adequate to their labor." And what of that ? Is there an abolitionist in the land who will obligate himself to give every slave in the country his food and clothing for his labor ? And suppose the labor of some is worth *more* than their food and clothing, is that any more than what occurs in families among ourselves ? Do not many children earn more than they get. And do not hired servants frequently do more than their wages is worth ? And are there not found among us, even in happy New England, individuals whose wealth came entirely through the hands of others—their servants and domestics ?

Texts cited. Jere. 5 : 26—5 : 28—7 : 5 to 7—9 : 1, 2—21 : 12—22 : 3—13—17—29 : 13, 14—34 : 10—11—17—50 : 33, 34.

The same general remarks will apply to these, as to the preceding texts. We think, however, if our author, had looked closely to the 34th chapter of this proph-

et, he would not have drawn so largely from him as he has.

SECTION 10.

TESTIMONY FROM "EZEKIEL, DANIEL, HOSEA, JOEL, AMOS, JONAH, MICAH, NAHUM, HABAKKUK, ZECARIAH AND MALACHI."—Chap. 8, p. 65.

This chapter purports to give us "various features of the slave system."

The remarks made at the commencement of section 8, apply here. It is to be remembered that the children of Israel were prohibited from being slaves to the heathen, because they were the chosen people of God. But if they forsook the Lord and served other gods, then were their enemies to triumph over them. Notwithstanding the Mosaic law allowed of slaves, yet it provided that neither strangers should be vexed, nor Hebrews oppressed. The wants of the poor,—i. e. those who were *not* slaves, for the wants of these their masters supplied; and the needy, the widow and the fatherless, were their brethren, the Hebrews, to supply. None of their brethren could they sell to the heathen, nor were the wages of the hireling to be detained over night after it became due. Hence the expressions in Ezekiel 27: 13—Joel 3: 3 and 6, &c. because the Israelites had not kept the law in these respects, but had broken it. Hence the propriety of the passages cited in the work under review. They have nothing to do with slavery in particular, at all, as a system.

Texts cited. Ezek. 13: 18, 19—18: 5 to 9—22: 27, 28, 29—27: 13—Dan. 4: 27—Joel 3: 3—Hosea 12: 7—Joel 3: 6, 7—Amos 2: 6, 7. This was strictly against the law of Moses. Jonah 3: 8, 9—Micah 6: 8, 9—Nahum 3: 1 to 4. The manner in which this passage is quoted, looks *dishonest*. See section 2, where this sophistry is exposed. Hab. 1: 4—Zech. 11: 4, 5—Mal. 2: 10—3: 5.

If Mr. S. thinks that he has given us various features of the slave system in these texts, we can assure him he is, for once, at least, widely mistaken! They are no

more the characteristics of the slave system, properly so called, than they are of the law of Moses. If men transgressed the rules required in that system, it was no more than they did with the Mosaic law. If, therefore, you denounce the one, you must the other. The crimes then here reprobated were crimes against the law; and if there is any reference had to slavery, it is in those crimes committed by breaking those restrictions under which the system existed, as established by that law.

SECTION 11.

TESTIMONY FROM "JESUS CHRIST."

"Our blessed Saviour did as really describe and condemn the sin of slaveholding as he did the sin of any other practice, to which men are now addicted." Ch. 9, p. 70. Consequently it is "described and condemned" as plainly as is that of murder, theft, adultery, lying, swearing, &c.!

In none of the passages here adduced, it is said, either directly or by implication, that the "loss of liberty" is a sin. And it is to be remembered too, that loss of liberty *did* exist under Moses, when the same precepts were in force which Christ here enjoins. For he himself says, "all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them;" why? "for this is *the LAW and the PROPHETS*." Matt. 7: 12. So also, "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, soul and mind, and thy neighbor as thyself." Matt. 22: 37, occurs, and was in force under the law. See Deut. 6: 5. Lev. 19: 18. And yet slavery could exist harmlessly and inoffensively in connection with them notwithstanding. It *must*, therefore follow, that loss, the entire loss of liberty, or the entire principle of slavery, is no sin. We have nothing to fear from the influence of the texts he has cited. The application he makes of them to the principles of slavery, is entirely assumed, and wants proof.

Texts cited. Matt. 5: 7,—11,—19,—23,—44,—7: 12,—9: 13,—22: 37 to 39,—2: 23,—25: 44, 45. Luke 4: 18, 19,—6: 36,—12: 15.—John 15. 17, 12. Acts 10: 38. It is extremely hard to see

what relation this passage holds to Negro slavery either *for*, or *against*. Luke 10 : 36.

SECTION 12.

TESTIMONY FROM "ST. PAUL."

"The Apostle Paul condemns slavery most explicitly—and shows that slave-holding is directly opposed to the spirit and temper of the Christian Religion. Chap. 10. p. 80.

And we will let the reader see by what strong evidence this condemnation of slavery is made to appear so "explicitly."

Art thou called being a servant? care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. 1 Cor. 7 : 21.

Servants be obedient to them that are your masters, according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ. Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free." Eph. 6 : 5.

And ye masters do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening; knowing that your master is also in heaven; neither is there respect of persons with him. Eph. 6 : 9.

Masters give unto your servants that which is just and equal, knowing that ye also have a master in Heaven. Col. 4 : 1.

Servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not with eye service, as men pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God. Col. 3 : 22.

Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own masters worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. And they that have believing masters, let them not despise them, because they are brethren; but rather do them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit. 1 Tim. 6 : 1.

Exhort servants to be obedient to their own masters, and to please them well in all things; not answering again;

not purloining, but showing all good fidelity ; that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things. Tit. 2 : 9.

Here let me ask the candid and unprejudiced, if these passages do not show most clearly, that slavery did exist in St. Paul's day, even in the church ? And if it did exist either in, or out of it, was it *sin*, wherever it did exist ? Would St. Paul give such advice as he did, had it been *sin* ? We think not.

But then these passages were brought to prove that St. Paul condemned slavery most "explicitly." But alas ! they are an unfortunate evidence. But what explanation does our author put upon them to make them subserve his purpose ? Why, forsooth, that, if "these precepts may be quoted to justify the power which the master usurps over his slaves, then the commands of Christ for the persecuted to pray for their persecutors, may be referred to, to justify persecution."* &c. p. 90.

What profound logic this ! To have proved his principle these texts ought to have established the point that all slavery is "*sin*,"—sin against God ! For this is one of the main pillars, on which all the Abolition movements are based. Remove the idea that "all slavery is sin," and their principal pretext for precipitancy and for *immediate* emancipation without adapting means to ends, ceases. Consequently they can have time to sit down and canvass the subject deliberately,—adapt their means to the ends desired, and eventually accomplish their object with safety. But so long as that "string is harped upon" which teaches that all slavery is sin ;" and that it is sin to remain in sin another day, just so long will there be precipitancy, and rash, head-long steps taken, by some at least. All the good such can do to the cause of emancipation, will never balance the evil which results from their rash movements. Hence, in none of Paul's writings can it be made to appear, that slavery is "sin." That he looked upon "it in the light of an *evil*," is apparent from his expression, "If thou mayest be made free, use it rather." 1 Cor. 7 : 21. If slavery

* See Section 1, Chapter 11.

was sin, do you think Paul would have connived at it, and have let it pass in that easy and simple manner in which he did, by giving some gentle advice *how* it should be *managed* and *regulated*, when he was speaking expressly on that subject? Would he have told servants to be obedient to their masters—in singleness of heart, as unto Christ; knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, he shall receive of the Lord, whether bond or free? Would he have told “servants—under the yoke” to “count their own masters worthy of all honor?” And would he have taught “believing masters—not to despise” their servants, “because they were brethren?” Would he have taught Titus to “exhort servants,” in his travels, “to be obedient unto their masters, and to please them well in all things; not answering again; not purloining, but shewing all good fidelity? We ask again; would he have done all this, if “slavery” was “sin?” But our Author asks us if this conduct of Paul *justifies* slavery? We will answer him in the words of Paul himself, “If” a slave “*may* be made free.” let him “use it rather.” When, therefore, he drops the expression, if these “precepts may be quoted to justify the power,” &c. he is *away* from the proposed subject. For he seems to lay it down as a principle that “all slavery is sin.” We, therefore, expected he would have “stuck to his text” and have given us a “discourse” from it. But in this, it seems, we have not had the privilege of being gratified.

Texts cited, in addition to those quoted above, are the following: Rom. 12: 9, 10,—1 Cor. 7: 23. That this text is no evidence of the *sin* of slavery, see the following verse “Let every man, *wherein he is called*,”—that is, being either “bond” or “free,”—“therein abide with God.” v. 24,—1 Cor. 13: 4, 5,—7. Gal. 5: 13, 14,—Eph. 4, 1, 2,—32,—Phil. 2: 3,—1: 8,—Col. 4, 3,—Acts, 26: 29,—Col. 3: 12, 13,—1 Thess. 4: 6,—1 Tim. 1: 9,—Philemon 16,—Heb. 13: 3.

SECTION 13.

TESTIMONY FROM "ST. JAMES, ST. PETER, AND ST. JOHN."

"Slave-holding is farther shown to be a sin by others of the Apostles—and we have the testimony of God, that the system shall finally and utterly come to an end." Chap. 11, p. 93.

We have before seen, that our Author has completely failed in proving the *sin* of slavery from the testimony of "Christ" and of "Paul." It was evident he intended to prove the fact by Christ, from the spirit and tenor of the "Golden Rule." But in this he failed. For the spirit and tenor of that Golden Rule was not a new institution of Christ after his incarnation; but existed before, in the days of the children of Israel, when as Mr. S. himself acknowledges, slavery *did exist*.—Consequently, the quotation of *that* Rule, and all corresponding texts, can never be applied to slavery in its principles, or, in other words, to *the entire loss of liberty*, even by implication. For if the tenor of those precepts would condemn the entire loss of liberty as "sin," *now*, by implication, it certainly would *then*. The consequence would be, that "loss of liberty" could never have existed, even by God's *permission*; for, he never would permit any thing, against the true tenor of his precepts. He never will be *divided* against himself.

It is therefore nothing strange that Mr. S. lost his case, from the want of testimony to his point, from St. Paul. For Paul proves nothing in his favor, as we have obviously seen. Having failed, therefore, in consequence of irrelevant testimony, does he expect the "judge," the people, will give him his case merely from the "*amount*" of testimony he is able to bring "in the action" without *any* reference to its import? Indeed, one of his principal witnesses testifies that "servants" must "be subject to" their "masters with all fear." And even if their masters are "froward," and *punish* them when they are *not* guilty, or when they "do well," they are to take it patiently." That is, it is no virtue in slaves to be insubordinate even to *wicked* masters. But all masters

were not so. For some of them are called "*good*" and "*gentle*" There is no evidence to prove, that the expressions, "endure grief," "suffering wrongfully," being "buffeted," "suffer for it," &c. have any reference to the "loss of liberty," in itself considered, but to unjust treatment in scourging, &c. probably in much the same way, as many of the slaves are used by unfeeling masters in our own day.* What evidence, therefore, is this, against the sin of "loss of liberty?" Nothing at all.

Permit us just to make a remark upon one other text here cited; for Mr. S. tells us, that, if this, with Deut. 24: 14, and Jeremiah 21: 12, does "not set down slave-holding as a sin against God, then no sin is described in any part of the Bible." p. 97. Now it is admitted that slaves work for their food, clothing and protection whatever that may be; and *not* for any stipulated sum as wages. It is presumed no one denies this. But the passage under consideration, James 5: 4, commences thus;—"Behold, the *hire* of the laborers who have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth," &c. The original, *ho misthos* implies, *merces*, *præmium laborum*, primarily, wages, or premium for labor, and shows evidently that these wages were due a servant who was *not* a slave, and to whom the master was *not* under any obligations to furnish food and clothing. But who had to provide all these things for himself. If, therefore, such an hired servant could not obtain his wages, he could not furnish either his own *food* or *clothing*. Taking away the wages of a hired servant, therefore, was the same thing as the taking away of the food and clothing of a slave. Both of which are reprehensible, when the master has their labor. But the food and clothing of a slave are not called "wages," because they are not the result of any agreement between the parties, although always understood,—for every slave-holder expects to support his slaves. With *hired* servants it is not so. They are supported just in proportion to the amount of wages they get. If they do not get their wages, they get *no sup-*

* 1 Pet. 2: 12 to 20.

port, for no body is obliged to support them. Hence the injustice and sin of withholding from such their wages; and hence the propriety of the passage quoted.—The same remarks will apply to Deut. 24 : 14. Where, then, is the force of these, and similar texts, against the *sin* of slavery? There is no force in them on this point. They are entirely irrelevant to the subject for which they are quoted. Explanation of Jere. 21 : 12 will be found in Sec. 9, and in other places.

Keeping, therefore, in mind the principles we have so frequently laid down, with regard to slavery, or the loss of liberty,—(for we use the terms synonymously, wherever they are used, as meaning the same thing,) it is not difficult to see that Mr. S. has utterly failed of proving the position he designed,—the *sin* of slavery. For so long as the Bible does not contradict itself, every writer of it, must tell, either the *same* story, or a continuation of it. Consequently, so long as it was acknowledged by Mr. S. that slavery *was* recognized by the Bible, just so long was it in vain for him to attempt to disprove that it did exist *without* sin, by the same book. It was time spent for nought, and a “vain beating the air.” We, however, give a list of the texts he has cited, which have not been referred to in this section, for the gratification of those who wish to look at them.

Texts cited. James 2 : 6, 8, 9,—10,—13,—3 : 17.—5 : 1,—4,—5,—2 Peter 2 : 2, 3.—1 Peter. 2 : 18 to 20,—3 : 8.—1 John 3 : 14,—16,—17,—4 : 20.—2 John 10, 11.—Rev. 18 : 11 to 13.

At the head of the chapter we are now reviewing, it was stated that we had “the Testimony of God, that the system shall finally and utterly come to an end.”

This is quoted by our author as being the sentiment of Inspiration. But does this sentiment declare that slavery *will* be abandoned now, and forever! We know it *will* be abandoned, and we would to God, that it *could* be, even *this moment*. For there is a time coming when *all* unrighteousness shall cease, whether it be sin, or not. “When nations will learn war no more,” and when, having food and raiment, we

shall therewith be content.” And that, inasmuch, as all reformation is to be brought about by the use of means, it is desirable that all Christians and philanthropists should be “up and doing” that the wheel of reform should turn *surely* and rapidly. But in doing this, “caution” is the “side of safety.” “Men are not like iron, to be wrought upon while they are hot,” as says the proverb. Take him in his cool, reflecting moments, if you wish to make a proselyte of him. Adapt the proper means to their proper ends, and the work is half accomplished. In this way is it, that slavery will be abolished in this country if it ever is, peaceably. There is no man so lost to propriety but that he will adhere to reason if it comes to him in the proper channel. He never can be gained by exaggerating his faults,—magnifying his errors, or by denouncing him as a knave, a liar, a thief, a murderer, an oppressor, an adulterer, or a debauchee! There is nothing like truth! O, it is a precious jewel. Well may it be said, “*Magnas est veritas, et praevaluit.*”

SECTION 11.

SOME FARTHER REMARKS.

We have now closed our remarks on the evidence brought forward by Mr. S. to prove the “sin of slavery.” We shall now offer a few thoughts on some of the sentiments expressed by the author in the work before us. What he has to say concerning the laws of the slave States—or of the lies told in selling slaves, even by ministers of the Gospel—of the heart-rending pangs, and “hideous howlings” made by disconsolate mothers at the loss of their children—of the customs of *man-traffickers, kidnappers, soul-drivers, bloody whips, man-catchers* and their *traps*, of *negro-hunts*, of *negro shooting parties*, &c. we shall not now stop to notice. If they exist, as here portrayed, it is a great calamity, and calls loudly for redress, or even if such cases exist at all.—But it is with the pernicious tendency of certain sentiments we have now to do. We think Mr. S. has not been sufficiently guarded in several of his expressions. In his note on Numbers 10 : 9, he says: “Here God

promised the Jews success, when they went to war against those who oppressed them." And then asks the question, "would not the same principles of his government lead him to favor the oppressed in this land, in an attempt to gain their freedom?"

Inasmuch as it is taken for granted by many, that, in abolitionist publications, the term "oppressed" is used instead of the term "slave," there is no mystery in knowing who are meant by that term. Now we ask, is there not here an insinuation that insubordination of the slaves is justifiable; and a hint for them to rise and assert their liberty? Is it not, in virtue, saying to them, you are oppressed—you are wronged—your birth is more noble than this—your rights are equal to your masters—*rise*, assert your liberties, and the God of heaven shall assist you! We ask again, is it not in effect telling them to revolutionize themselves, and that they are *sure* of conquest; for, "the Almighty has no attribute which could take sides with us in such a contest." The sentiment breathes the very spirit of *insubordination* and *insurrection*! But are we told the slaves are ignorant of our devices? That they cannot read? It is a mistake. Many of them can, and when such a sentiment gets among them it spreads. "*It is a fact*," says the Boston Recorder, "that free persons of color in Washington City take the Liberator, and read it to slaves." And what is there to prevent this? Will any one tell us *why* the slaves cannot get hold of these principles? After the development of such sentiments, it is of *no* use to preach, that "the true friends of the enslaved, do not believe it would be right, for the oppressed to use any violence," &c. With as much propriety might you hold a man under water for an hour, and excuse the matter by saying, you do not think it right to kill him or use violent means over him. We ask are such flimsy, miserable shifts as these, excuses? No, indeed they are not. Neither is the other. Let the slaves once get fully established in the principle here divulged by Mr. S. and they *will act*, notwithstanding all his negative preaching.

"We," abolitionists, "try to do something—*they*," the

opponents of abolitionist *measures*, "do nothing." p. 17. Yes, indeed, they have done something. According to the opinion of even English gentlemen, they have "thrown the emancipation cause back to a *lamentable* distance." And according to a letter addressed to the Editor of the New York Observer, the writer distinctly states that it is his opinion, "the removal of slavery from this country, if it is ever effected, is retarded FIFTY years, by the recent movements." "A few weeks since and thousands of masters in the South were deliberating in the fear of God, what was their duty toward their slaves? Now every man's hands are tied up.—They cannot move a step in the instruction of their slaves—they are compelled to hold them as they are. Said a gentleman to me yesterday, 'I have slaves. If the Northern people, or any one else, will agree to remove them to Africa, I will give them so many this year and so many next year, and so on till all are gone and a *thousand dollars* in cash.' " But these benevolent feelings toward the slave in the South, are, in a great measure, crushed. The slave's privileges have been curtailed, and his chains have been riveted stronger. Even his religious privileges have been narrowed down, and his intercourse with the whites obstructed, in consequence of abolition movements. Truly then did our Author say, "We try to do *something*." But do others "do *nothing*?"—to *assist* philanthropists in *bettering* the condition of the blacks? We think they do. Let us hear some testimony on this subject.

Mr. Rufus W. Bailey is a native of this State—(Maine.) He removed from it a few years since, to the State of South Carolina, where he is settled as a Presbyterian pastor, and preaches, as we understand, with success to his people. He owns no slaves, and, he says, he never expects to, or even wishes to do it. He says, within a few years, increased efforts have been made by Christian masters, and by ministers, to impart religious instruction to the slave population, and to bring them under a moral influence.—The vice of intemperance has been greatly diminished among them.—The

Sabbath is very generally regarded as a day of rest, if not of devotion.—Increasing and great care is used by masters to remove the most common sources of temptation, to provide for them good and separate sleeping apartments, to promote and encourage the marriage relation, and give a due respect to families by special indulgencies and privileges. Provision is generally made, in the construction of churches to accommodate them in separate seats, and in some places, churches are fitted up for their separate use. Sabbath school and family instruction is extended to them extensively in religious families; and, as, a missionary field, the black population of our plantations is attracting the attention, and enlisting the voluntary services, of all, who can feel the missionary spirit, or be warmed into action by the love of souls.”

“The Synod of South Carolina and Georgia,” continues he, “have made the religious condition of our slave population a subject of special consideration for several years. In regard to the spirit, which prevails in this Synod, I will state a fact, as the best illustration I can give. An intelligent gentleman from the North, who attended on the sessions of our last meetings and heard the discussions on this subject, declared to me that he was *entirely* satisfied, and *that* meeting had done much to mitigate and destroy the strong prejudices against Southern slavery, with which he had just come into the country.”—“Our clergy generally pay a particular attention to their black congregations. Many of them give the entire afternoon of the Sabbath to them. Sunday Schools among them are *almost universally* organized. Several of our most talented and most promising young ministers are devoting their entire service to the blacks, and, to do this, have declined calls to some of the most distinguished stations in our church.” *Ch. Mirror, of Sept. 10, 1835.* Thus much Mr. Bailey. Does all this testimony go to show that others “do nothing,” in the cause of benevolence and philanthropy?

But again: In addition to what the Presbyterians and other denominations are doing, the Methodist E. Church

is not asleep on the subject. In New Orleans, they have a mission station for the especial benefit of the black population of that city. The Mississippi Conference has also, six other missionary establishments within its bounds, "all for the benefit of the people of color" alone. The Georgia Conference has *five* establishments of the same kind and for a similar purpose, and on which there are "about one thousand church members." In South Carolina Conference there are *twelve* missionary stations for the black population, attached to which there are about 2,300 members of the church.

"These Southern missions," says the *16th Am. Rep. of the Miss. Soc. of the M. E. Church*, "for the special benefit of the slaves, are generally HIGHLY FAVORED BY THE PLANTERS!" *See Rep. referred to, p. 15.*

There are also other missionary establishments for the blacks as those in Limestone, Centreville, &c. in Tennessee. Neither are these stations all the means the slaves have of being benefited. They have the word of God preached to them—explained and enforced upon them in other places. They are visited, and instructed by the faithful servants of Christ. In proof of this statement it is merely necessary to observe, that in the South Carolina Conference alone, there are *twenty-two thousand even hundred and thirty-seven black church members!*—And, supposing there are as many more in other churches, we have, for the territory included by that Conference, the number of *forty-five thousand* church members! All of whom are blacks. But as it is frequently said others do nothing, we will just quote one more extract from Mr. Bailey.

"In the Report of their meeting"—the abolitionists' meeting of Maine—held in Brunswick on the 28th of October 1835, I see the following preamble and resolution recorded as *adopted*, viz.—"Whereas it is often said by our opponents that slaves ought not to be liberated till they are properly educated, and whereas those opponents are often complaining that abolitionists have done nothing towards liberating the slaves, therefore,

RESOLVED, that we have *liberated* as many as our

opponents have *educated* and promise to continue to do the same." This is a noble resolution, and I am sure that, under the deliberate action of such men, it cannot be mere gasconade. No doubt some calculations were furnished by the mover to show that the assertion contained in the resolution was the truth. Although I feel confident that other statements might be substantiated to subvert the position, yet it is the *pledge* which is of principal importance; and coming from such men it is of great value. I can render them, perhaps, some important aid in fulfilment of this most benevolent pledge. I know of not less than five hundred slaves who are "properly educated" in my judgment for freedom, and I presume my opinion of their qualifications in this respect will be admitted. They have been educated by "opponents" of the abolitionists, and can be procured at a fair price, according to the laws of the country. Any agencies which may be appointed to effect the plan of the "A. S. Society of Maine" in the fair purchase of them for "liberation" shall have my aid, and I have no doubt the number may be, by a little enquiry, swelled to thousands, and constantly increased. Will you* please to announce this interesting information to that enterprising and benevolent society, in such a way as will enable them *immediately* to apply their resolution of it to the case." See *Ch. Mirror*, Dec. 10, 1835. Here, then, is a fair chance to ascertain which side *does* the work. The anti-abolitionists have *acted* as well as said; but where is the *performance* of the noble resolution adopted by the abolitionists?

"Perhaps the reader is aware how often we have been told that, to abolish the slave system, would lead to an amalgamation of the whites and blacks of this country!" p. 64. No, sir. The simple liberation of the slaves will *never* do it. It is the principle assumed by abolitionists that is objected to. For let me ask the candor of any one, if the blacks are perfect *equals*, and have the same perfect *rights* with white people, why may

* The Rev. Silas McKen of this State to whom this communication was addressed.

they not marry? Have they not as good right to marry white people, as white people have to marry among themselves? By what principle of honor, or of equity can you prevent the marriage of *equals*? If you cannot, will it not follow, that an amalgamation of black and white is justifiable?

“A SLAVE-HOLDING preacher! How would the idea strike the reader, to contemplate *Jesus Christ* as an *enslaver* of the human species? How would it sound in the ear of a Christian, at this age of the world, to speak of *St. Paul* as a “soul-driver,” or a “slave-holder?” p. 69. And yet our author tells us, that Joshua was the *slave* of Moses, Elisha was the *slave* of Elijah, and St. Paul, St. Peter and the other Apostles were the SLAVES OF JESUS CHRIST!! p. 87. We think the first epithets *sound* quite as well as the last; and, as to *sense*, there is not much difference between them.

“How does it seem to the reader, to think of *Jesus Christ*, set up at auction, *bought* and *sold*, *yoked with an iron collar*, *chained*, *scourged* and driven to work with a club or a cow-hide?” p. 76. Abominable!—What! a vile worm presume to take the sacred name of the great Jehovah which is too holy for man to utter, and which was withheld even from Moses, who had privileges granted him which no other man ever did, of talking with the Lord “face to face,” to make such a use of it! But it is not the name. It is the *person* of the Great God himself that is made to subserve such an unholy comparison! We must acknowledge, that a tremor of horror ran through our soul while we read the sentence. A professed Christian Minister! “Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon; lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph.”

“For this relation”—that of master and slave—“it must be remembered, allows and justifies the master, in doing what the word of God forbids, and it not only allows of such things, but it makes it the master’s duty to do them, and it imposes a penalty upon him if he leaves them undone!” p. 85.

It is somewhat unfortunate that Mr. S. did not state what this "penalty" is, which this relation imposes upon the master if he do not do many things contrary to the word of God. But as he has not informed us, we must drop that point and proceed.

The position assumed here is false, because it is based on the position that a *relation is stronger than a bond*. For instance—a person may have a piece of property that is his own—it may have been given him, entirely and forever. The relation this individual holds to that property, is a *perfect* relation—he has the *entire* control over it, he can swap it, sell it, apply it to his own use, or he may trade it away in any manner he pleases. But it so happens he spends his property for rum—gets drunk, and commits murder! Now did he violate his relation to that property by thus spending it? Certainly not. But did he do *right*? Every one will answer no. If the man did not violate his relation to his property in thus disposing of it; and if he did wrong in doing as he did, *why* was it? The reason was, because a relation which exists between a man and his property, can never supersede the force of the bonds under which the man may be laid. In other words, man is under the bonds of a moral law to his God, and notwithstanding he may have all the rights which a "relation" can confer, yet if he uses that relation in a manner different from the principles of christianity, he is not accused by that relation, but by the strong voice of moral obligation to his God. The absurdity of the position appears at once. A man has no more right to abuse his property of any kind, than he has to abuse his slave; for a *bond, a relation can never break*.

Our author seems to think that if the relation between master and slave is to be justified, then it follows "that they justify every thing which it authorizes the master to do." And among the things which this relation authorizes the master to do, our author enumerates the abuse of the slave, even to "death" itself. Consequently, if a man *wills*, he may get drunk, steal, assault his friend and commit murder! And all this be right ac-

cording to this doctrine. It must be admitted that man is made up of two parts "mind and matter." The body being merely the agent, through which the mind acts; or, it being the "servant" of the mind. The relation, therefore, which exists between the mind and the body must be as close as that between the master and the slave. If therefore the master is obliged to "scourge," "maim," or "kill" his slave, simply in virtue of that relation; so also is the man obliged to do the same things on himself; or get drunk, steal, &c. in virtue of the same relation with his mind or will. The fallacy of the whole lies in the fact, a *relation can never abrogate a bond*. Hence those who talk so much about doing away slavery, because a relation is not impugned when evil is done, "know not whereof they affirm." The very principle which would abolish slavery on this ground, would abolish every thing in the universe to which there is attached a relation which may sometimes be made an evil use of. Even the very book of inspiration itself would be banished from the earth. For we sustain a relation to that, and yet we abuse the use of it in virtue of that relation. Consequently that blessed Book is to be put forever beyond our reach!

We notice one more sentiment in the work before us, and then we have done.

"'But the laws will not suffer me to do this,—I must obey the laws.' What! must you obey the laws which contravene the laws of God!" p. 89.

But in all this who made thee a judge? "But if thou judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge." Who shall say, *when* the laws of the land "do contravene the laws of God." Will you be your own judge? Remember there are others in the world who think differently, perhaps, from you. There are those who suppose that the laws of the land do *not* "contravene the laws of God." Whom shall we follow in this case? We seem to have no standard. Which course is the best to follow, that of the law which has been made by the wisdom of "many heads," or shall we set down our own pompous *Unity*, and follow that?

A case occurred several years ago, where an individual put the principle intimated here into practice. He was a zealous Christian by profession, and was governed by what he supposed was the law and will of God concerning him—leaving others to do as they chose; but for one, he must do right. In his estimation, “the law” or will of God to him was, that he should go one cold “blustering” night, some distance, and plunge the fatal knife into the bosom of an unsuspecting female! which laid her dead upon the spot! And all this without any provocation, other than that the laws of the land should not be obeyed when they “contravened the will of God” to him!

When we read this sentiment, we were really surprised to think that any one, considering the wide door it throws open, could have the hardihood to divulge it. And then after all, endeavor to support it from scripture. What is this but telling man to disregard all laws but such as they like? Who does not see in this statement the very essence of rebellion? In fact would not the same principle denounce *all* law? Would it not set at defiance all magistrates and civil rulers? Just get the principle sanctioned that no laws are to be obeyed which contravene the law of God, and every man will put his own comment on *that*—just to suit himself. And the consequence will be that no law whatever will be obeyed. Every man will be a law to himself, and will do just as he pleases. Of such sentiments we cannot be too marked in our expression of disapprobation.

E R R A T A .

The reader is requested to make the following corrections with his pen or pencil, viz.

Page 6, 14th line from bottom for *different*, read deficient

" 10, 5th line from top, for *Deut. 23 : 26*, read *Deut. 23 : 20*

" 11, 14th line from top, for *beg usury*, read pay usury.

Next line, same page, for 35, 6, read, 35, 36. Also, for *Deut. 23 : 2*, read *23 : 20*.

Change the first word of the heading of Sec. 3, p. 12, from *Does*, into *Do*.

Page 24, line 13 from top, for *Gen. 17 : 21*, read *Gen. 17 : 27*.

" 30, line 19 from top, for *8 : 49, 20*, read *8 : 19, 20*.

" 36, line 4 from bottom, for *2—*, read *21*.

" 45, line 16 from bottom, *ch. 2 : 22*, read *ch. 2 : 23*.

" 48, line 6 from bottom, for *34 : 32*, read *34 : 12*.

" 61, line 9 from bottom, for *dictated to him*, read *dictated by him*

" 63, line 19, from top, dele *and*, after "just."

" 74, line 6, from bottom, per *A.* for *B.* and *B.* for *A.* In the 4th and 1st lines also, read *P.* for *A.* ; and *A.* for *B.* in the 3d line.


Page 77, line 8, from bottom, for *unexceptionable*, read *exceptionable*.

Page 82, line 9 from bottom, for *Gen. 2 : 41*, read *Gen. 2 : 21*.

Page 83, line 4 from bottom, for *Deut. 12 : 15*, read *21 : 15*.

11 22 23 24





**HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.**



APR 89



**N. MANCHESTER,
INDIANA 46962**

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 011 899 749 9